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Abstract
Abstract
Many bridge authorities around the world carry out bridge inspections at regular fixed 
intervals, without explicitly considering issues associated with risk. In large bridge 
networks, this policy could result in unnecessary commitment of resources on more 
reliable bridges, while some vulnerable bridges may reach risk levels that are 
substantially higher than what is normally acceptable. Risk-based inspection (RBI) 
planning has the potential to provide consistent risk levels in a cost effective manner and 
has been deployed successfully in other industry sectors. The aim of this project is to 
develop, implement and validate an RBI planning methodology for a large network of 
bridges.
In a large network, it is neither feasible nor necessary to analyse each bridge 
individually. Hence, a risk ranking strategy, which starts by subdividing the network into 
a number of groups and subgroups, is developed. A qualitative risk scoring system that 
serves as an initial screening tool for inspection prioritisation is then proposed. The 
inspection intervals for these bridge subgroups can be specified using condition index as 
the relevant performance indicator. A novel deterioration model using Dynamic 
Bayesian Network (DBN), which links individual bridge element conditions to bridge 
group condition and then establishes the change in bridge group condition with time, is 
developed to obtain the required condition index deterioration profiles. The 
implementation and applicability of the above models and methods have been 
demonstrated using sample data from the UK bridge stock.
The proposed risk ranking strategy helps to classify bridges according to the risk levels 
in a systematic and practical manner. The group risk scores are used to define 
appropriate inspection intervals, and a case study shows this method to be both accurate 
and realistic. In addition, the proposed risk ranking strategy is generic and can be 
adapted for other structure networks. Furthermore, it is shown how, in the absence of 
actual data, expert knowledge can be introduced in the DBN model and utilised to 
achieve a consistent evaluation of a bridge group condition. The DBN deterioration 
model is shown to be an efficient tool for ‘what-if analysis. The case studies revealed 
that the inspection intervals, which are currently fixed at 6 years, may be varied between 
2 to 18 years, without compromising the average risk in the network.
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Chapter 1 : Introduction
1.1 Background
Good transport infrastructure is vital in the socio-economic development of a country 
since it provides safe and efficient movement of people and goods. Around 15% of the 
total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of all European citizens is spent on the transport 
sector (BRIME, 2001). Bridges are an important element in the transport infrastructure 
to carry either road or railway traffic over obstacles. For instance, there are around
600,000 road bridges in the US (US Department of Transportation, 2006). Table 1.1 
provides details of railway and road bridges in some European countries.
Table 1.1. Number of bridges in some European countries (BRIME, 2001 & Bell, 
2004a)
Country No. of Road Bridges* No. of Railway bridges
Belgium 5,000 5,206
Finland 15,000 2,247
France 28,000 41,482
Germany 34,600 32,400
Great Britain 9,500 40,000
Spain 13,600 6,411
Sweden 15,000 3,620
* National road network bridges only
It is vital to maintain these bridges in a serviceable condition to provide reliable 
transport services to the end users. Increased loading and severe environmental 
conditions can cause deterioration and subsequently lead to failure of bridges.
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Inspections and maintenance measures are required to identify and to rectify or control 
any signs of deterioration or to improve the load carrying capacity of the bridges. The 
selection of these bridge management activities is often influenced by budgetary and 
political constraints. Hence, a challenging task for a bridge authority is to ensure the 
safety of the users by taking necessary steps to monitor and control the deterioration and 
to improve or maintain the reliability of the transport network, while complying with 
budgetary and political constraints.
Nowadays, most bridge authorities around the globe employ some form of computerized 
Bridge Management System (BMS) to assist with this decision making process. BMS is 
a tool that helps to identify and optimize the bridge management activities, which are 
consistent with regulatory requirements, long-term objectives and budget constraints 
(BRIME, 2001). The ultimate objective of a BMS is to keep the bridge network safe and 
functional with optimal cost. A schematic diagram of a typical BMS is illustrated in 
Figure 1.1.
Prediction of 
Deterioration
Inspection Assessment
Maintenance
Options
Optimization Constraints
Figure 1.1. Schematic diagram of a typical BMS (BRIME, 2001)
In any BMS, inspections play a key role in collecting information on condition and 
performance of bridges. This information is then used to plan maintenance activities. At 
present, almost all bridge owners and managers in the UK, i.e. Network Rail, Highways 
Agency and local authorities, carry out bridge inspections at regular fixed intervals. This 
strategy does not explicitly take into account various factors associated with the safety
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and costs. These include, but are not limited to, bridge type, age, mode of deterioration, 
environmental conditions, costs of inspection, failure, repair and traffic delay and traffic 
management issues. Hence, this strategy will not be able to provide consistent level of 
safety across the network in a cost-efficient manner.
For instance, Britain’s railway network consists of around 40,000 bridges, owned and 
maintained by Network Rail. This includes bridges carrying railway traffic (Under-line 
bridges) and bridges carrying roads that pass over railway lines (Over-line bridges). 
According to the Network Rail standard for bridge inspections -  NR/SP/CIV/017, 
(Network Rail, 2004a), each bridge undergoes an annual inspection and a detailed 
inspection every six years. This code permits to alter the detailed inspection interval of 
an individual structure provided that a structure specific risk assessment is performed by 
the respective structure manager. However, performing such structure specific analysis 
and having structure specific inspection regimes will result in additional organisational 
difficulties. Hitherto, this specification has been rarely applied. Introduction of risk- 
based approaches in the selection of inspection regimes at a network level can lead to 
consistent safety levels within the network in a cost effective manner.
1.2 Overview of the Project
This project has been carried out to develop a strategy for risk-based inspection (RBI) 
planning for large bridge networks, with particular emphasis and attention given to the 
Network Rail stock. Structure specific analyses are neither feasible nor advisable when 
considering such a large network which consists of several thousand bridges. Hence, the 
first phase of the project has focused on the classification of a network into a small 
number of bridge groups with comparable risk.
A systematic and practical risk ranking strategy has been developed. The network is 
categorised into six main groups considering bridge type and age variations. Subgroups 
are developed for each of these main groups by considering other factors that affect risk. 
A qualitative risk scoring system is introduced to rank these subgroups. The case studies 
performed using Network Rail bridge data confirmed that the proposed method can 
identify bridge conditions correctly. Although the case study concentrated on the
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Network Rail bridge stock, the methodology is generic and can be easily modified to fit 
any other network of structures.
The aforementioned risk ranking strategy incorporates time invariant risk factors only. 
However, the time varying nature of risk also needs to be taken into account in
study as a criterion for the specification of appropriate inspection intervals. A bridge 
group condition index deterioration model is developed using Dynamic Bayesian 
Networks (DBN) to aid in this regard. This model serves as a system model by 
combining minor element conditions into a bridge group condition level. The time 
varying condition of the bridge group is evaluated through changes in minor element 
conditions. A case study, using Network Rail bridge data, showed good agreement 
between DBN model results and actual data. One important characteristic of this model 
is that it can utilize expert knowledge probabilistically, in the absence of real data. 
Although in deriving time variations for the condition a Markov property has been 
assumed in the case study, any other probabilistic or deterministic relationship can also 
be used.
A conceptual model to specify the optimum inspection intervals for the bridge sub 
groups formed through the risk ranking strategy is introduced in the final phase of the 
project. This method will help to maintain a consistent level of risk across the network. 
The practical use of this model is demonstrated through case studies. Sensitivity studies 
have been performed to identify the effects of various factors used in the inspection 
selection methodology.
1.3 Objectives and Scope of the Project
1.3.1 Objectives
The overall aim of this project is to develop a risk-based inspection planning 
methodology for a large bridge network. This can help to optimize the use of inspection 
resources in a cost effective and safety critical way, while maintaining a consistent 
overall risk at a network level. The main objectives of the project include;
specifying inspections. Condition deterioration at a bridge group level is also used in this
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> Develop criteria for grouping of bridges into families based on their relative risk 
levels, which can be treated in a similar fashion from the point of view of inspection 
optimization.
>  Develop a deterioration model which captures condition deterioration of bridges at 
group and network level.
>  Develop a risk-based framework that can optimize inspection intervals for bridge 
groups through the use of the deterioration model.
1.3.2 Scope of the Project
The scope of the project has been limited to altering the intervals of detailed inspections 
only, while having an annual visual inspection. This ensures that if any defects are 
identified for specific bridges, these will be subjected to special or additional detailed 
inspections. In addition, bridges with significant historical importance (Golden Assets) 
and bridges that are identified susceptible to scour are excluded from the RBI planning.
Although the RBI methodology developed in this project is applicable to any structure 
networks, primary focus during the case studies has been on the Network Rail bridge 
stock data. Hence, a description about the relevant Network Rail bridge management 
practice including the inspection methods, condition marking system and maintenance 
policies, is presented in Appendix A.
1.4 Organization of the Thesis
Chapter 2 presents an introduction to RBI and a review of various techniques used in 
RBI planning, the benefits of RBI and a summary of previous industrial applications of 
RBI.
Masonry arch bridges have been the focus of all case studies in this project. Hence, 
deterioration mechanisms associated with these bridges and their modelling techniques 
are discussed in Chapter 3.
One of the key elements that needs to be considered in an RBI planning methodology is 
the deterioration profile with time. In this project, a new method to model the condition
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deterioration of bridges using Dynamic Bayesian Networks (DBN) is developed. Hence, 
the underlying theory, and a brief summary of previous applications, of Bayesian 
networks are highlighted in Chapter 4.
Chapter 5 presents a newly developed risk ranking strategy for a network of bridges 
developed in this project. This method can be used to screen bridges according to their 
relative risk levels for inspection and maintenance prioritisation. A case study on the 
Network Rail bridge stock is also presented.
The key steps in the development of a bridge group deterioration model using DBN and 
sensitivity studies on the applicability of the model are presented in chapter 6.
Chapter 7 contains details about the proposed RBI planning method. Case studies for the 
specification of inspection intervals and sensitivity analyses to emphasize the potential 
effects of various factors are also presented.
Finally, the important findings of the study are summarised in chapter 8. Possible 
refinements and areas for further research are also highlighted.
UNIVERSITY OF
\a  SURREY
6
Chapter 2 Risk-Based Inspection
Chapter 2: Risk-Based Inspection
2.1 Introduction
A risk-based inspection (RBI) methodology can be useful in rationalising inspection of 
structures. It has the potential to maintain a consistent risk level thus significantly 
improving safety and cost benefits. The underlying philosophy of RBI is to ensure that 
high risk structures receive more frequent inspections than low risk structures. The UK 
Health and Safety Executive (HSE, 2001a) defines RBI as ‘the planning of inspections 
on the basis of the information obtained from the risk analysis of a system’. According 
to American Bureau of Shipping (ABS, 2003), RBI refers to the applications of risk 
assessment and risk management techniques during the various stages of an inspection 
procedure (planning, inspecting, documentation and data analysis), in order to direct the 
inspection resources to areas of high risk. Straub and Faber (2005) refer to RBI as ‘a 
decision analysis, aiming at the identification of the optimal inspection and maintenance 
strategies for deteriorating structures’. In general, a risk-based inspection plan of a 
system should seek to address the following; where, what, when and how to inspect? 
(Faber, 2002). In this chapter, the objectives, advantages and limitations of RBI, and its 
industrial applications are outlined, along with a critique on the suitability of these 
methods for the present study.
2.1.1 Risk
A key step in any RBI planning methodology is the evaluation of risk associated with 
the system. In generic terms, HSE (1992) describes risk as the ‘chance that something 
happening and its consequences’. Mathematically, it is defined as a function of the 
probability of failure and the consequences of failure. Typically, it is taken as the 
product of the two as given by Equation 2.1 (ASME, 1991).
Risk = PfCf (2.1)
Where, Pf = Probability of failure and Cf = Consequence of failure
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2.1.2 Tolerability of Risk
Any activity has a certain amount of associated risk. The willingness to live with some 
risk in order to accomplish some benefits, coupled with a belief that the risk is properly 
controlled, is termed as Tolerability\ Tolerable risk is not a negligible risk. It needs to 
be kept under review and to be reduced as low as reasonably practical (HSE, 1992). 
Authorities around the globe, such as the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE), try to 
develop regulations to achieve this goal. Figure 2.1 from HSE (1992) illustrates a
categorization of risk, to aid risk management.
UNACCEPTABLE
REGION
TOLERABLE
REGION
bO
BROADLY
ACCEPTABLE
REGION
Negligible Risk
Figure 2.1. Risk management framework (HSE, 1992)
Activities with risk in unacceptable regions are not permitted except in extreme 
situations, such as war times. Risk in the broadly acceptable region is considered to be 
insignificant and risk mitigating actions are not normally considered. The region of 
interest is the tolerable risk region, in which risk control measures are employed to keep 
the risk As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). The limits between the three 
regions are normally set by regulators or the company management, in the interest of the
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general public or work force, based on judgements in comparison with other risks an 
individual or society face (HSE, 1992).
2.1.3 RBI: A Risk Management Tool
Every industry has to deal with certain amount of risk, hence careful risk management is 
necessary to ensure safety and functionality of assets and facilities. RBI is one of the risk 
management tools, which has been used by various sectors to keep the risk within a 
tolerable limit (ABS, 2003).
Typically, an RBI plan will have one or more of the following objectives (API, 2000):
• Capability to define and measure risk
• Help to review safety, environmental and economical impacts in an effective manner
• Systematically reduce the likelihood of failure with the effective use of inspection
facilities
• Help to plan risk mitigation activities by identifying the areas of high consequences.
The key benefits achievable through the use of an RBI methodology are (HSE, 2001b; 
ABS, 2003);
• Risk can be managed to a consistent and acceptable level
• Inspection efforts can be focused onto most critical areas
• Help to identify the most appropriate inspection methods
• Optimization of the inspection resources, i.e. inspection time, cost, etc.
• Amount of reactive repairs could be reduced.
Some limitations of RBI include (ABS, 2003);
• The need for considerable data to establish the probability and consequences of 
failures
® Initial planning will require more time and analytical efforts than usual practice.
Despite these limitations, RBI has proved to be an efficient risk management tool 
through applications in various industries such as aeronautical, offshore, refinery, etc. 
Several authorities, including the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME, 
1991), the American Petroleum Institute (API, 2000), the UK Health and Safety
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Executive (HSE, 2001a) and the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS, 2003) have 
published guidelines to aid with RBI planning.
2.1.4 Framework for RBI Planning
No hard and fast rules are found in the literature for RBI planning. Any method that can 
evaluate risk and facilitate the development of an inspection plan to maintain a tolerable 
level of risk is considered acceptable (ABS, 2003). The authorities of certain industries 
have provided guiding principles to facilitate the RBI planning process. For example, 
the following four steps are recommended during the development of RBI planning for 
the process industry (ASME, 1991).
A. System Definition: Collect information about the elements of a system and the links 
between the elements and define the system boundary.
B. Qualitative risk assessment: Identify possible failure modes, causes and 
consequences and perform an initial ranking of elements.
C. Quantitative risk analysis: Evaluate the probability of failure and consequence of 
failure and calculate the risk.
D. Development of inspection plan: Develop the initial inspection plan based on the risk 
analysis and update it as new information is gathered from inspections.
Generally, design details, operational history, inspection and maintenance records, 
failure consequences such as failure cost, repair cost, etc. and details of possible risk 
mitigation methods are helpful in evaluating risk quantitatively. However, these details 
may not be generally available. In these cases, expert judgement could be utilized to 
estimate the risk qualitatively (HSE, 2001a). RBI can be broadly categorised into 
quantitative or qualitative approach based on the risk estimation method.
Several factors, including the significance of the system under consideration, the 
amount/severity of failure consequences, inspection methods and levels of hierarchy 
such as element, structure, group, and network levels, influence the selection of the 
appropriate RBI approach. Normally, a quantitative approach is selected when the 
consequences of failures are higher and RBI planning is carried out at structure or 
element specific level. Quantitative and often expensive inspection techniques, such as
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magnetic particle inspection, are considered in this approach. When the failure 
consequences are low and/or the assets are considered at a higher level of hierarchy 
(group/network level), qualitative RBI is used. In these cases, the inspection method is 
typically visual. The two approaches can be merged in developing further RBI planning 
methodologies.
2.2 Quantitative RBI Planning
2.2.1 Introduction and Methodology
In this approach, structural reliability analysis is typically carried out to quantify the 
failure probability. Deterioration models (e.g. fatigue crack growth model, corrosion 
initiation model, etc.) and structure specific data (material properties, structural 
characteristics, loading, etc.) are the essential prerequisites for this analysis. The 
consequences are included either directly or indirectly and the inspection plan could be a 
simplified plan or an optimized plan depending on the way in which the consequences 
are addressed.
In a simplified inspection plan, the consequences are taken into account when defining 
an appropriate target value for a structure/element and an inspection is recommended if 
the structure/element reaches this target value. Significance of the structure/element, 
redundancy in the structure, estimated costs of failures, repairs, etc. can be considered in 
specifying the target value (e.g. Onoufriou, 1999).
In some other cases, the consequences are taken as a sum of the costs of failure, 
inspection and repair or rebuilding, and may also include indirect costs i.e., traffic delay 
costs, subsequent loss of service, etc. The optimal inspection strategy is then selected by 
formulating an optimization problem involving these costs and the target reliability so 
that a required safety level is maintained with minimal whole life cost, i.e. total net 
present cost over the life of an asset (e.g. Sorensen, 1993). The important steps in the 
methodology are described below.
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2.2.2 Structural Reliability Analysis
One of the important elements of the quantitative approach* which is also common for 
both the simplified and optimised inspection plans, is the use of structural reliability 
analysis. Generally, variables related to a structure are classified into two groups; load 
(S) and resistance (R), both of which are random in nature due to associated 
uncertainties. Failure occurs when the load exceeds the resistance. Assuming S and R 
are statistically independent continuous random variables, the failure probability Pf can 
be estimated using Equation 2.2 (Nowak and Collins, 2000).
Pf = P(M < 0) (2.2)
Where, M is the safety margin: M = R-S 
Solving this equation for practical problems may be difficult. Therefore, it is often 
solved by making further assumptions. For instance, when R and S are statistically 
independent normally distributed random variables, the failure probability is given by 
Equation 2.3.
P f= 0(-P ) (2.3)
Where, O is the standard normal distribution function and p is the reliability index,
defined as,
jS= (2.4)
Where, jir, ps -  Mean values of resistance and load variables respectively
or, os -  Standard deviation of resistance and load variables respectively
In a real world situation, both load and resistance vary with time, hence, the failure 
probability (or reliability) will also vary with time. The change in structural reliability 
with time can be established using Equation 2.4, by expressing R and S as functions of 
time.
Hence, the first step in the quantitative RBI planning is the identification of suitable time 
varying functions to R and S. For instance, gust loading for aircrafts (Yang and Trapp, 
1974) and wave loading for offshore structures (Faber et al., 1996) were considered to 
be the dominant loads. The change in resistance with time is expressed through material
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specific deterioration models. For example, fatigue (e.g. Sorensen, 1992) in steel 
structures and corrosion reinforcement in concrete structures (e.g. Mori and Ellingwood, 
1994) were modelled through empirical formulae and the changes in R and hence in the 
reliability with time were established (e.g. Figure 2.2) and used for RBI planning.
In the following sub sections the specific characteristics of the simplified and optimized 
inspection plans are described.
2.2.3 Simplified Inspection Plan
In a simplified inspection plan, an inspection is recommended when the reliability-time 
profile reaches a predefined target reliability index. In Figure 2.2, the reliability curve 
reaches the target reliability at time Ti, hence, an inspection will be required at Ti.
Target p
Time
Figure 2.2. Selection of inspection intervals in a simplified plan (Sorensen, 1992)
An important step in this method is the specification of a suitable target value. 
Generally, code recommendations, structural redundancy, mode of failure and possible 
consequences are considered in the selection of target reliability. Two different target 
reliabilities can be selected for two identical structures in terms of failure probabilities, 
but with different consequences. Even for one structure, different target reliabilities can 
be selected considering different failure modes and corresponding consequences. For 
instance, Bhattacharya et al. (2001) summarised the target failure probabilities 
recommended by Det Norske Veritas (DNV) for offshore structures (Table 2.1).
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It can be observed from Table 2.1 that the target reliability can be varied considering the 
consequences, hence, the inspection intervals can also be varied accordingly. Onoufriou
(1999) demonstrated through a sensitivity analysis that the inspection intervals of an 
offshore floating structure could be varied from 1 to 11 years by changing the target 
reliabilities from 5.4 to 2.4. This example illustrates the importance of target reliability 
in the selection of inspection intervals.
Table 2.1. DNV recommended annual target reliabilities (Bhattacharya et al., 
2001)
Redundancy in 
the Structure
Failure Type Target Failure Probability Pf
Low Consequences High Consequences
Redundant - 10"3 (3.09) lO-4 (3.71)
Non-redundant Ductile IQ-4 (3.71) 103 (4.25)
Non-redundant Brittle 10"5 (4.25) 1 O'6 (4.75)
* Corresponding reliability indices, p, are given in parentheses.
In the simplified plan, consequences are usually qualitatively assessed. Thus, the target 
reliabilities are usually selected conservatively to minimise the effects of any 
underestimations. As a result, although required level of safety is achieved in the 
simplified inspection plan, it may not fulfil the other objective of an RBI planning, i.e. 
the cost effectiveness. In an optimal inspection plan this conservatism can be reduced by 
quantitatively assessing the consequences. However, this will increase the computational 
effort. Hence, a simplified inspection plan is preferred when inspection costs are not 
significant.
2.2.4 Optimal Inspection Plan
If the inspection resources are expensive or limited, consequences of failure are 
considered in terms of monetary values and explicitly included in specifying inspection 
intervals. Typically, event tree diagrams with two options (no repair and a repair) 
following an inspection are used to aid the calculations. An example of a relevant event 
tree is shown in Figure 2.3. Here, ‘V and ‘0’ represent repair and no repair options
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respectively. The total number of options available at the ith inspection is 21, and half of 
them (21'1) are repair options.
Branch, B1 
Branch, B2
I 
I
Branch, Bj
Branch, B2n
 ►
t
Figure 2.3. An example event tree for inspection selection (Thoft-Christensen &
Sorensen, 1987)
An optimization problem with an objective function of minimizing total expected costs 
was formulated by Thoft-Christensen and Sorensen (1987) (Equation 2.5). In this study, 
constraints were defined through a target reliability index and the life time of the 
structure.
m inC T = 2 C , ( q i) + f ; C RrjP(Bj) +  ^ C RP(F(TJ)
i=l j=l i=l
Such that, j8(T,) > ^  i = 1 ,2 ,............. , n, n +1 (2.5)
Ê Ti - T
i= i '
Where, CT = Total Cost, Ci(qi) = Inspection cost as a function of inspection efficiency qj, 
CR = Repair cost, r, = Number of repairs in branch j, CF = Failure costs, P(Ti) = 
Reliability index at Ti, pmin = Target reliability, T = Expected life time of the structure 
and n = Total number of inspections in T.
A detailed methodology for inspection selection using this approach can be found in 
Thoft-Christensen and Sorensen (1987). In the following section, industrial applications
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of the quantitative methods in different sectors are reviewed. Bridge related studies are 
discussed separately in Section 2.4.
2.2.5 A Brief Review of Applications
Various industries with safety critical assets and high consequences of failures have 
utilized the quantitative RBI techniques since early 1970s. Expensive inspection 
techniques are used and the inspection scheduling is typically carried out at element or 
structure specific levels. Examples for these applications can be found in aeronautical 
(e.g. Yang and Tang, 1974), offshore (e.g. Faber et al., 1996, Onoufriou, 1999, Sorensen 
and Faber, 2001) and nuclear (e.g. Vinod et al., 2004) industries.
The use of quantitative risk, evaluated with the help reliability techniques and cost 
considerations, for inspection planning appears to have been founded in the aeronautical 
industry. Yang and Trapp (1974) found that in a fleet consisting of several aircrafts, the 
probability of failure of a fatigue sensitive element tends to decrease with an increase in 
the number of inspections, provided that a repair is performed if a defect is identified 
during an inspection. The gust loading was obtained from a design load spectrum and 
the strength reduction due to fatigue cracks was calculated using a fracture mechanics 
approach.
Subsequently, Yang and Trapp (1975) formulated an optimization problem with an 
objective function of minimizing the inspection and failure costs, whilst maintaining a 
required safety level. From this analysis they produced curves showing the relative cost 
(= total cost/failure cost) and probability of failure with the number of inspections for 
(Figure 2.4). Optimum number of inspections was obtained from these curves depending 
on the target probability of failure.
Although the above studies introduced cost optimization into inspection planning, they 
were limited to constant inspection intervals. Deodatis et al. (1992) utilised Bayesian 
updating techniques to update the failure probabilities based on the inspection findings. 
Having more frequent inspections towards the latter part compared to the early stages of 
the life time of an aircraft was found to be the most cost efficient solution.
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Figure 2.4. Relative cost and Pf vs. number of inspections (Yang and Trapp,1975)
Luo and Orisamolu (1998) proposed the use of an optimisation technique called genetic 
algorithm to solve the optimization problem involving inspection costs and target 
reliability. Different inspection methods with variations in inspection cost and 
probability of detection were considered and the most cost effective solutions were 
identified. One advantage of using genetic algorithms is that they produce a number of 
possible solutions as opposed to a single solution. Hence, different inspection plans, 
which all satisfy the required safety and cost constraints, can be compared. For instance, 
possibilities using different inspection techniques at different stages of the life time were 
also considered in this study. The most suitable plan may be adopted depending on other 
practical issues such as managerial difficulties.
The offshore industry is another sector where the quantitative RBI planning has been 
successfully applied to manage risk. Expensive inspections, the majority of which are 
underwater, are needed for offshore structures and the application of RBI techniques 
resulted in significant cost savings. Many studies, for example, Thoft-Christensen and 
Sorensen (1987), and Sorensen (1992), have been devoted to the optimised inspection 
planning of offshore structures. The objective in this case was to identify critical 
locations on the structures and to inspect these locations more frequently. Initially, the
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fatigue critical elements (hot spots) in a structure were identified using pushover 
analysis. Probabilistic fatigue analyses were then performed for those hot spots to 
establish the change in reliability index with time. Inspection intervals were selected 
using an optimization problem involving the inspection, repair and failure costs 
(PROBAN, 1989). In these studies, updating with inspection information has also been 
considered and non-periodic inspections were specified.
Some other studies (e.g. Onoufriou, 1999) built on the simplified inspection plan and 
inspection intervals were selected depending on the selected target values without 
considering the costs explicitly. However, different inspection strategies (eg. the 
possibility of raising the joints of floating structures for inspection to avoid underwater 
inspection) were taken into account by Onoufriou (1999).
Straub and Faber (2006) proposed the use of a generic approach to minimize the 
computational effort. Some representative hotspots of the structure were analysed 
instead of considering all the hotspots in a structure and the results were saved in a 
database. The inspection intervals for specific hotspots can then be obtained by 
interpolating according to their characteristics. However, this approach requires data for 
fatigue analysis of the generic hotspots.
The RBI planning in the aforementioned studies were mainly carried out at specific 
element level. A group of elements have been considered by Vinod et al. (2004) in the 
development of a RBI plan of feeders in a pressurised heavy water reactor. Wall 
thinning due to erosion-corrosion was taken as the main failure mechanism of feeders 
and the failure probabilities were calculated using a Markov model. Transition 
probabilities between the states in the Markov model were calculated with the aid of an 
empirical formula. Inspectors were exposed to radiation since inspections were carried 
out while the water reactor was in operation. Hence, the consequences were estimated 
based on inspector exposure time and inspections cost. Optimum inspection intervals 
were obtained by solving an optimization problem which minimized the failure of 
feeders subject to constraints related to exposure time and costs using genetic 
algorithms.
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As it can be seen from the above examples, a detailed structural reliability analysis, 
which helps to predict the change in the reliability of structure over time, is the key 
element in this approach. Suitable deterioration models and specific data such as 
structural details, material data, loading are necessary to perform this analysis. 
Consequences can be implicitly incorporated through the selection of a target reliability 
index or explicitly considered by means of inspection, repair and failure costs.
2.3 Qualitative Inspection Planning Approach
2.3.1 Introduction and Methodology
More rigorous analytical efforts to evaluate the risk may not be feasible or indeed 
necessary when planning inspections at global level (i.e. group or network of structures). 
In these cases, likelihood and consequences of failures are assessed qualitatively, and 
typically represented in a tabular form known as ‘risk matrix'. Qualitative expressions, 
such as low, medium and high, are used in the classification. Generally, expert 
judgements are utilized to make these classifications (HSE, 2001a). An example risk 
matrix is presented in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2. An example risk matrix (ASME, 1991)
Likelihood of 
Failure
Consequence of Failure
Low Medium High
Low Very Low Moderate Medium
Medium Moderate Medium High
High Medium High Very High
In some applications, numerical scores are assigned to both probability and 
consequences of failure, and risk can be expressed as the product of these scores. As an 
example, the above risk matrix is presented on a numerical scale in Table 2.3. One 
advantage of using a numerical scale is that the difference between the risks can be 
compared quantitatively, although on the assumed scales. Different scales for probability
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of failure and consequence of failure can be used if it is required to give different 
weightings (HSE, 2001a).
Table 2.3. An example numerical risk matrix
Likelihood of 
Failure
Consequence of Failure
1 (Low) 2 (Medium) 3 (High)
1 (Low) 1 2 3
2 (Medium) 2 4 6
3 (High) 3 6 9
When likelihood and consequences are estimated numerically, risk may be presented as 
a probability/consequence plot, instead of a table. An example risk plot is illustrated in 
Figure 2.5.
High
Risk
Medium
Risk
Low
Risk
Consequences of Failure
Figure 2.5. An example risk plot (ASME, 1991)
As shown in this risk plot, risk can be classified into different categories by contours 
representing risk. The selection of the threshold risk level depends on several factors, 
such as cost considerations, required safety level, etc.
Structures that are identified as having high risk from the risk matrix/risk plot need more
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attention. Hence, these will be subjected to more frequent inspections, while extending 
the inspection intervals of the low risk items (HSE, 2001a).
The process industry (e.g. Sweet et ah, 2000, Conley, 2005) has utilized widely 
qualitative approaches for planning of inspections. As an example, the risk matrix used. 
by (Coley, 2005) is given in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4. An example risk matrix from process industry (Conley, 2005)
Likelihood Consequences
Insignificant Minor Major Catastrophic
Frequent ALARP ALARP Intolerable Intolerable
Reasonably Probable ALARP ALARP ALARP Intolerable
Remote Negligible ALARP ALARP ALARP
Extremely Remote Negligible Negligible ALARP ALARP
In this example, immediate risk mitigation activities, such as repair or replacement, are 
recommended for equipments with ‘intolerable’ risk. Equipments in the ‘ALARP’ 
region are subjected to more inspections, than the equipments in ‘negligible’ region, to 
maintain a consistent risk level.
The typical procedure for qualitative RBI planning can be illustrated schematically as 
shown in Figure 2.6 and the important steps are described in the following sub-sections.
2.3.1.1 Estimation of the likelihood of failure
Identification of possible defects that could affect the structural integrity is an important 
element in the likelihood estimation. Potential deterioration mechanisms causing the 
defects and the rate at which structures deteriorate have to be estimated from available 
design details, past inspection data, etc. If past inspection details of the structure are not 
available, ‘generic’ details from similar structures, combined with expert opinion could 
be utilized in the estimation process (ABS, 2003).
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Consequence Rating
Remaining
Life
Deterioration
Cost Constraints
Effects on 
Humans
Environmental
Aspects
Financial
Aspects
Past
Performance
Industry
Guidelines
Operating
History
Safety
Constraints
Risk Matrix
Target Risk Level
Inspection Intervals
Prioritise the High Risk 
Items
Available Data Likelihood Rating
Figure 2.6. Inspection optimization using risk matrix (HSE, 2001a)
2.3.1.2 Estimation of the consequence of failure
Failure of an infrastructure facility may result in several consequences such as, loss of 
human lives or injuries, repair or replacement costs, loss of income, indirect costs, 
environmental impacts, political impacts, etc. However, assessing all the consequences 
is a difficult task, and only a qualitative assessment is carried out in most practical 
situations. Typically, casualties, economic loss and environmental impacts are taken as 
indicators for the failure consequences (ABS, 2003). The consequences from various 
categories can be weighted according to their importance to obtain a consequence score. 
For example, 60%, 30% and 10% weightings for safety, environmental and economic 
consequences were used to obtain a consequence score by Nelson (2003) in a study on 
offshore platforms.
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2.3.1.3 Formation of the risk matrix
A risk matrix can be derived by combining the likelihood and consequence estimates. As 
discussed earlier, risk can be represented in a tabular form or in a 
likelihood/consequence plot.
2.3.1.4 Selection of the target risk levels
Different target risk levels, such as, constant probability of failure, constant 
consequence, constant risk, or risk contours can be considered depending on the safety 
and cost constraints as shown in Figure 2.7.
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Figure 2.7. Various target levels for risk ranking (ASME, 1991)
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If all elements in a system have the same consequences of failure, then a target level 
could be based only on probability of failure as illustrated in case I. On the other hand, if 
the failure probabilities are the same, then the ranking could be based on the 
consequences (Case II). In case III, constant risk target levels are considered, i.e. the 
product of the probability and consequences of failure remains constant.
Different combinations of likelihood and consequence can be used in case IV. For 
instance, up to a certain value of consequence the target could be based on the failure 
probability (i.e. similar to case I), and then it could be based on the consequences 
irrespective of likelihood (i.e. similar to case II).
2.3.1.5 Selection of inspection intervals
In the qualitative approach, the following methods are used to identify the inspection 
intervals (HSE, 2001a).
• From historical experience: The details about the system under consideration such 
as, the elements prone to failure, number of failures during the life time, repairs, 
maintenances, etc. are useful in determining the time of inspection. Details from 
similar systems can also be used, if no direct details are available.
• Using industry guidelines: Some industries (e.g. process industry) specify the timing 
of maximum inspection intervals.
• Based on the estimations about the remaining life: Inspection intervals are generally 
specified as a percentage of the estimated remaining life.
Usually, a combination of the above methods can also be followed. For instance, API
(2000) recommends that the maximum inspection interval for piping systems in the 
process industry should not exceed 50% of the estimated remaining life provided that the 
asset has sufficient remaining life. Previous history and expert knowledge will be 
required for the estimation of remaining life. Hence, the inspection intervals specified in 
this case would consider all three options.
If no data is available and the predictions are made entirely from expert judgements, 
then the initial inspection intervals are specified in a conservative manner. A review of
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risk ranking can be carried out based on the inspection findings and subsequent intervals 
may be updated based on the inspection outcomes (ABS, 2003).
2.3.2 A Brief Review of Applications
The process industry is one of the main users of the qualitative RBI approach for 
inspection scheduling. For instance, HSE (2001a) provides guidelines for RBI planning 
of pressure equipment and systems.. In addition, there are software packages such as 
‘DNV ORBIT Onshore’, to facilitate the uptake of RBI planning easy.
Sweet et al. (2000) developed a risk matrix using the DNV software to assist in planning 
the inspections for an ammonia plant. The plant consisted of 336 items of equipment 
such as pressures vessels, exchangers, air coolers and piping items. Likelihoods of 
failures were estimated from the primary deterioration mechanisms identified for each 
equipment. Internal thinning, atmospheric corrosion, corrosion under insulation, high 
temperature hydrogen attack and creep were found to be the most common deterioration 
mechanisms. Consequences of failures were estimated by considering the environmental 
and economical impacts, in the event of leak/rapture from the plant. Details about fluid 
type, toxicity, available amount for release, etc., were used for the consequence 
estimation. The probability of failure and the consequence of failure were each classified 
into five categories, and a risk matrix consisting of 25 elements was developed. High 
risk items were subjected to more frequent inspection, while allowing an increase in the 
inspection interval for the low risk items. The anticipated savings from the 
implementation of RBI on the annual maintenance and inspection budget was around 
5%.
Conley (2005) suggested the use of numerical values in the risk matrix. The likelihood 
of failure was classified into five categories [(<0.0002), (0.0002 -  0.002), (0.002 -  0.01), 
(0.01 -  0.1), (>0.1) failure events/year]. Potential leak affected area was used to classify 
the consequences of failure. Five ranges of affected area [(0 -  100), (100 -  1000), (1000 
-  3000), (3000 -  10,000), (>10,000) ft2] were used as the criteria for consequence rating. 
Although these are qualitative rankings based on expert judgement, they can be of help 
in understanding (and possibly visualising) risk.
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Chang et al. (2005) proposed a method for scheduling inspection intervals for a refinery 
piping system, based on a risk matrix and remaining life estimations.
NID = t|CRl (2.6)
Where, NID = Next inspection date of individual pipes
rj = Inspection effectiveness ratio (0-1)
C = Confidence rating (0-1 based on risk ranking) of individual pipes
Rl = Remaining life (Years) of individual pipes
The confidence rating C was identified from the risk analysis. A score of less than 0.5 
was assigned to higher risk pipes and vice versa. Inspection effectiveness ratio reflected 
the inspection method and inspector’s ability. Higher inspection effectiveness was 
assigned a score of 1. Remaining lives of the pipes were estimated based on the current 
conditions, and past performance. An upper limit (50% of the RL) set by the API (2000) 
was also introduced. This study demonstrates the use of remaining life estimation as a 
criterion in the inspection selection. However, for two pipes with the same risk level 
(e.g. C = 0.5), one with a Rl of ten years and the other with one year, the inspection 
intervals would be 3 months and 2.5 years, if the rj is assumed to be 0.5. Specifying so 
different inspection intervals for items with same risk may not be reasonable. This 
emphasises the point that the remaining life should also be included in the risk ranking, 
i.e. C should be a function of the remaining life.
HSE (2001b) developed a qualitative RBI plan for offshore plants subjected to 
corrosion. Different grades are allocated considering the availability of previous 
inspection records and the expected deterioration rates, in addition to the risk ranking 
from a risk matrix. For instance, when there are no previous records available or the rate 
of deterioration is rapid or unpredictable, then the element is assigned with a ‘Grade O’, 
whereas, if three or more inspection records are available and the deterioration rate is 
low or negligible deterioration rate a ‘Grade 3’ is assigned. ‘Grades’ 1 and 2 are defined 
in between the two extremes. The inspection intervals are then specified for different 
combinations of risk ratings and criticality ratings. A review of the risk ratings after an 
inspection is also recommended to ensure that the inspection findings are incorporated 
into future inspection schedules. Although these ‘Grades’ are used as an additional
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safety-related criterion, it is also possible to include them in the risk matrix, since the 
availability of past data and expected deterioration rate would influence the likelihood of 
failure.
As is evident from the above examples, the qualitative RBI planning involves a degree 
of expert judgements. Although these judgements are based on specific knowledge about 
the assets under consideration, which are very useful in the absence of actual data, they 
may be subjected to uncertainties associated with human error, bias, etc. Even the data 
itself may also be subjected to uncertainties due to experimental errors, etc. Hence, it is 
desirable to treat such judgements and data probabilistically to compensate for their 
uncertainty and subjectivity (Sundararajan, 1991). The use of Bayesian Belief Network 
(BBN) in this context was examined by Hahn et al. (2002) for RBI planning of sewer 
networks (Figure 2.8).
N e e d  to  In sp e c t
: L ikelihood of Failu re C o n s e q u e n c e  o f F a ilu re  ,
Overall O p era tionalOverall S tructural S o c io -E conom ic:
S tructural D efects O p era tional D efec ts  :Infiltration
^ M a t e r i a l  D e g ra d a tio n :; :
: : E ro sio n  :
Interior C o rro sio n Exterior C o rro sio n
Figure 2.8. A BBN model for risk matrix of sewer networks (Hahn et al., 2002)
In this model, factors affecting likelihood and consequence of failure were identified and 
linked to the risk (labelled as ‘Need to inspect’ in the above diagram). Root causes of 
these factors were also identified and linked with the model. For instance, the socio­
economic impact factor was connected to the following route causes: hazards to human 
health, environmental impacts, commercial concerns and traffic disruption. Each 
variable was qualitatively classified into three states, i.e. 'high', 'moderate'’ and 7ow’, in 
terms of severity. Instead of deterministically assigning one of these classifications, the 
probability of being in each of these states was obtained from expert judgements, which
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were then processed by the BBN to estimate the probability distributions of likelihood 
and consequences of failures, and hence the risk.
Whilst the use of BBN may help to rationalise the uncertainty associated with expert 
judgements, it is important to identify all the variables and the relationships between 
them, which may not be feasible for larger networks with a large number of influencing 
factors.
2.3.3 Concluding Remarks
Although rigorous analytical effort is not required in a qualitative approach, a clear 
understanding about the performance, functionality and possible consequences of the 
system under consideration is essential. A risk matrix, usually in the form of a table, is 
derived from qualitative estimations of likelihood and consequences of failure. The 
assessment is usually carried out using expert knowledge. Availability of data, e.g. past 
inspection records, design details, etc., may help in reducing the associated uncertainties. 
Structures with high risk are subjected to more frequent inspections while extending the 
inspection intervals for low risk items. The initial inspection interval is generally 
selected conservatively. Subsequent inspection intervals may be revised based on the 
inspection findings.
The qualitative approach is preferred for inspection planning at a group or network level. 
The inspection method in most of the cases is visual.
2.4 RBI in Bridge Management
The need for considering risk-based approaches in the planning of bridge 
inspection/maintenance works has attracted considerable attention over the past decade 
or so. Das (1996) listed the following concerns that elicited the use of RBI planning.
• Deterioration of structural material and development of defects
• Inadequate original specification of material and methods
• Increased loading
• Inadequate design requirements specified for older bridges.
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Therefore, it is vital to implement an effective inspection and maintenance strategy,
approaches were recognised as having the potential to optimize inspection intervals 
whilst maintaining an acceptable target risk level (Rubakantha et al. 1996).
A review of risk-based applications in bridge management is presented in this section. 
Most of the previous works mainly focused on a bridge specific level. Therefore, as 
previously discussed, a quantitative approach was considered to be the most suitable 
method. Recently, the bridge community has begun to focus also on qualitative 
approaches at a group or network level.
2.4.1 Quantitative Approach
The quantitative RBI planning applications in the bridge industry typically considered 
developing optimized plans, i.e. by solving an optimization problem involving 
inspection, repair and failure costs with a constraint of required reliability.
As discussed in Section 2.2, structural reliability concepts are employed to derive the 
probability of failure time profile. Although bridges could be subjected to various loads 
ranging from dead loads, traffic loads to accidental loads such as earthquakes, collision, 
etc., generally, dead and vehicle traffic are considered to be dominant. Code 
specifications and traffic data collected are considered in estimating these loads (Nowak 
and Szerzen, 1998). Reduction in structural strength is typically linked to the main 
deterioration mechanisms through suitable deterioration models. For instance, Sommer 
et al. (1993) used an empirical damage formula given below for corrosion penetration in 
steel bridge girders.
Where, C(t) is the average corrosion penetration, t is time and A, B are parameters 
obtained from experiments. Mori and Ellingwood (1994a, 1994b) proposed the use of a 
piecewise step function to represent the damage intensity function:
which can improve the reliability of the bridges within the available budget. Risk-based
C(t) = A f (2.7)
0 < t < T] 
t > T ,
(2.8)
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Where, C is the damage growth rate and Ti is the damage initiation time. Although this 
model is more generic than the one used by Sommer et al. (1993), this too requires the 
material and environment specific value for C.
The other two key elements in the quantitative approach are the selection of a target 
reliability index (3min and the determination of consequence costs. Typically, pmin is taken 
in the range of 3.5 to 4.5, when considering elastic behaviour and single element failure 
(Stewart et al. 2000). However, the code specified values vary significantly depending 
on the bridge types and failure modes (Lark and Flaig, 2005). Hence, these target values 
may be useful only when the RBI planning is carried out at bridge specific levels. 
Generally, the consequence costs are given in relative terms. For instance, repair costs 
were assumed to be ten times the inspection costs by Thoft-Christensen and Sorensen 
(1987). Nowadays, there are models available to calculate the monetary values of costs 
associated with bridge failures, which can be incorporated in the analysis. A summary of 
these methods can be found in Wong et al. (2005).
2.4.1.1 A Brief Review of Applications
One of the early studies that utilised the quantitative RBI planning in the bridge sector is 
the work by Sommer et al. (1993). They developed optimum inspection intervals for 
steel girders of a bridge subjected to corrosion. Losses in web and flange thicknesses of 
the girders were calculated using model given in Equation 2 .7 . These were then linked to 
strength reductions in individual steel girders, due to bending, shear and bearing failure 
modes. Failure of a girder was taken as a series system of these failure modes. For each 
girder, inspection interval was calculated by solving the optimization problem involving 
inspection, repair and failure cost with a constraint of target failure probability (similar 
to Equation 2 .5 ) . Constant inspection intervals were considered and |3mjn was taken as 
4.0. Case studies indicated that the optimum inspection intervals for steel girders 
subjected to corrosion would be in the range of five to ten years.
Frangopol et al. (1997) considered a similar optimization problem to develop a 
combined inspection and preventive maintenance plan for reinforced concrete bridge 
girders subjected to reinforcement corrosion. Two types of inspection/maintenance
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strategies, one with regular intervals and the other with irregular intervals were 
compared. The irregular intervals strategy was found to be the cost-efficient solution. 
Whilst this finding is useful when considering a specific structure, altering inspection 
intervals on an irregular basis at a network level may not be feasible and could result in 
additional managerial difficulties.
In the study by Mori and Ellingwood (1994a, 1994b), the use of a partial inspection 
strategy was examined. According to this partial inspection strategy, only a certain 
percentage of the element (‘x’ %) would be inspected using NDE techniques. If the 
damage is greater than a predefined critical value, another ‘x’% of the area will be 
inspected. If that too reveals that the damage is greater than the critical damage, then 
full inspection and repair will be carried out. Case studies indicated that the partial 
inspection strategy was more cost-efficient than having a full inspection. Although the 
concept of partial inspection could be an efficient solution with expensive techniques, it 
is less relevant when simple and less expensive techniques, such as visual inspections, 
are considered.
Some studies (e.g. Smilowitz and Madanat, 2000 and Kallen and van Noortwijk, 2006) 
considered bridge condition instead of performanceas a criterion for inspection planning. 
Markov chain was used to model condition index deterioration, which reduced the effort 
required for reliability analysis. However, the optimization problem needs to be solved 
and requires cost data as well as structural conditions. On the other hand, Flaig and Lark 
(2005) proposed a modified definition of risk in terms of relative reliability and relative 
consequences (Equation 2.9).
Risk = SrC r  (2.9)
Where, S r is the ratio between the nominal reliability of a bridge and the average 
acceptable reliability index for that bridge type and failure mode. C r is the ratio between 
the anticipated consequences of that bridge and appropriate consequences considered to 
be acceptable for the bridge stock. This approach helps to identify the relative priority of 
a bridge within a bridge stock and to allocate the funds accordingly. Although solving an
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optimization problem is not required in this method, reliability and cost calculations are 
necessary.
Recently, McMahon and Woodward (2006) proposed an inspection interval selection 
criterion, similar to the simplified inspection plan specified in Section 2.2.3, considering 
condition index deterioration and inspection effectiveness.
Detection
LevelCondition
Good
Detailed
Visual
Notifiable deterioration
Poor
Time
Figure 2.9. Selection of inspection intervals (McMahon & Woodward, 2006)
In Figure 2.9, ‘jc’ is the interval between the time at which a defect becomes detectable 
during a detailed inspection (tD) and the time at which it becomes detectable during a 
subsequent visual inspection (tv), ‘j7’ is the time between detecting a defect during the 
detailed inspections and the condition reaching a target value. The interval of detailed 
inspection can be extended if either x  is small (i.e., both visual and detailed inspections 
are capable of detecting the defects with almost same effectiveness) or j; is larger (there 
is enough time to detect a defect before it reaches a critical state). Inspection intervals 
were expressed as a function of y, for different ratios of x!y. Inspections were 
recommended in 3 yearly cycles, considering the practical aspects of inspection 
scheduling. For example, if the calculated value from the equation is 5 years, then an 
inspection is recommended every 3 years. Condition deterioration curves and target 
values were not specified in this work.
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As it can be seen from the above examples, rigorous analyses are undertaken in the 
quantitative approach to ensure the accuracy of the results. However, the decisions may 
still be subjected to uncertainties associated with inspection methods, interpretation of 
the inspection findings, human errors and modelling errors. Hence, it is vital to consider 
the level of uncertainties in the bridge management process. Better quality data, more 
reliable modelling techniques and improved industry guidelines may help reduce the 
level of uncertainties (Das and Onoufriou, 2000). Onsite collection of traffic loading, 
material testing (e.g. Stewart, 2001) and structural health monitoring (e.g. Rafiq et al.,
2004) are some of the techniques suggested to reduce uncertainties. However, these 
measures will incur additional costs and may not be feasible to apply at a network level.
2.4.1.2 Concluding Remarks
Quantitative approach is more appropriate when inspection planning at element/bridge 
specific levels or for a small group of bridges. However, bridges are usually used to 
form an integrated transport network, hence, it is vital to address the performance of the 
entire network in addition to the individual bridges. Qualitative approaches will be 
helpful in this context. One major advantage of qualitative approaches is that the 
decisions can be often made based on engineering judgements without the need for 
rigorous analysis and accurate data. In addition, since the inspection/maintenance 
planning can be done at a bridge stock level, the managerial and decision making 
difficulties could be minimised (Pardi et al., 2005).
2.4.2 Qualitative Approach
In the qualitative approach, probability of failure and its consequences are assessed 
qualitatively and risk is identified with the help of a risk matrix as described in Section 
2.3. Although the qualitative approaches have been in practice for over a decade or so, 
these are mainly carried out by the respective bridge engineers and published work in 
this area is relatively limited.
Recently, the code of practice for highway structures developed by Roads Liaison Group 
(2005) recommended the bridge owners to carry out a risk assessment of the structure, 
before increasing the inspection period. The likelihood of failure can be estimated based
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on factors, such as exposure severity, material, age, potential mode of failure, severity 
and extent of exiting defects. Consequence of failure should consider possible number of 
fatalities or injuries, traffic delay costs, socio-economic impacts and maintenance costs.
, The risk matrix given in the code is reproduced in Table 2.5.
Table 2.5. A risk matrix for highway structures (Roads Liaison Group, 2005)
Likelihood of 
deterioration/ 
incidents
Consequence of unchecked deterioration / incident
Low Medium High
Low Suitable for increased interval
Suitable for 
increased interval
May be suitable for 
increased interval
Medium Suitable for increased interval
May be suitable for 
increased interval
Use recommended 
inspection regime
High May be suitable for increased interval
Use recommended 
inspection regime
Use recommended 
inspection regime
As mentioned previously in Chapter 1, Network Rail also have similar provisions for 
altering the inspection intervals, but no explicit details are given in the code (Network 
Rail, 2004a) to carry out the risk assessment.
In some cases, numerical scores are used to represent the risk classifications. For 
example, Shetty et al. (1996) qualitatively assessed the failure probabilities and 
consequences of individual bridges on a scale from 0 to 10 based on engineering 
judgements. Bridge type, loading, structural strength and condition, redundancy in the 
structure and inspection effectiveness were considered in making the likelihood 
estimations. Consequences were estimated by considering factors such as traffic flow, 
number of lanes and span of the bridge, traffic delays, environmental impacts, repair/re­
building costs, etc. Risk was then measured as a multiple of these two scores on a scale 
of 0 -  100. This scoring system has been used as a risk ranking tool to prioritize bridges 
for inspections and maintenances. For example, within a group of bridges, a bridge with 
a risk score of 90 will be given more priority than a bridge with a score of 60. The use 
of numerical scores helps to make the distinction in risk levels more clearly, although on
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the selected scale. However, a method to select the inspection intervals is not specified 
in this work.
Similarly, Chassiakos et al. (2005) proposed a scoring system to prioritize bridge 
maintenance activities for concrete bridges in riverside environments. Seven attributes, 
i.e. defect type, traffic load, river bed characteristics, environmental conditions, bridge 
age, foundation type and superstructure type, have been identified as having influence in 
determining the maintenance priority. These attributes were then classified into different 
levels of severity. For example, loading was classified into ‘high’, ‘medium’ and Tow’. 
Relative weightings were then assigned for these attributes and to the severities. For 
instance, traffic load was assigned with a weighing of 0.15. In addition, its severities, i.e. 
high, medium and low, were given relative weightings 0.50, 0.35 and 0.15 respectively. 
A priority index (PI) given by Equation 2.10 was calculated from these weightings and 
used to prioritise bridges for maintenance works.
W = Z w*  (2.10)
i
Where, Wj = weight of the attribute
rjj = weight of the severity
Although this work has focused in maintenance planning, it highlights the ability of the 
qualitative approach in incorporating several factors that influence risk.
The above studies highlight the suitability of the qualitative approaches for bridge 
management purposes, including inspection and maintenance planning. However, 
methods to specify the inspection intervals are less researched. As a general guide, 
bridges with higher risk should be assigned more frequent inspections, and the 
inspection intervals for the lower risk bridge can be extended. Exact timing of the 
inspections has to be selected on the discretion of the respective bridge managers, based 
on engineering judgements. However, selection of inspection intervals based entirely on 
engineering judgements may be subjective. Hence, it is advisable to specify these 
intervals conservatively, unless valid evidence are available to justify the decision.
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The next section critically analyse the suitability of different methods for the present 
study.
2.5 A Critique on Available Methods
It has been observed in the previous section that there are two approaches available for 
the RBI planning, namely, quantitative and qualitative. However, the classification is not 
rigid and these may be combined depending on practical circumstances. A decision 
making model to help with the selection of a suitable RBI approach, published by the 
ABS, is shown in Figure 2.10 (ABS, 2003).
Less Less
Detailed Certain
More
Detailed
Hazard
Identification i <
Hazard/Risk 
Screening Analysis
Information for 
Risk Based 
 ^ Decisions
Broadly Focused 
Detailed Analysis
Narrowly
Focused
Detailed
Analysis
Quantitative
Qualitative
Figure 2.10. Decision making model for RBI analysis (ABS, 2003)
As suggested in Figure 2.10, quantitative approach is more detailed and its results may 
be more reliable, however these can only be attained at a higher cost. On the other hand, 
qualitative approach can be undertaken at a lower cost but its results may not be as 
accurate. Normally, a trade off between the cost and accuracy of the analysis can be 
made to select the appropriate approach.
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2.5.1 Selection Criteria
The selection of the method for a particular application will depend on several factors, 
including inspection methods, number of structures and the level of inspection planning 
(e.g. element, structure or network level), structural characteristics, significance of the 
structures, failure impacts, availability of data, etc. The suitability of an appropriate 
approach for a large bridge network is analysed against the previous applications 
considering these criteria.
2.5.1.1 Inspection Methods
Expensive (e.g. NOT) techniques are required for aircraft and offshore structures, hence, 
a quantitative inspection planning is preferred aiming at an overall cost efficiency. On 
the other hand, process industry mainly uses visual inspections planned qualitatively to 
provide cost efficient solution. The studies using quantitative approach for bridge 
management were considering expensive inspections methods, hence were not feasible 
for practical use for the management of such large network of bridges. In the current 
best practice, close visual inspection is the commonly used technique for collecting 
information on the performance of a bridge stock. Hence, a qualitative approach may be 
more appropriate for a bridge network when assessing the inspection method as a 
criterion.
2.5.1.2 Number of structures, Structural Characteristics and Level of Inspection 
Planning
RBI planning for aircraft and offshore structures are mainly limited to element or 
structure specific level, which makes it possible to perform a detailed quantitative risk 
analysis. Among the bridge related works, the studies using quantitative methods mainly 
focused on the inspection planning at element level (e.g. Sommer et al., 1993). Although 
a considerable number of elements in some studies (e.g. Vinod et al., 2004), these 
elements were of the same material type and kept in a factory environment. In contrast, 
the current study focuses on a network of bridges in the order of several thousands with 
variation in structure type, age, exposure conditions, etc., hence, a fully quantitative 
approach will not be feasible.
UNIVERSITY OF
v ;  SURREY
37
Chapter 2 Risk-Based Inspection
2.5.1.3 Significance of Structures and Failure Consequences
Failure of aircrafts will result in higher consequences in terms of fatalities. Although 
there could be bridges which have comparable consequences with air craft, the 
percentage of these bridges are small in a large network. In addition, bridge failures are 
usually progressive, which could be identified in advance and a possible collapse could 
be avoided in most of the cases. Furthermore, bridges vulnerable to sudden collapses 
(e.g. bridges susceptible to scour damage) are excluded from the scope of the RBI 
planning.
Higher economic and environmental impacts can be expected from failure of offshore 
structures. Bridges have relatively low consequences in terms of environmental impacts 
than the offshore structures. For many bridges, financial consequences also would be 
relatively less in comparison to offshore or aircraft structures.
2.5.2 Suitability of the Methods
By comparing the above findings against the decision making model presented in Figure 
2.10, it can be concluded that the ‘Narrowly Focused Detailed Analysis’ is neither 
feasible nor required for the current study.
The use of qualitative risk matrix is recommended by Roads Liaison Group for highway 
structures, if it is necessary to alter the inspection intervals (Roads Liaison Group,
2005). This code recommendation and the works by Shetty et al. (1996), Chassiakos et 
al. (2005), etc. validate the use of qualitative approaches in the bridge industry. 
However, a definite method to specify inspection intervals is not specified in these 
studies. The time variability of risk has been taken into account by means of a condition 
index deterioration model in the current study, which introduces a certain amount of 
quantitative element in the RBI planning methodology. Hence, the proposed RBI can be 
considered to be the ‘Broadly Focused Detailed Analysis’ category of the decision 
making model.
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2.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, the state-of-the art concepts of the RBI methodology and its practical 
applications in different industries are summarized followed by a critique on the 
available methods. RBI is a risk management tool that facilitates the allocation of 
inspection resources in a cost effective manner. RBI usually involves risk identification, 
risk assessment and implementation of risk mitigation measures. Several authorities such 
as ASME, HSE, ABS and API actively encourage the use of RBI to control risk in 
various industries.
RBI can be performed using different techniques. These are broadly classified into two 
approaches, quantitative or qualitative. In the quantitative approach, probability of 
failure is evaluated through rigorous structural reliability analyses. Consequences are 
taken into account either through a target reliability or by formulating an optimization 
problem involving costs (inspection, repair and failure). On the other hand, in a 
qualitative approach, risk is usually assessed using expert judgements and presented in a 
tabular form (risk matrix). Inspection resources are prioritized for structures identified as 
having high risk from the risk matrix.
Various factors, such as the level of inspection planning (e.g. element, structure, etc.), 
significance of the system, inspection method, etc., influence the selection of an 
approach for a particular application. Generally, a trade-off between the required level of 
accuracy and the cost and time of analysis has to be made in selecting the appropriate 
method. It should be noted that although two approaches are available, a suitable 
combination of the two approaches may also be considered.
RBI has been successfully used in various industries over the past three decades. 
Aeronautical and offshore industries are focusing on quantitative approach, whereas the 
process industry uses qualitative approach. Key studies from these industries are 
discussed and critically compared with the current study.
The previous studies mainly considered specific structures/elements or a group of 
elements. On the other hand, the present study focuses on networks of bridges in the 
order of tens of thousands. The differences in type, age, environment, deterioration
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characteristics, functionalities and consequences, etc. among the bridges add to the 
complexity. Therefore, the previous methodologies cannot be directly applied, but the 
useful concepts from them are extracted and utilized in the current study.
Identification and understanding of deterioration problems affecting the structure under 
consideration is found to be one of the key elements in an RBI planning. In this project, 
case studies have been performed using masonry arch bridges. Hence, a study about the 
potential deterioration mechanisms affecting these bridges is carried out and presented in 
the next chapter. Deterioration in condition is deemed to be an appropriate criterion for 
inspection planning at a group level. Thus, the relevant condition index deterioration 
modelling techniques are also presented in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3: Masonry Arch Bridge
Deterioration and Condition Index 
_________ Deterioration Models
3.1 Introduction
Bridges deteriorate over time leading to a reduction in structural performance and 
condition. Consequently this will lead to the increase in their failure probabilities and 
hence the risk. Several factors, such as bridge type, age, material, quality of 
workmanship, surrounding environment, traffic load, etc., influence the rate of 
deterioration. As discussed in Chapter 2, an understanding of structural deterioration is 
considered as a vital element in any RBI planning.
The case studies in this thesis are related to masonry arch bridges since approximately 
half of the Network Rail’s bridges are o f this type (Bell, 2004a). Hence, major 
deterioration processes affecting masonry arch bridges are identified through a literature 
study and the key findings are presented in Section 3.2.
Condition deterioration profile is found to be an adequate indicator to determine the RBI 
plan at a group or network level (Chapter 2). Therefore, the relevant condition index 
deterioration modelling techniques are also summarised in this chapter.
3.2 Deterioration Processes Affecting Masonry Arch Bridges
Masonry arch bridges are one of the oldest bridge types in use. The concept of arch 
bridge construction is believed to be originated from Mesopotamia approximately 5,000 
years ago (Van Beek, 1987). The Chinese built arch bridges around 2900 BC. An arch 
bridge built by the Romans in 105 BC at Alcantra in Spain is still in existence (Page, 
1993). A schematic diagram of a typical single span masonry arch bridge is shown in 
Figure 3.1.
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Spandrel wall Parapets
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wallArch Barrel
Abutments
Foundations
Figure 3.1. Cross sectional view of a typical masonry arch bridge (Page, 1993)
Currently, there are over 70,000 masonry arch bridges serving either railway or road 
networks o f the UK (Page, 1993). Among them approxim ately 20,000 bridges are 
owned by the Network Rail and all o f  these are more than 100 years old (Bell, 2004a). 
These bridges carry present day traffic loads that are well in excess o f  their envisaged 
design loads, which in turn will lead to deterioration o f their constituent materials. 
Severe environmental conditions may contribute to an increase in the rate o f 
deterioration. M ajor deterioration processes affecting the masonry arch bridges are 
described In the following sub-sections.
3.2.1 Scour
Scour is one o f the main causes for structural collapse o f masonry arch bridges (Page, 
1993). Network Rail defines scour as ‘the removal o f  material from under or adjacent to 
structural supports, foundations or earthworks by the action o f flowing w ater’ (Network 
Rail, 2004c). Failure due to scour is considered to be dangerous since it occurs suddenly 
without showing any warnings or signs o f  distress (M ckibbins et al. 2006). For instance, 
in 1986, nine bridges in a county in Ireland were badly damaged or collapsed due to 
scour following a flood. Previous inspections did not reveal any defects in some bridges, 
while reported defects o f  the remaining bridges had been repaired prior to the failures
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(Page, 1993). Hence, according to the Network Rail regulations, an additional detailed 
inspection of bridges must be carried out following a flood, and traffic over a bridge will 
be allowed to resume only if it is identified as safe to do so from the inspection. These 
inspections mainly focus on detecting scour damage, particularly looking for the 
following (Network Rail, 2004a);
• Examining underwater parts of the bridge for scour holes
• Surveying the bed profile for scour holes
• Check around footings
• Examining spandrels and wing walls for scour or voids
• Displacement or uplift of foundation.
3.2.2 Freeze-thaw Cycles
In areas with noticeable winters, the freeze-thaw cycle is one of the main causes for 
masonry deterioration. In Britain, the number of freeze-thaw cycles could be greater 
than that in Canada or central Asia due to its climatic conditions (Morton, 1990), thus 
making the UK masonry bridges more vulnerable to frost damage.
Water trapped in masonry units increase in volume by up to 9% during the phase change 
from fluid to solid leading to low permeability in masonry units. As a result, ice formed 
in the masonry pores will be highly pressurised. This pressure will be resisted by 
masonry, causing tensile stresses. Failure occurs when the tensile stress exceeds the 
tensile strength of masonry material. This is considered to be a significant problem since 
bricks are normally weak in tension (Kralj et al., 1991).
Failure of bricks due to frost occurs in the form of crumbling, spalling or splitting 
(Mckibbins et al, 2006). Factors such as pore size and porosity, moisture content, 
modulus of elasticity, saturation coefficient, strength, degree of firing, rate o f cooling, 
freezing geometry, and air entrainment affect the frost resistance capacity of bricks 
(Stupart, 1989). Yla-Mattila (1987) suggested that the colour of bricks can be used as an 
indicator in determining the number o f freeze-thaw cycles, based on a test carried out in 
Finland using four different colour brick walls. It was found that dark coloured bricks 
tend to have higher number of freeze-thaw cycles than light coloured bricks when
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exposed to the same weather. The reason behind this is that dark surfaces get heated 
more effectively and, hence, dark coloured bricks thaw quickly due to sunshine resulting 
in more freeze-thaw cycles.
Some masonry mortars consist of mixtures of aggregate (sand), binding materials such 
as hydraulic lime or pozzolanas, and water. These mortars are generally weak and when 
combined with water ingress can lead to frost damage of mortar (Lees and Bowler, 
1986). The moisture content of mortar at the time of freezing is one of the most 
important factors in determining the extent of frost damage (Davison, 1970). The 
deterioration of mortar due to freezing can lead to cracks in the mortar surface and 
general crumbling or powdering (Davison, 1970).
3.2.3 Chemical Attacks
Wet climatic conditions can induce chemical attacks also on masonry structures. For 
instance, rain water containing dissolved carbon dioxide, may react with calcium 
carbonate in the mortar and dissolve it by forming calcium bicarbonate (De Vekey, 
2001).
C 0 2 + H20  ^  H 2 C O 3  + CaC03 ^  Ca(HC0 3)2  (3.1)
Lime mortars, lime stones, and lime bonded sandstones are more vulnerable to this type 
of attack since their main constituent is calcium carbonate. Deterioration will occur by 
means of loss of mortar, loss of bricks from the outer layer and development of pits in 
stones (De Vekey, 2001).
Carbon dioxide present in air reacts with alkalis such as calcium hydroxide and forms 
carbonates. This process is called carbonation and this is often beneficial since it can 
increase the strength and durability of lime mortars (De Vekey, 2001).
Ca(OH) 2 + C 0 2 -> CaC03 + H20  (3.2)
However, alkalis such as sodium hydroxides from Portland cement may diffuse into 
bricks and form alkali sulphates along with carbonates. The alkali sulphate reaction will 
result in the formation of efflorescence in external brickwork (Lees and Bowler, 1986).
2NaOH +- C 0 2 -> Na2C 0 3 + H20  (3.3)
Na2C 0 3 + CaS04 Na2 S0 4 + CaC03 (3.4)
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Portland cement mortar may also be subjected to chloride attacks similar to sulphate 
attack. Two types of calcium chloroaluminates; (CaO^.AhOg.CaCk. IOH2O and 
(CaOjg.AlzOg.SCaCWOHzO can be formed by the reaction of chlorides with the 
tricalcium aluminate present in the Portland cement. Cracking and erosion of mortar will 
occur, if chlorides migrate into mortar (Lees and Bowler, 1986).
In industrial areas, air may be polluted by sulphates which form gypsum when reacted 
with calcium carbonate in the presence of water (De Vekey, 2001).
2S0 2 + 2 H20  -» 2H2S 0 3 + 0 2 ->2 H2S0 4 (3.5)
CaC03 + H2S 0 4 CaS04 + H2C 0 3 (3.6)
This may cause softening and erosion of material hence results in a reduction in strength 
of masonry. The modem mortars made with Portland cement contain aluminates and the 
end product from sulphate attack could be ettringite [(Ca0)3.Al20 3.3CaS04.31H20] 
(Lees and Bowler, 1986).
(Ca0)3Al20 3 + 3 CaS04 Water > (Ca0)3.Al20 3.3CaS04.31H20  (3.7)
In summary, climatic conditions and polluted air due to industrial wastes contribute 
towards the chemical attacks in masonry bricks and mortar and subsequently result in 
deterioration and strength reduction of masonry structures.
3.2.4 Ring Separation
If the arch barrel rings in a brick masonry arch bridge act independently of each other, it 
is known as rink separation (Page, 1993). Ring separation is a significant problem 
affecting multi-ring brick masonry bridges (Helmerich, 2007).
Different bond styles, such as header, header/stretcher and stretcher, were used to 
construct masonry brick arch bridges (Melbourne and Gilbert, 1995) (Figure 3.2). 
Among these, stretcher bond was widely used due to ease in its construction. Ring 
separation normally affects the multi-ring bridges with stretcher bonds when the bonding 
between the rings fails (Melbourne and Gilbert, 1995). Ring separation can have 
significant impacts on the load carrying capacity of a bridge. For instance, Melbourne 
(1990) observed 33%-56% reduction in the ultimate load carrying capacity due to ring 
separation in a series of laboratory test. One of the major difficulties in the identification
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of ring separation is that it is not visible. Tapping with a hammer can be used as an 
initial step, although its efficiency is limited to the separation between the first and 
second rings only (Page, 1993).
(a) Header (b) Header Z stretcher
Figure 3.2. Typical bonding styles (Melbourne and Gilbert, 1995)
3.2.5 Fatigue
Bridges are subjected to cyclic loading due to frequent traffic flows, which causes 
fatigue. BS 5400 Pt-10 (1980) defines fatigue as ‘the gradual cracking of a structural 
part, caused by repeated applications of a stress, which is insufficient to introduce failure 
by a single application.’ Fatigue is considered to be one of the dominant deterioration 
mechanisms for steel structures. Masonry bridges can also be affected by fatigue. 
Fatigue will normally lead to the gradual cracking in bricks and mortar. Fatigue strength 
of masonry depends on the compressive strengths of bricks and mortar, loading 
characteristics and environmental conditions such as degree of saturation (Roberts et al.,
2006).
Roberts et al. (2006) developed a formula (Equation 3.8) to represent the lower bound 
fatigue strength (F(S)) of dry, wet and submerged brick masonry, based on a series of 
laboratory test results carried out using brick masonry walls.
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F(S) = = 0 .7 -  0.05 log N (3.8)
Where, AS = Induced stress range
Smax = M aximum induced stress
Su == Quasi-static compressive strength under similar loading conditions 
N = Num ber o f stress cycles
This formula is comparable with the fatigue crack growth model for steel structures and, 
hence, may be useful for inspection planning o f a masonry bridge at elem ent level.
3.2.6 Biological a ttacks
Living organisms (ranging from small trees, shrubs to bacteria and fungi) can act as 
agents for deterioration o f  masonry arch bridges (see Figure 3.3).
Figure 3.3. Biological attack in masonry arch bridges (a) vegetation (Helmerich, 
2007) (b) small livening organisms (Bein et al., 2007)
The potential effects from this type o f attack include; instability o f  structure, local 
damage to structural elements and settlement or heave o f  structures (Network Rail, 
2004c). Generally, these biological attacks can be in the form o f either physical or 
chemical processes. Tree roots and shrubs will m igrate into the m ortar causing the 
removal o f mortar and subsequently lead to the reduction in the load carrying capacity o f 
the bridge. Small living organisms such as bacteria and fungi will act as agents o f 
deterioration o f mortar and bricks. Their effect is higher in damp and wet conditions. 
These organisms can form gypsum and sulphuric acid from the groundwater sulphates. 
This will lead to softening in low strength mortars and cracking in strong mortars as
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described in Section 3.2.3 (Mckibbins et al., 2006). Climatic conditions and improper 
maintenance are the root causes for the biological attacks.
3.2.7 Concluding Remarks
In summary, scour, freeze-thaw cycling, ring separation, fatigue and biological attacks 
are the major deterioration problems faced by masonry arch bridges. Their effect could 
range from cracks or splits in mortar and bricks to reduction in load carrying capacity or 
total structural collapse. Due to the special nature of scour damage and collapse with 
little warning, and the adopted practice of additional inspection following extreme 
events, the influence of scour on deterioration and risk ranking is not considered in this 
study. Loading, climatic conditions, and presence of chemicals are acknowledged as the 
major root causes for the other deterioration problems. These have been taken into 
account in the risk ranking strategy presented in Chapter 5.
3.3 Condition Index Deterioration Models
In this study, a bridge group condition index deterioration model is developed to aid 
with the specification of inspection intervals. Hence, the useful concepts and techniques 
related to the condition index deterioration modelling are summarised in this section.
3.3.1 Empirical Models
There are several empirical formulae available to express bridge condition as a function 
of time. These are mainly based on engineering judgement and are normally applicable 
for a particular bridge stock. For instance, Miyamoto et al. (2000) proposed two 
empirical equations to model the change in bridge load carrying capacity and bridge 
durability:
Where, SL = load carrying capacity score, SD = durability score, t = bridge age in years, 
at, bL, aD and bD are constants.
In this system, load carrying capacity and durability were represented in a numerical 
scale from 0 (dangerous) to 100 (new bridge). The constants, at, b^  aD and bD, need to
(3.9)
(3.10)
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be specified from previous inspection records or experts. In addition, this model is 
structure specific, i.e. these values need to be specified individually for each bridge, 
hence cannot be used at a network level.
In another study, Liu et al. (1997) represented the bridge conditions by five numerical
values, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4 and 0.5, known as ‘deterioration degrees’, where the lower
value represents a higher level of deterioration. A nonlinear empirical model was used to 
predict the future deterioration degrees of bridge decks:
^ = 7 7 ^  (3 1 1 )
Where, d(t,i) = Deterioration degree at age t
ttj = Factor related to the initial deterioration degree i.e. d(0,i)
Pi = Factor related to the age of a bridge
One advantage in this model is that it can be used if only one set of condition data is
available with aid of expert contribution. For example, they assumed an initial
deterioration degree [d(0,i)] of 0.02, and calculated a, using Equation 3.11. Then using 
one set of deterioration degree at a particular time t, the pi value was calculated. 
However, this model is also structure specific and may not be suitable at a network level.
Godart and Vassie (2001) proposed an empirical formula to assess the condition, which 
can be used for a stock of bridges with similar characteristics, i.e. material type, 
construction form, etc. (Equation 3.12).
C(t) = a + bt + ct2 + dt3 (3 .12)
Where, C(t) = Average condition state of the stock, t = Time in years and a, b, c and d 
are constants. These values can change from one bridge stock to another depending on 
factors such as construction material, geographic location, and previous maintenances, 
etc. Mathematically, four sets of condition data at four different times would be required 
to identify these constants. Otherwise, expert judgments can be employed.
It can be observed from the above examples, expert judgement and/or details about the 
historical performance of the bridges are necessary in these models. One common 
feature observed in all these models is that condition is taken as a function of time 
(bridge age), either power or exponential. This needs to be validated with real data. One
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drawback in these models is that they are applicable only for a specific bridge or a 
particular bridge stock for which they are calibrated. In the following sections some 
models, which can be used with any network, are described.
3.3.2 Markov Chain Model
Some bridge management systems use Markov chain models to predict future conditions 
of bridge elements. In a Markov chain model, the future condition of an element is 
assumed to depend only on the present condition of that element and not on the past 
condition (Ng and Moses, 1996). This assumption is useful since the past details about 
bridge conditions are not available. Madanat and Ibrahim (1995) proved the validity of 
Markov assumption using inspection data of about 5,700 bridges.
In a typical Markov chain model, change in conditions between two time steps is 
represented by a transition matrix given by:
...................  ' Pirn
  P 2m
P =
Pll Pl2
0 P 22
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0 .0
(3.13)
Where, pü -  the probability of remaining in the ith state
Pij -  the probability of changing to the j th state from the i* state 
Condition of an element after ‘r’ time steps is calculated using this transition matrix as 
given by Equation 3.14.
[Cr] =  [Co][Pii]r (3.14)
Where, Cr = Condition matrix at r* time step
Co = Initial condition matrix 
In many cases, a further simplification is made by assuming that the condition of a 
bridge element will either stay in its current state or deteriorate to the immediate next 
state, within the two subsequent inspections. This simplification has two underlying 
assumptions. One is that the condition index scale divides the condition into a sufficient 
number of states to pick up even relatively small defects. The second assumption is that
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the interval between two time steps is not too large (Cesare et ah, 1992). A typical 
transition matrix given the above simplification is shown by Equation 3.15.
P =
Pn 1-Pn .......................... o
0 P 22 ...........................  0
0 0     :
0 0   :
^ ^  P (m-l)(m-l) 1 P (m-l)(m-l)
0 0  0 1
(3.15)
In this case, only (n-1) probability estimations are needed to specify the transition 
matrix. Generally, previous inspection records are used to estimate these transition 
probabilities, however, engineering judgements can also be used in the absence of data 
(Thompson and Johnson, 2005).
Unlike the empirical models, Markov models are widely applicable for any network of 
structures irrespective of the condition rating system. However, these are mainly applied 
at element level.
3.3.3 Fault Tree Analysis
Fault tree is a logic diagram showing the relationships between a top event and the 
events that lead to the top event (Sundararajan, 1995). Fault tree models are useful in 
evaluating the system condition from element condition. Appendix B contains details 
about fault tree analysis.
Sianipar and Adams (1997) proposed the use of a fault tree model to estimate concrete 
deck conditions. In this model, deck condition was assumed to depend on bearing and 
expansion joint conditions. The root causes for deterioration of bearings and expansion 
joints were identified and linked to these through logical gates. The probabilities for the 
occurrences of these root causes were estimated from engineering judgements. The 
probabilities of bearings and expansion joints being in different condition states (e.g. 
good, fair, poor) were estimated through the ‘AND’ or ‘OR’ relationships, using the 
basic event probability estimations. These were used to calculate the probabilities of 
bridge deck being in different condition states.
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LeBeau and Wadia-Fascetti (2000) extended this idea to the bridge level. The failure of 
a steel girder bridge was estimated with the aid o f the fault tree model. In this model a 
hierarchy of the bridge elements from the minor elements to major elements was 
considered. Bridge condition was assumed to be dependent on the conditions of deck, 
superstructure and substructure. These minor element conditions were then linked with 
the conditions of secondary elements such as, joints, girders, etc. Finally, the secondary 
element conditions were related with the basic events that cause condition index 
deterioration (e.g. leakage, corrosion of girders, etc.). The top level model is shown in 
Figure 3.4.
Joint
Condition
Deck
Condition
Deck
Material
Condition
Superstructure
Condition
Substructure
Condition
Girders
Condition
Bearings
Condition
Abutments
Condition
Deterioration of Bridge Performance
Figure 3.4. A fault tree deterioration model (LeBeau and Wadia-Fascetti, 2000)
The failure probabilities of basic events were obtained from the expert knowledge and 
the probabilities of failure were calculated according to the fault tree diagram. The basic 
variables were assumed to be statistically independent to make the calculations simpler. 
Although fault tree technique is useful in modelling the interactions between the 
elements of a structure, it cannot directly incorporate the change in condition with time. 
Another limitation with the fault tree model is that it can be used to model only those 
systems that are either ‘series’ or ‘parallel’, using ‘AND’ or ‘OR’ gates respectively. 
The Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) can be useful in this regard since it can incorporate
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any type of relationship between elements as opposed to series or parallel systems in the 
fault tree model.
3.3.4 Bayesian Belief Network Model
Attoh-Okine and Bowers (2006) proposed the use of BBN to estimate the system 
condition from element condition. They followed the same element classification as 
LeBeau and Fascetti (2000) to develop the BBN model (Figure 3.5).
Abutments
Condition
Bearings
Condition
Girders
Condition
Deck Material 
Condition
Joints
Condition
Substructure
Condition
Deck
Condition
Superstructure
Condition
Bridge
Condition
Figure 3.5. A BBN model for bridge deterioration (Attoh-Okine & Bowers, 2006)
The root causes of deterioration for each of the minor elements and their corresponding 
probabilities of occurrences were adapted from LeBeau and Fascetti (2000). The 
conditional probabilities between the variables were selected based on engineering 
judgment. The advantages of BBN over fault tree model include: any type of 
relationship can be included, a ‘what-if analysis can be easily performed and updating 
with new information is easy. These two methods are compared through an example in 
Chapter 6 .
Although the use of BBN for bridge condition evaluation was initiated by Attoh-Okine 
and Bowers (2006), the variation in condition was not considered in their model. On the 
other hand, the model developed in the present study incorporates the time variability of 
condition.
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3.4 Concluding Remarks
The case studies in this project have been performed using masonry arch bridges, hence, 
the main deterioration problems affecting these bridges are summarised in this chapter. 
Scour, frost, chemical and biological attacks, ring separation and fatigue are found to be 
the most important deterioration problems affecting masonry arch bridges. Among 
them, scour can cause sudden failure and bridges identified as being vulnerable to scour 
are excluded from the scope of the current study. The underlying causes for these 
deterioration problems include climatic conditions, presence of chemical substances in 
the environment and the location of the foundations (e.g. in water). These root causes are 
used in the development of risk ranking strategy (see Chapter 5).
Deterioration in structural condition is widely used as a criterion for RBI planning at a 
group or network level. A summary of available methods to model the condition 
deterioration of bridges is presented in this chapter. Some of these models are empirical 
and mostly developed considering a particular network. Some other models, such as 
fault tree and Markov chain models, can be used with any network.
Recently, BBN has also used by Attoh-Okine and Bowers in this context (2006). In the 
present study, this concept is extended to a network level and time variability of 
condition is included through the use of a special type of BBN. Hence, the underline 
theory of BBN and some relevant example applications from the literature are 
summarised in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4: Bayesian Belief Networks
4.1 Introduction
The importance and need for a deterioration model in the RBI planning has been 
identified in Chapters 2 and 3. In this context, a bridge group level deterioration model 
is developed using a probabilistic modelling tool known as Dynamic Bayesian Network 
(DBN). DBN is a special type of Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) that deals with 
problems in time varying domains. This chapter introduces the concepts of BBN and 
DBN, which are applicable to the specific problem in hand.
In many real world situations, decisions often have to be made under uncertain situations 
using a limited amount of available information. One way of handling such situations is 
to develop a graphical representation showing the causal relationships between the 
events that lead to the situation under consideration. This graphical representation is 
known as 'Causal Network?. If  the strengths of the causal relationships in such a 
network are expressed as conditional probabilities, then the network is called a BBN. 
Bayesian probability theorem forms the basis for the probability calculations in a BBN. 
BBN is an efficient tool for modelling cases where some information is already known 
but incoming data is uncertain or only partially available.
One of the key features of BBN is that it can utilize expert knowledge for decision 
making in the absence of adequate data. In addition, graphical representation makes the 
problem domain clearly understandable. Various industries have utilized BBN over the 
past two decades to model problems associated with uncertainties. Examples of the 
application of BBN can be found in medical (e.g. Ramoni et al., 1995), weather 
forecasting (e.g. Abramson et al., 1996), agriculture (e.g. Batchelor and Cain, 1999), as 
well as in various other industries.
The use of BBN can result in following benefits (McCann el ah, 2006);
• Previous information can be utilized.
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• Updating is possible as new information arrives.
• It can be used to model problems with any amount of data.
• Both discrete and continuous data can be used.
• Graphical representation makes the BBN easily understandable.
• Sensitivity analysis of the variables can be easily performed.
The shortcomings of BBN are;
• Fully specified conditional probability tables are required.
• Conditional probability tables may become very large and difficult to specify.
• Models can be based entirely on expert judgement, and, hence could be biased or 
inaccurate.
In section 4.2, the basic principles of BBN and DBN are discussed following Jensen and 
Nielsen (2007). Some relevant applications of BBN are highlighted in Section 4.3.
4.2 Fundamentals of Bayesian Belief Networks
Bayesian Belief Network theory is a growing subject, and only a part of it, which will 
help in understanding the development of the deterioration model, is described here. An 
introduction to the basic probability theory that serves as the basis for BBN is given in 
Appendix C.
4.2.1 Causal Networks
A causal network is a graph, which consists o f a set of variables and a set of directed 
links between the variables to represent the causal relationships. Sometimes, this graph 
is referred to as a directed graph and the link is called directed edge. If a link goes from 
variable A to variable B in a causal network, then A is called a parent of B and B is 
called a child of A (see Figure 4.1). If the links in a directed graph go in a cycle, then 
that graph is called as a directed cyclic graph (Figure 4.1.a). In this example, the 
variables are connected in cycle A->B-> C-> A. These types of networks are sometimes 
referred to as feedback cycles. If the variables in a directed graph do not follow a cyclic 
pattern, then it is called a directed acyclic graph (DAG) (Figure 4.1. b).
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Variables
Links/Directed Edges
(b). Directed Acyclic Graph(a). Directed Cyclic Graph
Figure 4.1. Example causal networks
A variable can be in any number of discrete states or have a continuous sample space. 
Continuous variables can also be discretized into a finite number of states for 
computational purposes. One advantage of using numerical states is that the conditional 
probabilities can be specified using standard probability distributions.
At any particular time, a variable can be in only one of these states. However, this state 
may not be known for certain. Causal networks help to overcome this uncertainty with 
the help of evidence about the other variables in the network. The evidence is normally 
in the form of certainty about the state of the variables. This can be either soft or hard 
evidence. If a variable is known to be in a particular state with full certainty then the 
evidence is known as ‘hard evidence’. Sometimes a variable may be believed to be in a 
particular state but not with full certainty. This type of information is referred to as ‘soft 
evidence’. For example, assume a machine has two states namely; function and failure. 
If it is known that the equipment is in failure state with full certainty (i.e probability of 
machine being in failure state is 1), then this information is classified as hard evidence. 
Whereas, if we are only 90% sure that the machine is in failure state (i.e probability of 
machine being in failure state is 0.9), then this is ‘soft evidence’.
Causal networks are classified into serial, diverging and converging connections 
depending on their configuration.
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4.2.1.1 Serial Connections
An example of a serial connection is given in Figure 4.2. In this network, variable A 
influences variable B and variable B influences variable C. Therefore, A is the parent of 
B and B is the parent of C.
Figure 4.2. Serial connection
In this network, evidence about A will influence the certainty of C through B. However, 
if the state of B is known with certainty, the link between A and C is blocked and they 
become independent from each other. This can be explained through a simple example. 
Let staff in an office use a lift when it is in an operating condition. Otherwise they will 
use the stairs. Power supply influences the lift operating condition (See Figure 4.3).
People 
use lift
Lift
Operating
Power
Supply
Figure 4.3. An example of serial connection
In this example, if it is known with certainty that the power supply is in good condition 
that will increase the certainty o f the lift is being operational and, hence, the certainty of 
people using the lift. On the other hand, if it is known for certain that the lift is in 
operating condition then the information about the power supply has no further influence 
on the certainty o f people using the lift. That is, if the state of an intermediate variable in 
a serial connection is certain (or instantiated), then no further information will pass 
through the network.
4.2.1.2 Diverging Connection
In a diverging connection, one parent variable is connected to several child variables. An 
example is shown in Figure 4.4, where variable A is a parent of variables B, C and D. 
Information can pass through the network, if no evidence about the state of the parent 
variable A is available. However, when A is instantiated (i.e. known to be in a particular
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state with full certainty) information will not be transmitted. Hence, child variables B, C 
and D are d-separated given A.
Figure 4.4. Diverging connection
For example, assume two beams are cast using same material (see Figure 4.5). If there 
is a defect observed in ‘Beam 1’, then the material quality could be low and, hence, 
‘Beam 2’ can also expected to be defective. However, if the material quality is known 
to be of high standard with full certainty, then the information (i.e. ‘Beam 1 ’ is being 
defective) has no influence on the state of ‘Beam 2’.
Material
Quality
Beam 1 Beam 2
Figure 4.5. An example of diverging connection 
4.2.1.3 Converging Connection
A converging connection is illustrated in Figure 4.6. In this connection several parent 
variables have influence on one child variable. In this network, parent variables A, B and 
C remain independent if no evidence is available. However, when evidence about the 
child variable A or any parent variable is introduced, the parent variables become 
conditionally dependant on each other.
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Figure 4.6. Converging connection
Let a load P be hung using two elastic cables to keep it 1m above the ground (Figure 
4.7). If it is known that the load is less than 1m above the ground, then the possibility of 
both cables being elongated increases. Similarly if it known that one of the cables is 
elongated, the possibility o f the load being lowered below 1m and, hence, the possibility 
of the second cable also being in an elongated state increases. Therefore, information 
about any of the variables in a converging connection makes the variables conditionally 
dependent.
Cable 1 Cable 2
Hanging 
Load Height
Figure 4.7. An example of converging connection
4.2.2 Bayesian Belief Networks
If the strengths of the links in a causal network can be expressed by means of 
conditional probabilities, then it becomes a Bayesian Belief Network. If a variable B has 
only one parent A, then the strength of the link is expressed by the conditional 
probability P(B|A). If B has two parents A and C then the strength is given by P(B|A,C), 
and so on. As mentioned in Section 4.2.1, some causal networks can have cyclic 
relationship. However, these cyclic networks are difficult to model quantitatively. 
Therefore, they are not generally permitted in Bayesian networks.
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A typical Bayesian network can be constructed when the following information is 
available.
• A set of variables and a set of directed edges (links) between variables.
• Each variable has a finite set of mutually exclusive states.
• The variables form a directed a-cyclic graph (DAG) with the aid of the directed 
edges (Section 4.2.1).
• For each variable A with parents Bi, B^  ,Bn the conditional probability table
P(A|Bi,B2,  ,Bn) is available. The number of conditional probabilities required
depends on the number of variables and the number of states of each variable. For 
instance, if a network has ‘n’ number of variables, each with ‘x’ number of states, 
then the number of conditional probabilities required is x11. If a variable has no 
parents, then the unconditional probability P(A) is used (Jenson and Nielsen, 2007).
A careful study about the problem in hand is necessary to identify the variables, 
construct the DAG and define the conditional probabilities.
4.2.3 The Chain Rule for Bayesian Networks
Assume that U is a universe of all variables A i,A2, ,An in a BBN, and P(U) is the
joint probability of all the variables.
P(U) = P(Ai,A2, An) (4.1)
The Bayesian theorem for two variables A and B states that (see Appendix B);
P(A,B) = P(A|B)P(B) (4.2)
Iterative use of the Bayesian theorem in Equation 4.1 yields;
P(U) = P(An|Ai, ,An_i) P(An_i|Ai, ,An_2) P(A2|Ai)P(Ai) (4.3)
This is known as chain rule and is used for probability calculations in BBN. This can be 
expressed in the following form;
P(U) = f l  P(Af I Pa(Aj )) (4.4)
i=l
Where, pa(A;) are the parent variables of Aj.
Since the variables have mutually exclusive states, the probability distribution of any 
variable Ak can be calculated by marginalizing other variables in the joint probability 
table.
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P ( A k) = 2> (U ) (4.5)
A k
4.2.4 An Illustrative Example
Consider a situation shown in Figure 4.8, in which, a load P is supported by a beam and 
a cable. It is possible to identify whether the cable has reached the failure state with the 
help of a strain gauge reading.
Strain Gauge
Cable
Beam
Figure 4.8. An illustrative example
This can be modelled using BBN as shown in Figure 4.9.
Cable
Beam
Support P?
Strain_Gauge
Figure 4.9. BBN model for the illustrative example
In this model, each variable is assumed to have two states. Cable (C) and beam (B): 
functional (Yes) or non-functional (No). Strain gauge (SG): the reading is within the 
maximum strain (Yes) or not (No). Support P? (SP): able to support P (Yes) or not 
(No). The following probabilities have been assumed.
P(B = Yes) = 0.9 and P(B = No) = 0.1
P(C = Yes) = 0.9 and P(C = No) = 0.1
P(SG|C) and P(SP|C,B) are provided in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 respectively.
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Table 4.1. P(SG|C)
C = Yes C = No
SG = Yes 0.9 0 .1
SG = No 0 .1 0.9
Table 4.2. P(SP|C,B)
B = Yes B = No
C = Yes
ÜIIo C = Yes C = No
SP = Yes 1 0.7 0.4 0
SP = No 0 0.3 0 . 6 1
Using these probabilities, the joint probability distribution of the variables in the BBN is 
calculated using the chain rule (Table 4.3).
Table 4.3. Joint probabilities of the variables considered in the BBN
B = Yes B = No
C = Yes C = No C = Yes C = No
SG = Yes (0.729,0) (6.3*10"3, 2.7* 10'3) (0,0.081) (0 , 1 * 1 0 "3)
SG = No (0.081,0) (0.0567, 0.0243) (0, 9*10‘3) (0, 9*10'3)
In this table, (x,y) represents the probabilities of variable ‘SP’ being in states ‘Yes’, ‘No’ 
respectively.
Different probabilities can be obtained by marginalizing the corresponding variables 
from the joint probability table.
As an example, P(SG = Yes) is found to be 0.820, by marginalising SG = Yes, i.e. 
addition of the values in row 4 of Table 4.3.
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4.2.5 Dynamic Bayesian Networks
A Dynamic Bayesian Network (DBN) is a special type of BBN, which deals with 
domains containing recurring networks that change over time. In this case, the basic 
network, which repeats with time is called a ‘time slice’. In DBN models, instead of 
considering the whole network, this time slice is connected through temporal links to 
form the actual model. The temporal links and the conditional probabilities between the 
variables in all time slices need to be identical in a DBN model.
Three time scales influence DBN construction. First is the ‘initial time’ or the time at 
which the DBN starts; the next is the ‘transition interval’ or the time interval between 
two time slices; third is the ‘horizon’ or the time at which the DBN ends, which could be 
either a ‘finite horizon’ or ‘infinite horizon’ depending on the nature o f the problem 
being modelled.
An example DBN is shown in Figure 4.10.
Figure 4.10. A DBN example
In this example, the basic network, which consists of variables A, B and C at time tj (i.e., 
A(tj), B(tj) and C(ti)), repeats over time. This network can be treated as time slices of 
these variables along with the temporal relationships as shown in Figure 4.11.
As it can be seen from Figure 4.11, each time slice can be considered as a separate BBN 
linked by the temporal link shown by the read line. In this network, only two variables 
(A(ti) and B(t;)) are connected through the temporal link since the third variable C(ti) 
does not have any connections with the variables in the other time slices.
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C(ti)
■ i+ l ,
■ i+ 1 ,
■ i+ l ,
Time Slice, t;
Temporal Links
Time Slice, ti+i
Figure 4.11. Time slice representation of the DBN example
As stated earlier, the temporal relationships for all time slices must be identical in a 
DBN. For instance, if A(ts) is not connected with A(t4), while A(ti) and Afe) and A(ti) 
and A(t3) are connected (in Figure 4.10), then the network cannot be treated as a DBN. 
In addition, the strength of the temporal links, i.e. conditional probabilities (also known 
as transition probabilities), should also be the same. In this example, P[A(ti+i)|A(tj)] and 
P[B(ti+i)|B(tj)] should be equal to P[A(ti)|A(ti_i)] and P[B(ti)|B(ti-i)] respectively.
Probability distributions of the variables A(t{) and B(t;) at time slice tj, i.e. P[A(t;)] and 
P[B(tj)], and the conditional probabilities within two time instances of the variables 
(P[A(ti+i)|A(ti)] and P[B(tj+i)|B(tj)]) are used to calculate P[A(ti+i)] and P[B(ti+i)] at time 
slice ti+i. P[A(tj+i)] and P[B(ti+i)] are then used to calculate the P[C(tj+i)] within the time 
slice tj+i. This procedure will be repeated until the time horizon is reached. This method 
can save considerable analytical effort and time when there are more variables within a 
time slice and/or more number of time slices. With the development of technology this 
type of analysis can be easily carried out using commercially available software (e.g. 
Hugin, 2007).
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4.3 Examples of Applications of BBN
Bayesian networks have been widely used in various industries, such as, medical (e.g. 
Gerevini et al. 1990), software (e.g. Heckerman and Breese, 1994), finance (e.g. 
Abramson and Finizza, 1995), weather forecasting (e.g. Abramson et al., 1996), 
agriculture (e.g. Batchelor and Cain, 1999) and defence (e.g. Neil et al., 2001). Recently, 
researchers have focused on the application of BBN for modelling system effects 
because of its flexibility to adopt the ‘AND’ (series system) and ‘OR’ (parallel system) 
relationships used in fault-tree representation. Furthermore, it can model systems which 
have neither ‘AND’ nor ‘OR’ relationships (Wilson and Huzurbazar, 2006). The 
relevance of this concept for the deterioration modelling of bridges is explained in 
Chapter 6 .
Weber and Jouffe (2003) compared the effectiveness of DBN against Markov Chains in 
predicting the reliability variation of systems with time, through a simple example. A 
water distribution system with three valves (Vi, V2 and V3) was considered (Figure 
4.12a). This system was modelled using DBN as shown in Figure 4.12b. The same 
system was modelled using a Markov Chain, which resulted in 25 different 
combinations to identify the state of water supply. The Markov model required more 
computational effort than the DBN model, while results from both models were found to 
be similar.
The above study demonstrates that while both DBN and Markov model are useful in 
predicting the variation in the reliability of a system, DBN modelling can be more 
readily carried out. In addition, in the Markov model the possible combinations of 
element failures that lead to the system failure need to be identified. Hence, when 
considering large systems with several elements and different failure modes, some 
potential failures arising from combinations of element failure may be missed. On the 
other hand, DBN links the relationships between the elements and the system first, and 
then defines the possible combinations of failure modes through conditional 
probabilities. Hence, it is less likely to miss potential failure combinations.
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V a ( k + 1 )  )  (  V i ( k + 1 )
W a t e r
S u p p l y
R O R C
W S
(a). Water Supply System (b). DBN Representation
Figure 4.12. DBN representation of a water supply system (Weber & Jouffe, 2003)
4.4 BBN for Bridge Deterioration Modelling
As discussed in Chapter 3, fault tree models were widely used to link element level 
conditions with bridge level condition (e.g. Sianipar and Adams, 1997, LeBeau and 
Wadia-Fascetti, 2000). These models are limited to either ‘series’ or ‘parallel’ 
relationships. On the other hand, BBN is ideally capable of modelling any type of 
relationship between the elements. In Section 6.2 of Chapter 6 , these two methods are 
compared through a typical masonry arch bridge support condition model, which is a 
function of abutment and wing wall conditions. Furthermore, variation in condition with 
time can be incorporated through the use of DBN. In this case the model is not limited 
only to Markov assumption, and any complex relationship can be used. Considering the 
above specific benefits and the common benefits listed in Section 4.1, it has been 
decided to use the BBN and DBN techniques to model bridge group deterioration with 
time.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, the basic theory of BBN is introduced, followed by a brief summary of 
relevant applications. The scope of the contents is limited in providing an understanding 
for the DBN model presented in Chapter 6 . BBN is an efficient tool for reasoning and
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decision making under uncertain circumstances. One of the important features of BBN is 
its graphical representation, which makes the domain of the problem easily 
understandable. In addition, it uses Bayesian probability theorem for probability 
calculations, and, hence the results have mathematical background unlike some of the 
‘black-box' treatments followed in methods such as neural networks. Moreover, BBN 
can utilize experts’ knowledge in the absence of adequate real data, and the model can 
be easily updated as new information arrives.
There are two important issues that need to be addressed in the BBN modelling. First, 
the domain of the problem being modelled has to be studied carefully and all the 
important variables having influence on the problem and the relationships between them 
must be identified to form the graphical structure of the problem (causal network). The 
other important task is the specification of conditional probabilities between the 
variables. For larger networks this could be a tedious task as the number of conditional 
probabilities increase exponentially with respect to the number of variables. For 
instance, if a network has ‘n’ variables, each with two states, then the number of 
conditional probabilities is 2 n, whereas, if all the variables have three states, then the 
number of conditional probabilities would be 3n (Jenson and Nielsen, 2007).
Despite these difficulties in the modelling process, Bayesian Networks have been found 
to be a popular tool for decision making in various sectors from the early 1990s 
onwards. Even though most of the studies found in the literature deal with static 
domains, Bayesian Networks are capable of modelling situations that change over time 
as well. The underlining concept remains the same, that is, a graphical structure showing 
the relationships between the variables by means of conditional probabilities.
BBN is found to be an effective alternative for traditional fault trees for modelling 
system effects since it can be used to model any relationship between the elements in a 
system, in addition to the ‘series’ and ‘parallel’ relationships used in fault trees. These 
two methods are compared through a practical example in Chapter 6 , followed by the 
development of a system model for masonry arch bridge group condition from minor 
elements’ conditions. DBN is capable of incorporating temporal relationships in a 
network, which has been utilized along with the system model to develop condition-time 
profiles for the masonry arch bridge group.
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Chapter 5: A Risk Ranking Strategy
for Bridge Networks
5.1 Introduction
In the literature, RBI applications have been limited mainly to element/structure level or 
to a group of structures with similar characteristics (Chapter 2). However, such an 
approach is not feasible for a large bridge network consisting of bridges with different 
characteristics. Even if all the bridges are individually analysed, and inspections are 
scheduled accordingly that will result in large variations in inspection intervals over the 
network. This will subsequently lead to practical difficulties in planning and conducting 
inspections and associated additional expenses. Therefore, it is necessary to categorise 
the network into a number of groups consisting of bridges with comparable risk as part 
of developing an RBI methodology. A systematic risk ranking approach for a network of 
bridges is developed for this purpose. This method does not only categorize the bridges 
into groups with similar characteristics but also ranks them according to their relative 
risk levels. Therefore, the inspection intervals could be selected based on these risk 
levels.
There are many factors that affect risk of a bridge network. These are identified in 
Section 5.2 and rationally combined into five bridge attributes. In Section 5.3, a 
qualitative scoring system is introduced, which utilizes the attributes to rank bridges in 
terms of their relative risk. The relative importance of the attributes in deriving the risk 
scores is studied through a sensitivity analysis. The methodology has been demonstrated 
in Section 5.4 through its application on the UK’s Network Rail bridge stock. Processes 
are developed to establish the severity of the attributes for the network, and a random 
sample of bridges has been ranked accordingly. Useful comparisons between the bridge 
condition indices (the current practice) and the risk scores for these sample bridges have
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been made. The benefits and the limitations of the method and the potential for further 
refinements are discussed in Section 5.5.
5.2 Factors Affecting Risk and Bridge Attributes
Based on a study of available literature, and discussions with bridge owners, 15 key 
factors have been identified as having a significant impact in determining the relative 
risk levels of bridges in a network. These are highlighted in the left hand side of Figure 
5.1. Factors having similar characteristics or effects are combined to yield the following 
five bridge attributes; type, environment, inspectability, consequence, and deterioration 
(right hand side of Figure 5.1). The rational and criterion used to combine the key 
factors are elaborated in more detail in the following sub sections.
5.2.1 Type
In a network, there may be different forms of bridges with variations in the material 
type, construction form, and span, etc. Since each material has different mechanisms and 
rates of deterioration, material variation is a significant factor affecting risk. Bridge age 
is another important factor since it affects the rate of deterioration, hence the risk. 
Normally, a correlation can be observed between the bridge age and bridge form within 
a network of bridges. This may be due to the fact that the construction methods are 
similar over a certain period of time until another method is introduced. For instance, all 
the masonry arch bridges owned by Network Rail were built more than 100 years ago, 
whereas its entire concrete bridge stock is less than 100 years old (Bell, 2004). Hence, 
these two factors are grouped under a bridge attribute called ‘type’.
5.2.2 Environment
The ‘environment’ attribute is represented by factors that are external to the structure but 
play an important role in determining the structural deterioration, hence the risk. These 
include loading, climate, location, and surroundings of the foundation. For example, 
steel or concrete bridges in a coastal area or in an industrial area are more vulnerable to 
corrosion attack than bridges in a countryside. Similarly, if the foundation of a bridge is 
under water, it could be susceptible to scour damage. Severe climatic condition and
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higher loading increase the rate of deterioration. These factors are grouped together 
under ‘environment’ attribute.
KEY FACTORS +  ATTRIBUTES
Loading
Climate of the area (e.g. rain 
fall, frost)
Surroundings of the 
foundation (e.g. in water)
Bridge Location (e.g. coastal) ,
Bridges with access difficulty
Bridges having hidden details
Railway traffic flow
Road traffic flow
Duration/costs of remedial 
work
Material quality/ workmanship
Type
Inspectability
Deterioration
Consequences
Past performance
Maintenance works
Environment
Dominant deterioration 
mechanisms
Bridge Forms, e.g. Material 
type, Construction type
Age
Figure 5.1. Relationship between key factors affecting risk and bridge attributes 
5.2.3 Inspectability
If all the main elements of a bridge are not inspectable then the risk of some defects 
remaining undetected is high. The two scenarios leading to this include bridges having 
hidden details or bridges having difficulty in accessing the elements for inspection. For
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example, a tenanted arch bridge (i.e. a masonry arch bridge in which the area below the 
arch barrel is occupied for purposes such as storage) may have unidentified defects in 
arch barrels. Similarly, if some parts of a bridge are under water then it may be difficult 
to inspect them during visual inspections. These factors are grouped separately under the 
inspectability attribute.
5.2.4 Consequence
The consequence attribute covers a wide range of factors; from direct consequences of 
failure such as fatalities, injuries, repair/replacement costs to indirect consequences such 
as traffic delay costs, environmental impacts, political impact, etc. Evaluating and 
interpreting all these consequences in numerical terms is difficult. Hence, an alternative 
approach needs to be adopted. A reasonable judgement regarding the consequences can 
be made based on a qualitative examination of parameters such as traffic flow (over 
and/or under the bridge) and duration/cost of remedial works. For example, higher 
traffic flows can be used as an indication of high traffic delay costs, if the flow is 
interrupted, or high human loss in case of an accident. Similarly, the length of a bridge 
(multiple spans or long span) may be related to high maintenance costs and/or longer 
interruption during remedial works, etc.
5.2.5 Deterioration
The deterioration attribute incorporates all the factors relating to the time dependent 
degradation of structures. These include dominant deterioration mechanisms, 
workmanship, material quality, past performance and maintenance. The deterioration 
mechanisms dominate the time varying nature of the bridge condition/performance. 
However, the other factors will also assist in the classification, e.g. good workmanship 
and material quality and satisfactory past performance can be an indication of a lower 
deterioration rate.
5.3 Risk Ranking Methodology
A simple and practical approach to rank bridges in network, according to their relative 
risk levels, is introduced in this section. Initially, a bridge network is classified into a
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number of main groups, considering the ‘type’ attribute. Within each main group, the 
other three attributes, i.e. ‘environment’, ‘inspectability’ and ‘consequence’, are 
classified in terms of their severity. A scoring system is introduced to express the 
relative risk numerically by considering the severities of the above three attributes. 
Subgroups can be formed according to the relative risk scores. A flow chart highlighting 
the proposed risk ranking methodology is shown in Figure 5.2.
Form Subgroups
Classify Environment 
According to Severity
Classify Inspectability 
According to Severity
Classify Consequence 
According to Severity
Introduce Scoring System  
and Evaluate Risk Scores
Identify Type Attribute and 
form Main groups
Figure 5.2. Risk ranking methodology
In the present study, the ‘environment’, ‘inspectability’ and ‘consequence’ attributes are 
classified into two categories for simplicity. However, this classification can be refined 
further if necessary. For example, the environment can be classified as very severe, 
severe, medium or mild, instead of the currently proposed severe/mild classification.
It should be noted that among the five attributes described in Section 5.2, the ‘type’, 
‘environment’, ‘inspectability’ and ‘consequence’ can be considered time independent. 
Hence, these are utilised in this risk ranking strategy to provide an initial screening of
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the bridges in terms of their relative risk. The ‘deterioration’ attribute provides the 
variation of the condition/performance of bridges with time. This is used, along with the 
risk ranking strategy, to develop a risk based inspection planning methodology for a 
bridge stock (see Chapter 7).
5.3.1 Qualitative Risk Scoring System
Risk is defined as the multiplication o f the probability of failure and consequence of 
failure. The environment and inspectability attributes are related to the probability of 
failure (Pf) and the consequence attribute represents the consequence of failure (Cf). 
Therefore, a score representing the relative risk of a subgroup, R, can be expressed 
through Equation 5.1. In some structures, environment may be a critical factor in 
defining the relative risk whereas inspectability may be more critical in others. This is 
represented through the introduction of weighting factors for environment and 
inspectability attributes.
R = (W1E + W2I)xC  (5.1)
Where, E -  Environment Score
I -  Inspectability Score 
C -  Consequence Score
Wj, W2 -  Weight factors representing relative importance of E 
and I within the overall risk score R.
In this equation, a score of one for the best cases and two for the worse cases are 
assigned to the attributes. For example, a score of one is allocated for the mild 
environment whereas two is assigned to the severe environment. The relative risk score, 
R, is then normalized to vary between one and two by linear interpolation.
The effect of weight factors Wi and W2 on ‘R ’ is found to be small from the sensitivity 
analysis (Section 5.3.2). Furthermore, the scoring system is only a qualitative measure of 
the relative risk among the sub groups of bridges. Hence, it has been decided that it is 
reasonable to ignore the weighting factors from the scoring system and the ‘R’ is 
calculated using Equation 5.2.
R = (E + I)xC  (5.2)
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The risk ranking procedure for a typical main group and the resulting risk scores are 
schematically expressed in Figure 5.3. These should be repeated for each main group 
defined through the type attribute.
Main Bridge Group
Environment
Mild Severe
Inspectability
Easy
Inspectability
I
Hard
Consequence Consequence Consequence Consequence
Hard
1 1 1 1
▼
< ^ L O T V ^ < ^ H :2 h ^ > <C f L o \ v / >< H i g h > <\ L o \ v ^ >< ^ H ig h ^ > <C >Low <^H igh% >
1.00 1.33 1.17 1.67 1.17 1.67 1.33 2.00
Figure 5.3. Relative risk scores
It can be observed from Figure 5.3 that through the use of the proposed risk ranking 
methodology, a main group of bridges can be categorised into five subgroups with 
relative risk scores of 1.00, 1.17, 1.33, 1.67 and 2.00. Whilst these subgroups serve the 
purpose of categorising bridges for inspection scheduling, the risk scores can be utilized 
in specifying inspection intervals as will be seen in Chapter 7.
5.3.2 Sensitivity Analysis for Weighting Factors
The risk score (R) is calculated, using Equation 5.1, for different combinations of 
environment (E), inspectability (I) and consequence (C) factors (e.g. mild environment, 
hard inspectability and high consequence), while changing the relative weight of W1/W2 . 
The notation EIC = 122 represents the combination of mild environment (E = 1), hard 
inspectability (I = 2) and high consequence (C = 2). Altogether eight combinations can 
be obtained using various combinations of attributes, as plotted in Figure 5.4.
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Figure 5.4. Variation of R  for different W 1/W 2 
From this graph it can be seen that the variation in the risk scores with the relative 
weights is small when the relative weighting is higher than three. Therefore, a maximum 
relative weight of three can be used for the environment and inspectability attributes. 
However, it is difficult to decide whether the ‘environment’ or ‘inspectability’ is critical 
for a particular structure and to assign the weightings accordingly.
Hence, an additional analysis is performed. In this method, the worse case is assigned a 
relative weight of three. That is, if the ‘environment’ is severe then W 1/W2 is taken as 3 
and if the ‘inspectability’ is hard, then W2/W 1 is taken as 3. If both the ‘environment’ 
and ‘inspectability’ are in worse or better conditions, the weight factors have no effect. 
The scores with and without the weight factors and the percentage difference between 
these scores are presented in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1 shows that the percentage differences between the two methods are small with 
a maximum of 9.6%. This indicates that introduction of weight factors has only a small 
effect on the final risk score. Hence, considering the fact that the scores are only a 
qualitative measure of relative risk, the effect of weight factors can be neglected from 
the scoring system.
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Table 5.1. Differences in scores with and without weight factors
Condition
Score without 
weight factors
Score with 
weight factors
Percentage 
Difference (%)
EKM11 1.00 1.00 0
EIC=112 1.33 1.33 0
EIC=T21 1.17 1.25 6.8
EIC=122 1.67 1.83 9.6
EIC=211 1.17 1.25 6.8
EIC=212 1.67 1.83 9.6
EIC=221 1.33 1.33 0
EIC=222 2.00 2.00 0
5.4 Case Study on Network Rail Bridge Stock
The proposed risk ranking strategy is demonstrated through its application on the UK 
Network Rail bridge stock that comprises over 40,000 bridges. This includes under line 
bridges (bridges carrying railway traffic) and over line bridges (bridges carrying roads 
over the railway lines). Criteria for the classification of the attributes are established in 
the following sub sections. A random sample of bridges is ranked according to the 
relative risk to demonstrate the risk ranking methodology. The resulted risk scores are 
compared with condition indices of the sample bridges to check the validity of the 
methodology.
5.4.1 Type Attribute -  Main Group Identification
Main groups for the bridge stock are identified from the ‘type’ attribute. A break down 
of the Network Rail bridge stock in terms of their structural form and age are presented 
in Figure 5.5 and Table 5.2 respectively.
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Figure 5.5. Breakdown of Network Rail bridge types (Bell, 2004a)
Table 5.2. Network Rail bridge age details (Bell, 2004a)
Age (years)
Bridge Type
Concrete Metal Masonry
<20 3% 4% -
20-50 6% 4% -
50-100 1 % 12% -
>100 - 20% 50%
The following observations have been made from these data.
• Half of the network bridges are masonry arch bridges comprising either brick or 
stone, and are over 100 years old.
• Metallic bridges constitute about 40% of the stock and spread over three age ranges, 
i.e. less than 50 years , from 50 to 100 years and more than 100 years.
• The remaining bridges are made of concrete and were constructed mostly within the 
last 50 years.
Hence, the network can be classified into the following main groups; brick masonry
arch, stone masonry arch, steel, other metallic and concrete bridges.
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In addition to the above observations, discussions with bridge stock owners and 
contractors (Steering Committee, 2005-2008) have been carried out to help with the 
development of the project. These discussions have led to the following suggestions.
• Cast iron bridges have the tendency to fail in a brittle manner. Therefore, it is
necessary to consider them as a separate group, although they are very small in
number.
• The age variation in the other metallic bridges can be better represented through their 
construction method instead of the material type. Old metallic bridges were mainly 
made up of riveted connections, whereas new bridges were constructed with welded 
connections.
• Although different construction forms have been used in concrete bridges, their main 
modes of deteriorations are similar. In addition they are only 10% of the stock.
Hence, only one group would be representative for this type.
Based on the observations and discussions, following six main groups are proposed to 
represent the Network Rail’s bridge stock. They are,
• Brick Masonry Arch bridges
• Stone Masonry Arch bridges
• Cast Iron bridges
• Riveted metallic bridges
• Welded metallic bridges
• Concrete bridges
This classification may be further refined if required. For example, brick masonry arch 
bridges, which comprise about 37% of the bridge stock, can be further classified based 
on the quality of brick and mortar used over various time spans.
It is worth highlighting that a detailed understanding about the bridge network under 
consideration is necessary to select suitable main bridge groups. If data is not available 
or inadequate, expert knowledge can be utilised as seen from this example.
i f  UNIVERSITY OF 7 9
b  SURREY
Chapter 5 A Risk Ranking Strategy fo r  Bridge Networks
5.4.2 Environment Attribute Classification
Four factors, i.e. loading, climate, location, and surroundings of the foundation, are 
identified as having influence in determining the ‘environment’ attribute (Figure 5.1). 
However, their effects could be different for different material type. Hence, it is 
necessary to understand the influence of these factors in some detail. From a literature 
study, loading, climatic conditions (frost and wetness), scour and presence of chemicals 
are identified as the primary causes for masonry arch bridge deterioration (Chapter 3). 
Among them, scour is not considered for the classification since the Network Rail has 
special inspection provisions for bridges susceptible to scour. The environment attribute 
of a bridge is categorised into ‘mild’ or ‘severe’, based on the severities of the other 
factors. Environment is considered to be severe if two or more of the following criteria 
are met:
• Loading: High
• Climate of the area: Severe
• Location of the bridge: Industrial area.
The above guideline can be modified depending on the specific requirements. For 
example, bridges subjected to very severe frost-thaw cycles may be considered to be in 
severe ‘environment’ regardless of other factors. Such decisions may be taken at the 
discretion of the respective bridge managers. The general procedure for classification of 
these factors is explained below.
5.4.2.1 Loading
Loading is one of the external factors that affect deterioration of bridges. For example, 
excessive and/or cyclic loading contribute to ring separation and/or fatigue in brick 
masonry arch bridges. A quantitative evaluation of loads acting on each structure is 
neither feasible nor necessary since this case study considers a group of 15,000 bridges. 
Hence, a qualitative classification of loads, based on the traffic types served by the 
bridges, has been used.
Railway routes are classified by the Network Rail into the following categories; primary, 
LSE (London South Eastern), main secondary, secondary, rural and freight (see
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Appendix A). Am ong them, primary, LSE and freight routes carry heavy and/or more 
frequent traffic and, hence, the underline bridges serving these routes are considered to 
be highly loaded. Similarly, over line bridges serving m otorways and trunk roads can 
also be considered as heavily loaded bridges (Steering Committee, 2005-2008).
S.4.2.2 Climate of the Area
Frost and rain are the two m ost comm on causes for the deterioration o f m ortar and brick. 
However, it is difficult to identify the rainfall and frost limits that cause the material 
deterioration. As an alternative, the average annual rainfall and frost are used as the 
criteria to establish the limits, i.e., i f  the annual rainfall or frost o f  an area is higher than 
the national average, then the climate o f that area is considered to be ‘severe’.
As an example, Figure 5.6 shows the average annual rain fall and frost m ap from the UK  
M et office (2007).
Rainfall Amount (mm) 
Annual Average 
1971 -2000
Days of Air Frost 
Annual Average 
1971 - 2000
Figure 5.6. The average annual rainfall and air frost maps (Met office, 2007)
From this data, the climate o f regions having annual rainfall over 1125 mm or air frost 
less than 55 days, which are the national average values, is taken as ‘severe’.
UNIVERSITY OF
#  SURREY
8 1
Chapter 5 A Risk Ranking Strategy for Bridge Networks
5 4.2.3 Location of Bridge
The susceptibility o f  masonry bridges due to their location is relatively low when 
compared to concrete or metallic bridges, which are prone to corrosion attack when 
exposed to salty environment. However, masonry bridges in highly polluted industrial 
areas are taken as severe in terms o f the location since the mortar and brick in these 
bridges are subjected to chemical attacks.
5.4.3 Inspectability  A ttrib u te  C lassification
As mentioned in Section 5.2.3, the inspectability can be affected due to any hidden 
details o f  the bridge or due to the difficulties in accessing the bridge for inspection. 
Figure 5.7 shows an example for bridges with hidden details. This is a typical tenanted 
arch bridge in which the areas under the arch barrels are occupied. Inspection o f all 
elements, especially o f arch barrels, is not possible in this bridge. These hidden elements 
may have unidentified defects and, hence, increased risk levels.
Figure 5.7. A bridge with hidden details (tenanted arch bridge)
In some other cases, inspectors may not be able to access all m ajor elem ents during the 
inspection. For instance, if  some elements o f  a bridge are under water, then it may be 
difficult to inspect them during the visual inspection.
These details can be obtained from the past inspection reports. Norm ally, the exam iners 
make a note in the examination report whether or not they were able to exam ine all 
major parts o f the bridge. If  there are hidden details or difficulties in accessing the 
bridge, then the inspectability is classified as severe.
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5.4.4 Consequence Attribute Classification
Railway traffic flow, road traffic flow and duration/cost of remedial activities, are taken 
as the indicators for the consequences attribute (see Figure 5.1). If two or more of these 
factors are classified as high, then the consequence factor is considered as ‘high’. 
Similar to the environment attribute classification, these general guidelines may be 
modified by the bridge managers considering the specific requirements. For instance, 
Network Rail may decide to assign ‘high’ consequence for bridges that carry an 
important railway such as cross country service, irrespective of the other factors.
5.4.4.1 Railway Traffic Flow
Railway traffic flow (in terms of volume and/or frequency) can be considered as an 
indicator of the possible consequences of an underline bridge failure such as human life 
loss/or injuries, loss of income, etc. Hence, it is important to assess the amount of traffic 
flow that could be affected by the failure of a bridge. Details such as number and 
frequency of trains, passenger/freight capacities of the trains, etc. will be useful in 
estimating the railway traffic flow consequences. However, when considering, a large 
bridge network, such specific estimations may not be feasible. Hence, it is proposed to 
use the railway line classification as a criterion. The primary and LSE lines are assumed 
to have high traffic flow rates (volume and/or frequency). Hence, underline bridges 
serving these routes are considered to have higher consequences in terms of railway 
traffic flow.
An alternative approach to identify the consequences of a bridge is by considering the 
maintenance policies used by the Network Rail. The most significant assets, which are 
generally identified by considering the traffic flow statistics, are maintained under policy 
A or B (see Appendix A.2 for details of the policies). Therefore, bridges maintained 
under these policies can be taken as having high consequence in terms of railway traffic 
flow.
The first approach is used in this study since the policy classification details of the 
sample structure are not available.
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S.4.4.2 Road Traffic Flow
In this case also, a qualitative method is proposed to identify the road traffic flow. If a 
bridge carries or is adjacent to motorways and trunk roads, then it can be assumed to 
have higher consequences in terms of road traffic flow. As an alternative, bridges on 
traffic sensitive roads (Appendix D) may be considered as of high consequence.
5.4.4 3 Cost and/or Duration of Remedial Actions
Cost and duration of remedial actions are bridge specific and depend on the severity and 
extent of defects. Remedial actions may range from small repair works such as, re­
pointing of masonry mortar or painting of steel girders to replacement of major elements 
or the entire bridge and the costs will vary accordingly. Duration of remedial works may 
contribute towards indirect costs such as traffic delay costs, loss of income, etc. 
Estimation of costs at this structure specific level may not be appropriate when 
considering a large group of bridges. Hence, for the purpose of this classification 
procedure, it is assumed that the bridges with multi or long spans may encounter high 
cost and/or duration.
5.4.5 Application of the Methodology on Sample Bridges
The proposed methodology has been demonstrated through its application on a random 
sample of brick masonry bridges from the Network Rail bridge stock. The details about 
bridge locations, railway routes and bridge spans are obtained from the past inspection 
records. Bridge locations have been compared with the rain fall and frost maps (Figure 
5.6) to identify the relevant climatic condition. Details of roads and industrial areas in 
the vicinity of the bridge have been identified from Streetmap (2007). The required 
information about the inspectability is also obtained from the past inspection reports. 
These details are used to classify the attributes.
As an example, the classification for asset Reference ANG034 is demonstrated here:
1. Environment Attribute
• This is a masonry underline bridge serving a rural line near to Roughton Road 
area. Hence, the loading is taken as low (Section 5.4.2.1).
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• The met office records shows that the rain fall and frost of this area is less than 
the national averages. Therefore, the climate is mild (Section 5A.2.2).
• Its land ranger reference is TG215407. From Streetmap (2007), there are no 
noticeable heavily pollutant industries near the bridge. Hence, the location is also 
mild for this bridge (Section 5.4.2.2).
• Therefore, the environment attribute of this bridge is classified as ‘mild’ (Section
5.4.2).
2. Inspectability Attribute
• Past inspection records for this bridge indicate no inspection difficulties or 
hidden details of the structure (Sections 5.4.3.1 and 5.4.3.2).
• Hence the inspectability attribute is classified as ‘easy’ (Section 5.4.3).
3. Consequence Attribute
• Since the bridge is in a rural route, the railway traffic flow consequence is low 
(Section 5.4.4.1).
• From Streetmap (2007), the road adjacent to this bridge is Hall road which is not 
a critical road. Therefore, the road traffic flow consequence is also low (Section
5.4.4.2).
• Inspection report shows this is a single span bridge. Hence, the repair and 
remedial costs is taken as low (Section 5.4.4.2).
• Therefore, the consequence attribute classification is Tow’ (Section 5.4.4)
Since this bridge has mild environment, low consequence and easy inspectability, 
according to Figure 5.5, a risk score of 1.00 has been assigned to this bridge. This 
methodology has been applied to other sample bridges and the classification is presented 
in Table 5.3. -
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Table 5.3. Bridge groups classification and risk scores
Asset Ref Environment Consequence Inspectability Risk Score
ANG034 Mild Low Easy 1.00
ANG006 Mild Low Easy 1.00
NW006 Mild Low Easy 1.00
GW006 Mild Low Easy 1.00
ANG031 Mild Low Easy 1.00
LNW-MID002 Mild Low Easy 1.00
STH030 Mild Low Easy 1.00
ANG033 Mild Low Hard 1.17
LNE030 Mild Low Hard 1.17
ANG007 Mild Low Hard 1.17
SCO 104 Severe Low Hard 1.17
LNE-MID001 Mild High Hard 1.33
LNE008 Mild High Hard 1.33
ANG030 Mild High Easy 1.33
LNE-MID106 Mild High Hard 1.33
SCO103 Severe Low Hard 1.33
LNW-MID025 Severe Low Easy 1.33
GW101 Severe High Easy 1.67
It can be observed from Table 5.3 that the majority of bridges (about 61%) in the sample 
have a risk score of 1.17 or less, which can be taken as a Tower’ risk category. Another 
31% of bridges have a risk score of 1.33 (or ‘medium’ risk). The remaining bridges (6%) 
have a risk score of 1.67 which can be considered a ‘higher’ risk category. None of the 
bridges in the sample has the highest risk score of 2.00. Although the sample consists of
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bridges from different parts of the network, it is relatively small compared with the 
bridge stock, hence, the network level risk scores could vary from this sample results.
5.4.6 Comparisons between Risk Scores and SCMI Scores
In order to check the proposed risk scores with the current practice, the SCMI scores of 
the sample bridges have been extracted from the Network Rail database (see Appendix 
A.3 for detail about the SCMI) and compared with the SCMI scores in Figure 5.8.
Risk Score Vs SCMI
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Figure 5.8. Risk score vs. SCMI
Figure 5.8 shows that the higher SCMI scores correspond to lower risk scores, which is a 
reasonable agreement between the two systems.
It should be noted that the ‘environment’ attribute is comparable with the bridge 
condition index since it combines the external parameters that play an important role in 
determining the deterioration. Therefore, a further check is performed by comparing the 
‘environment’ of the sample structures with the SCMI scores as presented in Table 5.4.
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Table 5.4. Bridge environment classification and SCMI scores
Asset Ref Environment SCMI Range of SCMI for mild and severe groups
ANG034 Mild 93
ANG006 Mild 92
ANG033 Mild 84
LNE030 Mild 75
NW006 Mild 70
LNE-MID001 Mild 70
GW006 Mild 66
52-93
LNE008 Mild 66
ANG031 Mild 64
LNW-MID002 Mild 61
STH030 Mild 60
ANG030 Mild 63
ANG007 Mild 53
LNE-MID106 Mild 52
GW101 Severe 58
SCO 103 Severe 52
40-58
SCO 104 Severe 47
LNW-MID025 Severe 40
Table 5.4 demonstrates a good correlation between the environmental attribute 
classification and the SCMI scores obtained from the last inspection reports of these 
bridges. Bridges belonging to mild environment have a higher SCMI score (the higher 
the SCMI score the better the condition) with two exceptions, i.e. ANG007 and LNE-
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MID 106. This may be attributed to other bridge specific issues, e.g. quality control 
issues and construction defects, etc.
The ranges of the SCMI scores for the two groups of severe and mild environment are 
40-58 and 52-93 respectively. This comparison shows that the environmental attribute, 
which is a key element of this methodology, is able to identify the bridge condition with 
reasonable accuracy. The extended range of mild environment bridges and the overlap 
between the two categories may be eliminated by introducing a medium category in the 
procedure, and/or with further refinements of classification criteria for the attributes.
While the SCMI score is a good indicator of the current condition it does not account for 
inspectability and consequences both of which affect the risk. Hence, the SCMI by itself 
may not be sufficient to provide a sound basis for risk ranking and inspection 
prioritisation. The proposed risk ranking methodology, on the other hand, includes these 
two additional elements contributing to the risk. In addition, it provides a rational 
framework for combining these factors to arrive at relative risk scores for various groups 
of bridges hence forms a sound basis to prioritize the bridges for inspection and 
maintenance works.
5.5 Concluding Remarks
The development of a risk ranking strategy is presented in this chapter. The proposed 
methodology is useful to rank the bridges in a network according to their relative risk 
levels. The method is systematic and practical to apply. It also provides a sound basis for 
prioritising interventions and inspections over a bridge network to ensure that a 
consistent risk level is maintained over the network.
Initially, the key factors affecting risk of a bridge network have been identified from a 
careful examination of available literature and consultations with a steering committee 
comprising various bridge authorities in the UK. Some of these factors are found to be 
affecting the risk in a comparable manner. Hence, these factors have been grouped 
together and assigned to a bridge attribute. The attributes are type, environment, 
inspectability, consequence and deterioration. Among them, deterioration is a time 
varying attribute. Others can be taken as time invariant for the time frame considered
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for inspection planning and used in the risk ranking.
Initially, the ‘type’ attribute is used to classify a network into main bridge groups. The 
other attributes, i.e., environment, inspectability and consequence, are classified based 
on their severity and the bridges within a main group are ranked accordingly. A scoring 
system has been formulated to represent the relative risk in numerical terms. In this risk 
scoring system, attributes affecting probability of failure are multiplied by the attribute 
affecting consequence of failure, considering the definition of risk. Environment and 
inspectability attributes affects the probability of failure, while the consequence attribute 
contributes to the consequence of failure. A relative weighting between environment 
and inspectability attribute has been introduced to identify the importance o f these 
factors in determining the probability of failure, hence the risk. Sensitivity analysis 
showed that the effect of weighting factor is negligible. Hence, a risk score without 
weighting factor is proposed.
The proposed method is demonstrated through its application on the UK railway 
network bridge stock, and some sample bridges from this network have been ranked 
according to the methodology. A comparison between the ‘environment’ attribute and 
the condition indices (SCMI) of the sample bridges has showed a good overall 
agreement between the two systems. This provides assurance that the proposed 
approach, although qualitative, its results are in line with the observed condition of 
actual bridges. In addition, the proposed risk ranking methodology considers the 
inspectability and consequence attributes to evaluate the risk score.
It is therefore proposed that this risk ranking strategy can be used by bridge owners to 
assist in an initial screening process to select and prioritise bridges for inspection 
according to their relative risk and form the basis for differentiating between the 
required inspection intervals for different groups. At the same time, this method 
facilitates to keep the variations in the inspection schedules across the network to a 
practical minimum level since this categorise the bridges into a small number of 
subgroups. This feature is particularly desirable when managing a large stock of assets 
like the Network Rail bridges. A further characteristic of the proposed methodology is 
that it is generic and can be adapted and developed further to fulfil the specific needs of
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different bridge or other asset owners. Further refinements to the method such as 
categorising each factor into three categories (e.g. mild, medium and severe) can be 
considered to improve the accuracy of the method.
The ‘deterioration’ attribute is taken into account through a bridge group level 
deterioration model using Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN) and presented in Chapter 6. 
A method to identify the inspection intervals for bridges using the risk ranking strategy 
and the BBN deterioration model is developed and presented in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 6 : Bridge Group
Deterioration Modelling: BBN and
DBN
6.1 Introduction
Prediction of deterioration in structural performance/condition is considered to be an 
important element in any RBI planning as discussed in Chapter 2. A bridge group level 
deterioration model has been developed in the course of this study to aid network level 
RBI planning. The objectives of this model are twofold; firstly, it links element level 
conditions to a bridge group condition, and, secondly it estimates the change in 
condition at the bridge group level with time.
Various techniques for deterioration modelling include empirical models based on 
expert knowledge, fault tree models and Markov models. Recently, Attoh-Okine and 
Bowers (2006) used Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) to estimate the bridge condition 
from element conditions (Chapter 3). A comparison of fault tree and BBN is presented 
in Section 6.2 with the aim to highlight the pros and cons of these approaches.
The above models are useful in predicting deterioration, but they are developed mainly 
for individual members or at the best at a bridge level. It was necessary to develop a 
deterioration model at a global level (e.g. bridge group /sub group level) to plan 
inspection intervals for a bridge network. Hence, in the present study, the concept of 
BBN model is extended from bridge level model to a group level model and presented in 
Section 6.3. The impact of various assumptions made during the modelling process is 
assessed through sensitivity analyses and is presented in Section 6.4. Temporal variation 
in bridge group condition is accounted for through the use of Dynamic Bayesian 
Networks (DBN) as elaborated in Section 6.5.
Potential uses and the limitations of the model are demonstrated through various case 
studies presented in this chapter.
4"' UNIVERSITY OF
xi 5 SURREY
92
Chapter 6 Bridge Deterioration Modelling Using DBN
In addition to the condition index deterioration model, a more refined material specific 
deterioration model for masonry elements has also been developed. This model links the 
root causes of masonry deterioration, which are identified from the literature review 
presented in Chapter 3, with the element level deterioration through a DBN 
representation. This can be used to plan inspections at element level. However, this 
model requires more data and/or expert judgements to develop the required condition 
probabilities. These details are discussed in Section 6.6.
6.2 Fault Tree vs. BBN
In the past, fault tree models have been widely used to estimate bridge level condition 
from element level condition (e.g. Sianipar and Adams, 1997, LeBeau and Wadia- 
Fascetti, 2000). Fault tree models propagate element conditions to a system level 
condition using either ‘series’ or ‘parallel’ relationships (Chapter 3). On the other hand, 
BBN is ideally capable of modelling any type of relationship between the elements 
(Chapter 4).
These methods are compared through a typical masonry arch bridge support condition 
model, which is a function of abutment and wing wall conditions. For simplicity, each 
variable is assumed to have only two states, namely, ‘Good’ and ‘Poor’. The initial 
conditions of minor elements, i.e. P(AC= Poor) and P(WC= Poor), are taken as 0.25. 
Hence, P(AC= Good) and P(WC= Good) would be 0.75. Where, AC = Abutment 
condition, WC = Wing wall condition and SC = Support condition.
6.2.1 Fault Tree Model
In a fault tree the ‘parallel’ and ‘series’ systems are modelled using ‘AND’ or ‘OR’ 
gates respectively (Chapter 3). An ‘AND’ system fails only if all the elements in the 
system fail, i.e. intersection of events, whereas failure of a single element will lead to the 
failure of an ‘OR’ system, i.e. union of events. In this example, the variables being in the 
‘Poor’ state is considered to be the ‘failure’ (undesirable) event and the corresponding 
‘AND’ and ‘OR’ system representations of the support condition are shown in Figure 
6 . 1.
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SC in ‘Poor’ Condition SC in ‘Poor’ Condition
AC in ‘Poor’ 
Condition
AC in ‘Poor’ 
condition
WC in ‘Poor’ 
Condition
WC in ‘Poor’ 
Condition
(a). ‘AND’ System (b). ‘OR’ System
Figure 6.1. Fault tree representations of a masonry arch bridge support condition
Assuming AC and WC are considered statistically independent, hence;
In the ‘AND’ model, the probability of support being in ‘Poor’ state is evaluated through 
Equation 6.1 (see Appendix C);
P(SC = Poor) = P(AC= Poor) x  P(WC= Poor) (6.1)
The probability of support being in ‘poor’ state for the ‘OR’ model is evaluated through 
Equation 6.2 (Appendix C);
P(SC = Poor) = P(AC=Poor)+P(WC=Poor) -  P(AC=Poor) X (WC=Poor) (6.2) 
From these equations, the probability of support being in the ‘Poor’ state, i.e. 
P(SC=Poor), is found to be 0.0625 when using the ‘AND’ model. If ‘OR’ model is 
considered, P(SC=Poor) would be 0.4375.
6.2.2 BBN Representation
A BBN is a diagram consisting of a set of variables connected through a set of directed 
links representing the relationships between the variables. The variable preceding a link 
is termed ‘parent’ variable and the variable at the other end of the link is called ‘child’ 
variable, e.g. minor elements (abutment condition and wing wall) conditions are the 
parent variables and the support condition is the child variable. A child variable is 
statistically dependent on its parent variables (Chapter 4). A BBN model for,the support
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condition, developed using a commercial software (Hugin, 2007), is shown in Figure 
6.2.
Support 
Condition (SC)
Wing wall 
Condition (WC)
Abutment 
Condition (AC)
Figure 6.2. BBN representation of support condition
Two types of information are required to fully define the BBN model. First is the 
conditional probability table (CPT) for linking the parent variables (minor element 
conditions) to the child variable (support condition) along the chain. Secondly, condition 
states for the minor element conditions need to be specified (Chapter 4).
The CPT used in this model is shown in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1. CPT for fault tree and BBN example
AC WC P(SC = Poor) P(SC = Good)
Poor Poor 1 0
Poor Good 0.5 0.5
Good Poor 0.5 0.5
Good Good 0 1
This CPT indicates that the support condition is assumed to be equally influenced by the 
abutment and wing wall conditions, i.e.:
P(SC = Poor | AC = Poor, WC = Poor) =1
P(SC = Poor | AC=Good, WC=Poor) = 0.5
P(SC= Poor | AC=Poor, WC=Good) = 0.5
P(SC= Poor | AC=Good, WC=Good) = 0
The output from the BBN model is shown in Figure 6.3.
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Figure 6.3. Results from the BBN model
In this figure probabilities are given as percentages. For example, P(AC = Poor) is given 
as 25%. Similarly, P(SC= Poor) is found to be 0.25 from this BBN model. It can be seen 
in Figure 6.3 that the P(SC = Poor) is the same as the P(AC=Poor) and P(WC=Poor), 
which can be attributed the assumed CPT. Different results can be observed by changing 
the CPT. For example, the fault tree ‘AND’ and ‘OR’ system results can be obtained 
through the BBN model by defining appropriate CPTs as explained in the next section.
6.2.3 Fault Tree Representation through BBN Model
As discussed earlier, the SC is considered to be in the ‘Poor’ state only when both the
AC and WC are in the ‘Poor’ state in the ‘AND’ relationship. This can be expressed
through the following conditional probabilities:
P(SC = Poor |AC = Poor, WC = Poor) = 1 
P(SC = Poor | AC = Good, WC = Poor) = 0 
P(SC= Poor | AC = Poor, WC = Good) = 0 
P(SC= Poor | AC = Good, WC = Good) = 0.
On the other hand, if either AC or WC is in the ‘Poor’ state, then the SC is considered to 
be in the ‘Poor’ state for the ‘OR’ relationship, i.e.:
P(SC = Poor |AC = Poor, WC = Poor) = 1 
P(SC = Poor | AC = Good, WC = Poor) = 1 
P(SC = Poor | AC = Poor, WC = Good) =1 
P(SC = Poor | AC = Good, WC = Good) = 0.
The full CPT for the ‘AND’ and ‘OR’ relationships are shown in Table 6.2.
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Table 6.2. CPT for BBN ‘AND’ and ‘OR’ relationships
Model AC WC P(SC = Poor) P(SC = Good)
Poor Poor 1 0
Fault tree Poor Good 0 1
AND’ Good Poor 0 1
Good Good 0 1
Poor Poor 1 0
Fault tree Poor Good 1 0
‘OR’ Good Poor 1 0
Good Good 0 1
The BBN model results are given in Figure 6.2.
Wino Wall Condition
IE.00 Good 
25.00 Poor
Support Condition :
56.25 Good 
43.75 Poor
: Abutment Condition
SH.00 Good 
25.00 Poor
Winq Wall Condition 
3 = 2 5  00 Good
?5 00 Poor
; Abutment Condition :
11.00 Good
25.00 Poor
Support Condition : 
ZZZ3QC2B Good 
6.25 Poor
(a). ‘AND’ System Results (b). ‘OR’ System Results
Figure 6.4. Fault tree results through BBN
From Figure 6.4, P(SC=Poor) for the ‘AND’ and ‘OR’ systems are found to be 0.0625 
(6.25%) and 0.4375 (43.75%) respectively, which are the same from the Fault tree 
analysis. Hence, the BBN is capable of modelling fault tree representation.
It can be seen from the above example, the fault tree model gives two different results 
for P(SC = Poor), i.e. 0.0625 and 0.4375, which is equivalent to around 86% difference. 
In addition, the physical systems of bridges are generally more complicated than just the 
‘AND’ or ‘OR’ model. Hence, it becomes necessary to use expert interference under 
these circumstances, for example, by introducing appropriate weighting factors for the 
results from both systems. BBN is useful in this context since expert knowledge can be 
integrated in the model when defining the conditional probabilities. One limitation with
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the BBN is that defining CPTs may become difficult when there are more variables 
and/or more states (Chapter 4). A systematic approach to develop the CPTs, which will 
help to overcome this limitation, is introduced in the next section.
6.3 A BBN Model for Masonry Arch Bridge Group Condition
The main objective of the present study is to develop a network level RBI plan. 
Structural condition and its deterioration are considered to be the appropriate criteria 
when planning inspections at this level (Chapter 2). In this context, a condition index 
deterioration model at a bridge group level is developed.
The case studies in the present study are performed using Network Rail bridge stock, in 
which 50% of the bridges are masonry arch bridges (Chapter 5). Hence, the scope of the 
present model is limited to masonry arch bridges. However, the methodology can be 
extended to any other bridge type using the basic principles described in this chapter.
6.3.1 Element Classification of Masonry Arch Bridges
Spandrel wall Parapets
Wing wall Wing wall
Face Ring
Barrel Arch
Abutments
Figure 6.5. Typical elements of a masonry arch bridge (Network Rail, 2004b)
A bridge can be considered as a system made up of several elements. In this study, an 
element classification, similar to the Network Rail structure condition marking index -
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‘SCMF, has been adopted. A masonry arch bridge is classified into the following major 
elements; end supports, deck and intermediate support (if any). The major elements are 
discretized further into minor elements (Network Rail, 2004b). For masonry arch 
bridges, the key minor elements for the supports include wing walls and abutments. The 
minor elements for the deck comprises barrel arch, face rings, spandrel walls, and 
parapets as shown in Figure 6.5.
6.3.2 BBN representation of Masonry Arch Bridges
The element conditions are treated as variables of a BBN. As discussed in Section 6.2.2, 
the support condition (major element) is considered as the child variable of abutment 
and wing wall conditions (minor elements). Similarly, deck condition (major element) is 
a child variable o f barrel arch, face rings, spandrel walls, and parapets (minor elements). 
These two major elements conditions are then connected to the condition of a masonry 
arch bridge group, in which case the support and the deck conditions are the parent 
variables of the bridge group condition (child variable). The resulting BBN model 
developed using this concept is shown in Figure 6.6.
fi Barrel Arch Condition
Spandrel Wall Condition
Abutment Condition Face Ring Condition
Deck ConditionWing Wall Condition Support Condition Parapet Condition
Masonry Arch Bridge Group Condition
Figure 6.6. A BBN model for masonry arch bridge group condition
This BBN consists of nine variables and eight links. Although some bridges may have 
additional elements, e.g. strengthening measures such as anchors, only generic minor 
elements are considered herein. All the variables are modelled using a scale of 0-100 
representing their SCMI scores. In general, an element having an SCMI score above 80 
is considered to be in ‘good’ condition, with no remedial or repair action required on the
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element. On the other hand, an element with an SCMI score below 45 is considered to 
be in a ‘poor’ state, in need of some essential maintenance action. Elements within the 
score band from 45 to 80 are considered to be in a ‘fair’ condition and require planned 
maintenance activities (Steering Committee, 2005-2008). Based on this information, 
each variable is considered to be in one of the three condition states; SCMI range of (0 -  
45), (4 5 -8 0 ), or (80-100).
The processes of defining the input values, i.e. the conditional probability table (CPT) 
for linking the parent variables to the child variables along the chain and the condition 
states for the parent variables, are elaborated in the following sub-sections.
6.3.3 Conditional Probability Tables
Usually CPT for a BBN is derived through the use of expert elicitation, i.e. an expert or 
a panel of experts specify the required probabilities. However, when there are large 
numbers of variables and/or states, the task becomes difficult and could lead to errors in 
the prediction. For example, in the proposed model, 27 conditional probabilities, 
representing different combinations of states of the abutment and wing wall conditions, 
need to be specified for the support condition alone since each of the three related 
variables (support, wing wall and abutment) has three states (see Chapter 4). Altogether 
297 conditional probabilities are required for the whole model. This could be a tedious 
task and, hence, has been considered as a major limitation of BBN in the literature.
As defined in Chapter 4, conditional probability is a measure of strength for the link 
between two variables, which reflects the relative weighting between the variables. For 
example, the support condition depends on the condition of its minor elements, abutment 
and wing walls. Hence, the support condition can be expressed through Equation 6.5.
S s= W ^ + W ^ S ^  (6.5)
Where, S's = Support SCMI score, Sa = Abutment SCMI score , Wa = Weight factor for 
abutment, Sw = Wing wall SCMI score and Ww = Weight factor for wing wall 
In the SCMI system, each minor element is assigned an element factor in order to move 
from the minor element level to a major element level (Network Rail, 2004b). These 
element factors reflect the expert knowledge on the relative importance of minor
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elements in defining the condition of a bridge. The element factors currently used for 
masonry arch bridge elements and the relative weightings based on these element factors 
are shown in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3. Element Factors for masonry minor elements (SCMI, 2001)
M ajor Element M inor Element ElementFactor
Relative
Weighting
Support
Abutment 10 0.67
Wing wall 5 0.33
Deck
Barrel Arch 10 0.51
Face Rings 3.5 0.18
Parapets 2.5 0.13
Spandrel wall 3.5 0.18
For example, the condition of support, which is a major element, depends on the 
condition of its minor elements, abutment and wing walls, weighted according to the 
ratio 10:5, which is expressed mathematically by Equation 6.6.
Ss =0.67 SA+0.33 Sw (6.6)
Where, Ss = Support SCMI, Sa = Abutment SCMI and Sw = Wing wall SCMI
An element can take any SCMI value from 0 to 100. Ideally, in a large network of 
bridges this could result in a uniform distribution of condition scores. Hence, the minor 
element conditions are considered as uniformly distributed random variables. For 
example, Sw in ‘Poor’ condition is represented as a uniform distribution with minimum 
and maximum values of 0 and 45 respectively, which represents their SCMI range. 
Similarly, Sw in ‘Fair’ condition is represented by a uniform distribution with minimum 
and maximum values of 45 and 80 respectively. Finally, Sw in ‘Good’ condition is 
represented by a uniform distribution with minimum and maximum values of 80 and 100 
respectively. The distributions for other elements are established using the same concept.
The distribution functions for all major elements given the condition states of the 
associated minor elements are derived using Monte Carlo simulation. For example,
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cumulative distribution functions (CDF) for Ss are computed using Equation 6.5, for 
each combination of Sw and Sa, i.e. nine probability distributions are derived for Sg 
using three condition states of Sw and Sa each. As an example, the cumulative 
conditional probability distribution of support condition given the . abutment in ‘Poor’ 
and the wing wall in ‘Fair’ condition, i.e. P(Sg = Si | 4 5 < S a< 8 0 , S w< 4 5 ) , is given in 
Figure 6.7.
CDF of P(Ss=Si/SA<45,45<Sw<80)
0.9
0 .7
0.6
0.5
0.2
0.1
10040 50 60 70 80 9020 300 10
|<------- Poor Condition  Fair Condition  condition
S s
Figure 6.7. The CDF of P(Ss = Si|SA<45) 45<SW<80)
From Figure 6 . 5 ,  the probability for the support being in ‘Poor’ condition given the 
abutment in ‘Poor’ and the wing wall in ‘Fair’ condition, i.e. P(Sg < 4 5 1 Sa<45, 
45<Sw<80), is found to be 0 . 7 9 .  Similarly, P ( 4 5 < S s  < 80| Sa<45, 45<Sw<80) and P ( S g  
> 80| Sa<45, 4 5 < S w < 8 0 )  are 0 . 2 1  and 0 respectively.
The full CPT derived for the support condition given the wing wall and abutment 
conditions is shown in Table 6 . 4 .
Similarly, the conditional probabilities for other variables, i.e. deck and bridge group, 
have been derived using Table 6 . 3 ,  leading to the relationships shown by Equations 6 . 7  
and 6.8 respectively. These CPTs are given in Appendix E.
SD = 0.51 SB + 0.18 SF + 0.13 SP + 0.18 SSw (6.7)
SBg = 0.5 Ss + 0.5 Sd (6.8)
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Where, Sd = Deck SCMI, Sf = Face ring SCMI, S? = Parapet SCMI, Ssw = Spandrel 
wall SCMI, Ss = Support SCMI and SBg = Bridge group SCMI.
Table 6.4. CPT for the support condition
Wing wall 
Condition
Abutment
Condition
Support Condition
Ss <45 45 < Ss < 80 Ss > 80
Sw<45 Sa<45 1 0 0
S\y<45 45<Sa<80 0.33 0.67 0
Sw<45 SA>80 0 1 0
45<SW<80 Sa<45 0.79 0.21 0
45<Sw<80 45<Sa<80 0 1 0
45<Sw<80 SA>80 0 0.44 0.56
Sw >80 SA<45 0.50 0.50 0
Sw >80 45<Sa<80 0 0.85 0.15
Sw >80 SA>80 0 0 1
6.3.4 Initial Conditions of Minor Elements
Element level SCMI scores for a random sample of 50 masonry arch bridges have been 
used in this study to derive probability distributions for the condition of minor elements 
in the bridge network. These are then used to define the probabilities associated with 
each of the three states for the minor elements, i.e. P(SCMI < 45) for ‘Poor’, P(45 < 
SCMI < 80) for ‘Fair’, and P(SCMI > 80) for ‘Good’ condition. As an example, the CDF 
of the Sw obtained from the histogram of the wing wall SCMI scores is shown in Figure 
6 .8.
From the CDF, the probability that the wing walls are in poor condition is computed as 
0.21. The probability for it to be in fair state is 0.50 and the probability for it to be in 
good state is 0.29. Since there are only three mutually exclusive states, the probabilities 
sum up to unity.
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Figure 6.8. CDF of Sw
The CDFs for all other elements are shown in Appendix E. These probabilities for all the 
minor elements in the selected sample of 50 bridges are summarized in Table 6.5.
Table 6.5. Element level probability distribution of sample structures
Variable P(SX<45)* P(45<SX<80)* P(SX >80)*
Wingiwall condition 0.21 0.50 0.29
Abutment condition 0.21 0.63 0.16
Barrel arch condition 0:22 0.67 0.11
Face ring condition 0.15 0.68 0.17
Parapet condition 0.12 0.69 0.19
Spandrel wall condition 0.19 0.63 0.18
* Sx = SCMI score of respective elements, i.e. Sw, Sa, Sb, Sf, S? and Ssw
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6.3.5 Model Outputs
Probabilities o f the major elements and the bridge group being in the prescribed intervals 
(e.g. P(SBg<45), P(45<SBg<80) and P(SBg> 80)) can be obtained as outputs from the 
BBN model.
Abutment Condition:
20.83 0 - 4 5  
3.54 45 - 80 
15.63 80 - 100
Spandrel Wall Condition
19.35 0 - 4 5  
,2.91 45 - 80 
17.74 80 - 100
Barrel Arch Condition
22.22 0 - 45 
36.66 45 - 80 
11.12 8 0 -1 0 0
Winq Wall Condition
20.90 0 - 4 5  _
1 50.29 45 - 80 )—* 
28.81 80 - KKT
Support Condition :
20.04 0 - 4 5  
H8.40 45 - 80 
11.56 SO - 100
Deck Condition
16.02 0 - 45 
23 45 - 80 
3.74 80 - 100
JL
Face Ring Condition
15.00 0 - 4 5  
18.33 4 5 - 8 0  
16.67 80 - 100
Masonry Arch : Bridge: Gr.
19.84 0 - 4 5  
.36 45 - 80 
3.80 80 - 100
Parapet Condition
11.60 0 - 45 
119.20 4 5 - 8 0  
19.20 80 - 100
d ition
Figure 6.9. Results from the BBN model
The BBN model results representing the sample structure data is shown in Figure 6.9. It 
includes the condition states and associated probabilities (shown as percentages) for the 
variables to be in these states. For example, the probability of the support condition to be 
in a ‘poor’ state, i.e. P ( S s  < 45), is found to be 0.20 (this is shown as 20.04 against the 0- 
45 interval in the figure). The probabilities for it to be in ‘fair’ and ‘good’ states are 0.68 
and 0.12 respectively. These values add up to unity since these are mutually exclusive 
states. A hand calculation for the support condition has been carried out to verify the 
BBN model result and is provided in Appendix E, which shows a good agreement.
It can be seen from Figure 6.9 that the majority of the minor elements are in a ‘fair’ 
state, i.e. have an SCMI score in the range of 45-80. Hence, the BBN model estimates a 
higher probability for the major elements and bridge group conditions to be in this range. 
The CDFs of the variables can be idealized from this output. For example, from Figure
6.7, P(Sbg<45), P(45<SBg<80) and P(Sbg>80) are found to be 0.20, 0.76 and 0.04 
respectively. Hence, P(Sbg<80) and P(Sbg<100) are 0.96 and 1.0 respectively. The 
resulting CDF of the bridge group condition is shown in Figure 6.10.
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Figure 6.10. Idealised CDF of bridge group condition using the BBN results
The accuracy of the CDF can be improved by considering more number of states, e.g. a 
BBN model with five states instead of three states has been developed and is presented 
in Section 6.4.3.
As mentioned in chapter 4, BBN can be used to execute ‘what-if analysis, i.e. the 
change in the probability distribution can be easily obtained when new evidence 
regarding the conditions of elements become available. For example, Figure 6.11 
illustrates the potential change in probability distributions of the support condition and 
bridge group condition, if all the abutments are assumed to be in good condition (P(Sa) 
>80 =1).
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Face Ring Condition 
15.00 0 - 4 5  
63.34 4 5 - 8 0  
16.66 80 - 100
Masoi tlon
Deck Condition
16.02 0 - 45 
S124 45 - 80 
3.74 80 -100
Support Condition 
0.00 0 - 45 
3 42.73 45 - 80
S 3  57.27 80 -100
Parapet Condition : ;
11.54 0 - 4 5  
ZZ359.23 45 - 80 
19.23 80 - 100
Wing
20.90 0 - 45 
50.29 45 - 80 
28.81 80 - 100
Condition
Abutment Condition
0.00 0 - 45 
0.00 45 - 80
m m  so - loo
Masonry Arch Bril
4.67 0 - 45
S 6 4  45 - 80 
.5.68 80 - 100
Barrel Arch Condition
22.22 0 - 45
11.11 8 0 -1 0 0
Spandrel Wall Condition ■ 
■ 19.35 0 - 45
2023362.91 45 - 80 
1 17.74 80 - 100
Figure 6.11. An example ‘w hat-if scenario
It can be observed from Figure 6.11 that the probability of bridge group being in ‘good’ 
condition (P(Sbg> 80) increases to 0.16 from its original value of 0.04 (see Figure 6.9) if 
the abutment condition of the considered network is improved to a good state (Sa>80). 
A similar ‘what-if analysis by restoring the parapet conditions into a ‘good’ condition 
(Sp>80) showed that P(Sbg> 80) improves to 0.05. This feature is extremely useful since 
it helps in identifying the potential elements that should be focused upon during a 
maintenance programme to sustain or improve the overall bridge group condition.
6.3.6 Verification of the Model
The BBN model has been verified through simple checks, using ‘what-if analysis 
feature, with arbitrary extreme input conditions for the minor elements. For example, 
when all the minor elements are in a single state, both the major elements and the bridge 
group should be expected to be in that same state. The model, with all minor elements 
set at ‘poor’ state (SCMI range 0 to 45), is shown in Figure 6.12. As expected, the 
resulting probability for the bridge group to be in the poor state is found to be 1.
This simple check, which has been repeated for other conditions, i.e. all elements in 
‘fair’ or ‘good’ condition, returned expected results, hence validating the BBN model.
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Face Ring Condition
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0.00 45 - 80 
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Support Condition ; 
ZZZIQO30CBO-45
0.00 45 - 80 
0.00 80 - 100
Wing Wall Condition 
mmm^^o-45
0.00 4 5 - 8 0  
0.00 80 - 100
Spandrel Wall Condition
mmmmmmo-45
0.00 4 5 - 8 0  
0.00 80 - 100
Abutment Condition : :
m m  0 - 4 5
0.00 45 - 80 
0,00 80 - 100
Deck Condition
0.00 4 5 - 8 0  
0.00 80 - 100
Masonry Arch Bridge Gr
0.00 45 - 80 
0.00 80 - 100
Parapet Condition
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Figure 6.12. Validation results for BBN model
The model is also validated using the inspection data from the selected group of sample 
bridges. For this purpose, probability distributions for the condition states of each minor 
element, derived from the inspection records, were fed as input for the BBN model, as 
explained in the preceding section. In Figure 6.13, the bridge group level SCMI 
distribution from BBN is compared with the computed SCMI distribution of the same 
sample bridge group using the currently adopted procedure described in Network Rail 
(2004).
0,9
0.8
0-45 45-80 80-100
SBG Range, Si
0Sample Structure Results OBBN Mode! Results
Figure 6.13. BBN model results Vs sample structures results
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It is evident from the figure that the results from the two methods are strongly correlated 
providing further assurance regarding the validity of the BBN model. The small 
differences observed can be attributed to the fact that the BBN considers only the 
generic elements present in masonry arch bridges, whereas, the sample structure SCMI 
scores could include the conditions of bridge specific elements such as introduced 
strengthening. Hence, there is a slight variation between the two results.
6.4 Sensitivity Analyses
The effects of assumptions and procedures followed in the BBN modelling have been 
assessed though sensitivity studies.
6.4.1 Effect of Minor Element Conditions on the Bridge Group Condition
One procedure followed in the model is the specification of CPT using the relative 
weightings between the minor elements, which has been assessed through the following 
sensitivity trail. The ‘what-if feature is used to identify the effects of each minor 
element condition on the bridge group condition. Each minor element has been assigned, 
in turn, a probability of ‘V for being in ‘poor’ state, i.e. SCMI < 45, keeping the 
remaining elements in their existing state, and the resulting changes in the bridge group 
condition have been calculated. As an example, the output from the BBN model, when 
the wing wall has been assigned a ‘poor’ state, is given in Figure 6.14.
Face Ring Condition:::: 
15.00 0 - 45 
ÜÜZS18.33 45 - 80 
16.67 80 - 100
ditionMas
Barrel Arch Condition
22.22 0 - 45
11.12 80 - 100
Support Condition : : 
MS 41.26 0 - 4 5  
2 3 3  58.64 45 - 80 
0.10 80 -100
Spandrel Wall Condition 
5  19.35 0 - 4 5
2 3 = 5 5 2 .9 1  45 - 80 
3  17.74 80 - 100
Wing Wall Condition
MmNmmmo-45
0.00 45 - 80 
0.00 80 - 100
Abutment Condition :
20.83 0 - 45 
153.54 45 - 80 
15.63 80 - 100
Deck Condition
16.02 0 - 45 
« 2 3  45 - 80 
3.74 80 - 100
Masonry Arch Bridge Gr
32.61 0 - 45
0.65 80 - 100
Parapet Condition
11.60 0 - 45
19.20 45 - 80
19.20 80 - 100
Figure 6.14. The effect of wing wall condition on the bridge group condition
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The probability of bridge group condition to be in poor state [P (S bg < 45)] will increase 
from 0.20 (Figure 6.9) to 0.33 (Figure 6.14) due to ‘poor’ wing wall condition. The 
resulting change in the network condition probability is 0.13. This process is repeated 
for all minor elements to obtain the changes in bridge group condition probabilities for 
being in ‘poor’ state; these are shown in Table 6.6.
Table 6.6. The change in bridge group condition with minor element condition
Element changed to 
‘poor’ state
P(Sbg <45): when the 
element is in ‘poor’ 
state
Change in P(Sbg <45) from 
BBN model results using 
sample structure data
Abutment 0.52 0.32
Barrel Arch 0.45 0.25
Wing wall 0.33 0.13
Face Ring 0.25 0.06
Spandrel wall 0.25 0.05
Parapets 0.24 0.04
The sensitivity of bridge group condition on the minor elements is computed by 
normalizing the individually calculated change in the group condition (column 3 in 
Table 6.6) over the total change (i.e. sum of the changes in bridge group conditions from 
each minor element), which is presented using a pie chart in Figure 6.15.
Wing wall 
15%
Spandrel wall 
6% Abutment
38%
Parapets
4%
7%
Barrel Arch 
30%
Figure 6.15. Sensitivity of minor elements on bridge group condition
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It may be observed that the abutment and barrel arch have the greatest influence in 
determining the overall bridge group condition, followed by the wing wall and finally 
the remaining three minor elements. This ranking is in tune with the prior weightings 
given to the various elements (see Table 6.2). However, it also incorporates the actual 
condition of these elements. It is therefore possible to differentiate between elements 
that have assigned nominally equal prior weightings (e.g. abutment and barrel arch) and 
can thus reveals true sensitivities in the light of actual data/information about a given 
bridge stock.
6.4.2 Effect of Initial Conditions
An input used in the BBN model is the initial conditions of minor elements. Hence, it is 
important to see the effect of different initial conditions in determining their sensitivities 
on the bridge group condition. In this context, three other similar sensitivity analyses 
have been performed by changing the initial conditions of minor elements.
For the second case, all elements are considered to be in ‘poor’ condition (i.e. SCMI < 
45). Then each minor element is set to be in the ‘good’ state in turn and the resulting 
change in the overall condition has been observed. The sensitivities of the minor 
elements have been calculated using the procedure specified in Section 6.4.1. In the third 
case, all elements are considered to be in ‘fair’ condition (45 < SCMI < 80) except one 
minor element, in turn, which is assumed to be in ‘poor’ condition. The final case 
assumes all the elements in ‘good’ condition, except one minor element, in turn, in 
‘poor’ condition.
The sensitivities of the minor elements on the bridge group condition for the other cases 
are calculated in a similar manner to the case 1 (Section 6.4.1) and are shown in Figure 
6.16.
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Figure 6.16. The change in sensitivities with different initial element probabilities
As is evident from Figure 6.16, considerable variations in the sensitivities have been 
observed depending on the initial conditions. For example, sensitivity of the abutment 
condition in case 1 is 38%, which changes to 24% in case 4. This is equivalent to 37% 
change in its significance between the two cases. The change in sensitivities observed 
for different cases with respect to the case 1, for each element, are presented in Table
6.7.
Table 6.7. Change in sensitivities for different cases with respect to the case 1
Element
Change in sensitivity of minor elements with respect to case 1 (%)
Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
Abutment 3 13 37
Barrel Arch 23 17 30
Wing wall 27 13 33
Face Ring 57 71 100
Spandrel wall 50 67 133
Parapets 75 75 75
4? UNIVERSITY OF
#  SURREY
112
Chapter 6 Bridge Deterioration Modelling Using DBN
It can be seen from Table 6.7 that the sensitivities of minor element conditions on the 
bridge group condition vary considerably with the initial conditions. A maximum of 
133% difference between two cases (6% in case 1 and 14% in case 4) is observed for 
face rings. These highlight a strong influence of the initial conditions on the BBN 
outputs.
It can also be observed that the abutment and barrel arch have the greater influence in all 
four cases. This may be attributed to the prior weightings used in establishing the 
conditional probabilities.
In the fourth case, i.e. when the initial conditions of minor elements are ‘good’, the 
differences between the sensitivities are small. In contrast, the sensitivities obtained 
from the second test, i.e. when initial element conditions are ‘poor’, are inline with the 
prior weightings. This highlights an important point for good maintenance practice, i.e. 
when a structure stock is new and in good condition, maintenance resources should be 
spread uniformly across all minor elements, to maintain the network condition at its 
optimum levels. On the other hand, in an aged bridge network, priority should be 
diverted to key elements such as abutment, barrel arch, and perhaps wing walls, to 
optimize the network condition state.
From these sensitivity studies, it becomes evident that it is vital to consider the initial 
element conditions as accurately as practically possible in addition to the relative 
weightings between different elements to assess the overall bridge group condition and 
the BBN model is an efficient tool in this context.
6.4.3 Sensitivity of Number of States in the BBN Model
Another assumption used in the modelling process is the discritization of the element 
conditions into three states. Ideally, the variables in a BBN can be discretized into any 
number of states. However, increasing the number of states increases the number of 
conditional probabilities to be specified as well as the computational effort. A model 
with five states has been developed in order to investigate this effect. During the 
discussions with bridge owners and contractors (Steering Committee, 2005-2008), the
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recommendation was made to have the following intervals; (0-20), (20-40), (40-60), (60- 
80) and (80-100).
The conditional probabilities between the variables have been assigned using the 
approach specified in Section 6.3.2. CPT of support condition is given in Table 6.8.
Table 6.8. CPT of Support Condition (five-state model)
Abutment Wing wall
Deck Condition
P (S s< 20) P (2 0 < S s< 40) P (40< S s< 60) P (6 0 < S s< 80) P (S s)> 80
Sa<20 Sw<20 1 0 0 0 0
Sa<20 20<Sw <40 0.75 0.25 0 0 0
Sa<20 4 0< S W< 60 0.25 0.75 0 0 0
Sa<20 60<Sw <80 0 1 0 0 0
Sa<20 Sw>80 0 0.75 0.25 0 0
20<Sa<40 Sw<20 0.25 0.75 0 0 0
20<Sa<40 20 < S W<40 0 1 0 0 0
20<Sa<40 40 < S W< 60 0 0.75 0.25 0 0
20<Sa<40 60<Sw <80 0 0.25 0 .7504 0 0
20<Sa<40 Sw^'SO 0 0 1 0 0
40<Sa<60 Sw<20 0 0.75 0.25 0 0
40<Sa<60 20<Sw <40 0 0.25 0.75 0 0
40<Sa<60 40 < S W<60 0 0 1 0 0
40<Sa<60 60<S\y<80 0 0 0.75 0.25 0
40<Sa<60 Sw^80 0 0 0.25 0.75 0
60<Sa<80 Sw<20 0 0 1 0 0
60<Sa<80 20<Sw <40 0 0 0.75 0.25 0
60<Sa<80 4 0< S W<60 0 0 0.25 0.75 0
60<Sa<80 60< S W<80 0 0 0 1 0
60<Sa<80 Sw^80 0 0 0 0.75 0.25
SA>80 Sw^20 0 0 0.25 0.75 0
SA>80 20< S W<40 0 0 0 1 0
SA>80 4 0 < S W<60 0 0 0 0.75 0.25
SA>80 60< S W<80 0 0 0 0.25 0.75
SA>80 Sw> 80 0 0 0 0 1
' x w " 3
UNIVERSITY OF 1 1 4
SURREY
Chapter 6 Bridge Deterioration Modelling Using DBN
For the initial probabilities the same data used in the ‘three states’ model has been used 
(Section 6.3.4). These element level data have been discretised into five states to fit 
with the new BBN model states (Table 6.9).
Table 6.9. Element level input for the five state model
Variable P(SX<20) P(20<SX<40) P(40<SX<60) P(60<SX<80) P(SX>80)
Wing wall 0.11 0.09 0.21 0.31 0.29
Abutment 0.05 0.14 0.29 0.37 0.16
Barrel arch 0.06 0.17 0.22 0.44 0.11
Face Rings 0.05 0.10 0.22 0.47 0.17
Parapets 0.04 0.06 0.31 0.40 0.19
Spandrel wall 0.15 0.05 0.18 0.45 0.18
The result from this model is shown in Figure 6.17.
Mas dition
Support Condition
1.53 0 - 20 
12.05 20 - 40 
34.33 4 0 - 6 0  
40.51 6 0 - 8 0  
11.58 80 - 100
Wing Wall Condition : 1 
10.74 0 - 2 0  
8.48 20 - 40 
20.90 4 0 - 6 0  
i  31.07 60 - 80
1 28.81 80 - 100
Barrel Arch Condition ;
5.56 0 - 20 
16.67 2 0 - 4 0  
22.22 4 0 - 6 0  
44.44 60 - 80 
11.11 8 0 - 10 0
Spandrel Wall Condition ; 
1 14.52 0 - 20
4.84 20 - 40 
i  17.74 40 - 60
ZEZ3 45.16 60 - 80
i  17.74 80 - 100
Face Ring Condition
5.00 0 - 20 
10.00 20 - 40
21.67 4 0 - 6 0
46.67 6 0 - 8 0  
16.66 80 - 100
Abutment Condition
5.21 0 - 2 0  
13.54 2 0 - 4 0  
29.17 4 0 - 6 0  
36.46 6 0 - 8 0  
15.63 80 - 100
Deck Condition
0.70 0 - 20 
8.53 20 - 40 
38.87 40 - 60 
48.15 6 0 - 8 0  
3.75 80 - 100
Masonry Arch Bridge Gr..
3.34 0 - 2 0  
! 6.18 20 - 40
4 1 .1 2  4 0  -  6 0  
c z a  45.54 6 0 - 8 0  
3.82 80 - 100
Parapet Condition : : 
3.85 0 - 2 0  
5.77 20 - 40 
I 30.77 4 0 - 6 0
S  40.38 6 0 - 8 0
19.23 80 - 100
Figure 6.17. Results from the five state BBN model
The idealised cumulative probability distributions derived from the three and five state 
BBN model results are compared with the sample structure data in Figure 6.18.
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Figure 6.18. Comparison of three state and five state model results
As can be observed from Figure 6.18, although the three-state model seems to be 
conservative (i.e. giving a higher percentage of bridges in the poorest states), the five- 
state model introduces a higher degree of accuracy due to the additional intervals 
considered. On the other hand, the five-state model requires additional input for the 
conditional probabilities, which is often difficult to obtain from real data. Hence, the 
number of states can be specified considering the level of accuracy needed in the 
analysis and any practical constraints in terms of analytical effort and time. In the 
present study, for the development of the Dynamic Network, the five-state model has 
been adopted, in line with recommendations made by the project steering committee.
6.5 Inclusion of Time Variation
The BBN model discussed in the previous sections serves as a system model by 
estimating the bridge group condition based on the element conditions. However, it is 
vital to identify the variation in condition with time to plan inspections.
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Dynamic Bayesian Networks (DBN) is a useful tool to model situations that changes 
with time in a repetitive fashion. In a DBN, the basic network that repeats with time, 
which is called a ‘time slice’, is connected through temporal links to form the time 
varying model. The relationships between the variables in two subsequent time slices are 
expressed through conditional probabilities (also known as transition probabilities) 
(Chapter 4).
The DBN concept is utilised to predict the change in the bridge group condition with 
time. The basic BBN model presented in Section 6.3 is transformed into a DBN model 
as shown in Figure 6.19.
B arre l Arch C ond ition
Time Slice, tjS p a n d re l  W all C ond ition  (ti)
A b u tm e n t C ond ition
B arre l Arch C ond ition  ( I H 1 ) y :
f  W ing W all C ond ition  (10 s F a c e  R ing  C ond itio n '
. A b u tm e n t C ond ition  ft M j S p a n d re l  W all C ond ition  ( t M  )
F a c e  R ing  C o n d itio n  g i + 1 ) 3
P a ra p e t  C o n d itio n% n g  W all C ond ition  ft 1+1)
D eck  C ond ition  ft i+ lj P a r a p e t  C ond ition  ft 1+1)^,
S u p p o rt C ond ition  ft i+1)
Time 
Slice, ti+i
M a so n ry  A rch  B rid g e  G roup C ond ition  ft i+1)
Figure 6.19. A DBN model for masonry arch bridge condition
In this figure, the minor element conditions at two subsequent time instances (tj and f+i) 
are shown by dotted and straight lines. For example, the variable ‘Wing Wall Condition 
(h)’ represents the wing wall condition at time instance U and ‘Wing Wall Condition 
(h+i)’ is the wing wall condition at the next time instance tj+i. Hereafter, these are 
referred to as ‘Sw(tj)’ and ‘Sw(ti+i)’ respectively. A similar reference system is followed 
with other variables. For instance, support condition at time instance tj+i is denoted as 
Ss(ti+0-
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In bridges, minor elements deteriorate over time, which then propagate to major element 
and bridge deterioration. Hence, the major elements (support and deck) and bridge group 
conditions are not considered as part of the time slice, but are evaluated from the minor 
element conditions using the static BBN model. For instance, Ss(ti+i) is not directly 
linked with SsCk), but it is calculated from Sw(ti+i) and S^(fr^) as in the case o f static 
BBN model.
An example for the time slice representation is shown in Figure 6.20.
.W ing W ait C . ' ;  A bu tm en t C o 5?.:. S p a n d re l  Wa; Barrel Arch J^ace R ing  C ..'’ 3 » arap e t Con..'*
Time Slice 1
W ing W all ) (A butm ent C. ) s p a n d re l  W a ..3 ( B arrel Arch... )  ( F a c e  R in g  )  (P a ra p e t  Co...
iW mg W all C .^) A bu tm en t C oj!) S p a n d re l  Wa.?,' fB arre l Arch . ^  ^ a c e  R ing  C..%* ^ P a ra p e t C on..
Time Slice 2
W ing W a ll ... ) (A butm ent C , .} S p a n d re l  Wa».3 (B arre l Arch... ) ( F a c e  R ing  ... ) (P a ra p e t  Co..
(Wing W all C .v  A b u tm en t C o .^  S p a n d re l  Wa.%* TBarrel Arch ...7 S a c e  R ing  C.,^> P a r a p e t  Con.I!
Time Slice 3
Avmg W alt C .T* A butm en t Co.%* S p a n d re l  Wa.l* (B arre l Arch ..^‘ S a c e  R ing  C..V S>arapet C on..';
Time Slice 4
Figure 6.20. Time slices of the masonry arch bridge group DBN
Figure 6.20 shows that the information is transferred from one time slice to another 
through the links between the variables. For instance, condition distribution of Sw(ti) is 
used as the input for Sw(ti+i), and the condition distribution of Sw(tj+i) is calculated 
based on the transition probabilities [P(Sw(ti+i)=Si|Sw(tj)= S j. This result will be used 
as the input for the condition at the next time slice [Sw(tj+2)], and so on.
The process of defining the input values for the model is elaborated in the following sub­
sections.
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6.5.1 Model Inputs
Three types of data are required to fully define the DBN model. First is the CPT for 
linking the minor elements to the major elements and to the bridge group. Secondly, the 
initial element conditions (e.g. Sw(ti)) need to be specified. These are defined similar to 
the static model as discussed in Sections and 6.3.3 and 6.3.4.
In addition, the transition probabilities related to successive time steps, e.g. 
[P(Sw(ti+i)=Si|Sw(ti)= S j ] ,  for each minor element have to be specified for the DBN. In 
the absence of real data, these have been assumed using the Markov principle. Thus, 
starting with the case where SCMI values for each variable are discretized into five 
states [(0-20), (20-40), (40-60), (60-80) and (80-100)], it is postulated that at the next 
time step each variable will either stay in its current state or move to the immediate next 
state. An example of the transition probabilities used for wing wall conditions is given in 
Table 6.10.
Table 6.10. An example for transition probabilities
P [Sw(ti+i)]
[Sw(ti)]
80-100 60-80 40-60 20-40 0-20
P (S w (W )>  80) 0.9 0 0 0 0
P(60< Sw(ti+i) < 80)) 0.1 0.9 0 0 0
P(40< Sw (W <60)) 0 0.1 0.9 0 0
P(20< Sw (W <40)) 0 0 0.1 0.9 0
P(Sw(ti+i) < 20)) 0 0 0 0.1 1
In this Table, the probability of Sw stays at its current state at the next time step, e.g. 
P(Sw(ti+i)>80|Sw(tj)>80), is assumed to be 0.9 (This is referred to as Ph hereafter 
adopting the notation given in Chapter 3). Hence, according to the Markov principle, 
the probability of Sw deteriorating to the immediate next state is 0.1 (i.e. 1 - Pjj). If an 
element is in the worst condition state (Sw(tj) <20), then it is assumed to stay in the same 
state, notwithstanding the effects of possible maintenances. The validity of this 
assumption has been examined through a sensitivity study and is presented in Section 
6.5.5.
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It is also necessary to specify the transition interval, i.e. the time interval between two 
consequent time steps (i.e. h+i -  tj). In the present study, this has been set to six years to 
be consistent with the current inspection practice. A sensitivity analysis has been 
performed to determine the effect of the transition interval and presented in Section 
6.5.4.
6.5.2 Model Outputs
The output from the model provides the bridge group condition and the major element 
conditions at different points-in-time. These can be used to develop the deterioration 
profiles of major elements or bridge group with time.
For example, the histograms of Sbg at time step 0 (i.e. current condition) and at time step 
1 are presented in Figure 6.21.
0.6
0.5
0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-100
S bg
q Time Step 0 □ Time Step 1
Figure 6.21. Change in Sbg from ‘time step O’ to ‘time step V
It can be observed from Figure 6.21, at time step 0, the bridge group that has the highest 
probability (0.46) is in the SCMI range of 60-80 (i.e. P(60<Sbg<80) = 0.46) followed by 
the 40-60 range with a probability of 0.41. The probabilities in the other three intervals 
are relatively small. The mean Sbg calculated using this histogram is found to be 58.6.
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At the next time step, P(60<Sbg<80) decreases to 0.37 while P(40<Sbg<60) increase to 
0.50. Similarly P(SBg> 80) decreases while P(20<Sbg<40) and P(Sbg<20) increase from 
their initial values. The mean Sbg at time step 1 is found to be 56.3. Since the time 
interval between two time steps is taken as 6 years, the rate of change in the Sbg is found 
to be 0.38 SCMI/year.
The median Sbg range has changed from (60-80) to (40-60) at time step 1, while the 
mean value remains at the (40-60) range. However, the mean value also deteriorates to 
lower ranges during the subsequent time steps. As an example, the histogram at time
step 6 is compared with the time step 1 histogram in Figure 6.22.
0.6
0.5
0.4
w 0.3
0.2
0.1
0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-100
S bg
0  Time Step 1 □ Time Step 6
Figure 6.22. Change in S b g  from ‘time step 1’ to ‘time step 6’
It is apparent from this figure that the median Sbg changes from (40-60) to (20-40). 
Similarly, the mean Sbg also changes from (40-60) to (20-40). It can also be observed 
that the probability of Sbg having an SCMI score greater than 80, i.e. P(SBg> 80), 
becomes 0 at time step 6.
6.5.3 Deterioration Rate of SBg from DBN Model
The expected conditions of major elements and bridge group at each time step obtained 
from the DBN can be used to derive the respective deterioration profiles. As an example, 
the deterioration profile of mean Sbg is plotted in Figure 6.23.
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In this Figure, the deterioration profile is approximated by linear regression curve, from 
which the deterioration rate is found to be 0.30 SCMI/year.
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Figure 6.23. Deterioration profile of mean Sbg
6.5.4 Sensitivity of Transition Interval on the SBg Estimation
As discussed earlier one of the parameters that needs to be specified in the DBN model 
is the transition interval, i.e. time between two subsequence time slices. A sensitivity 
analysis has been carried out to determine the influence of the transition interval in the 
prediction of deterioration rate of Sbg- Initially, the transition interval has been set to six 
years as mentioned previously. Then, reduced time intervals (four, three and two years) 
have been considered. The element deterioration probabilities, i.e. 1-Pii, have been 
correspondingly adjusted to 0.066, 0.05 and 0.034 respectively, in order to be consistent 
with the initially assumed of 0.1 over the six year period. The change in the mean 
bridge condition with transition interval is presented in Figure 6.24.
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The effect of transition interval in estimating the bridge group condition is found to be 
negligible from Figure 6.24. Maximum difference of only 0.86% has been observed 
when using six time steps (or six year interval) and eighteen time steps (two year 
interval). Therefore, it has been decided to use the model with a six year interval. This 
arrangement is considered to desirable since this is inline with the current detailed 
inspection interval, hence, any information available from inspection can be directly 
utilised.
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Figure 6.24. The variation in mean S b g  with different transition intervals
6.5.5 Effect of Element Level Transition Probabilities on the SBG Estimation
In this model, the transition probability (P;j) has been assumed due to lack of real data. 
Sensitivity analysis has been carried out to study the effect of this assumption. The 
variation in SBg for different transition probabilities is plotted in Figure 6.25.
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Figure 6.25. Variation in Sbg with time for different Pii
It can be observed from Figure 6.25 that the deterioration of bridge group condition is 
dependent on the assumed transition probabilities. In addition, the differences in the Sbg 
estimations increase with time. For example, at year 6 the maximum and minimum 
estimations for SBg are 58.9 and 54.9 respectively, which is equivalent to a 6.8% 
difference. On the other hand, at year 36 the maximum and minimum estimations are
54.3 and 34.9 respectively (38.8% difference). Therefore, it is important to use as 
accurate transition probabilities as practically possible.
6.5.6 Sensitivity of Minor Elements on the SBg Estimation
Another assumption followed in this model is that the minor elements deteriorate at the 
same rate, i.e. P» is the same for all elements. This assumption has been examined by 
changing the ?» for the following elements: abutment, barrel arch and wing wall. These 
elements are selected since they have been identified as having a significant influence in 
the overall bridge group condition from the static BBN model sensitivity analysis 
(Section 6.4.1).
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In this analysis, each of the above three elements has been assigned a Ph of 0.75 in turn, 
while maintaining a Pü of 0.95 for other elements. The deterioration profiles of mean 
Sbg obtained from this analysis are compared in Figure 6.26.
65
60
55 •54.3
,51.1
>50.1
47.8
50
45
40
18 24
Time (Years)
30 36 42
Ai of all elements = 0.95
Ai of abutment = 0.75, Ai of other elements = 0.95 
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Figure 6.26. Change in Sbg with different element deterioration rates
As can be seen from Figure 6.26, the mean Sbg reduces to 47.8 from 54.3 (that was 
originally predicted) after 36 years when the abutment deteriorates faster than the other 
elements. This is equivalent to a 12.0% change. Similarly, if the barrel arch or wing wall 
deteriorate faster than the other elements, the mean Sbg reduces to 50.1 and 51.1 
respectively, which are equivalent to 7.7% and 5.9% changes.
The above results indicate that the effect of different deterioration rates of the minor 
elements will have an influence on the overall bridge group deterioration. However, for 
the time span of inspection interval (in this study it is limited to 18 years), the variation 
can be considered to be small. In addition, generally a good correlation between element
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conditions can be expected. Hence, the transition probabilities of all minor elements can 
be considered to be the same.
6.5.7 Inclusion of Inspection Findings and Maintenance Effects
As discussed in Section 6.3.5, BBN is found to be an effective tool for performing 
‘what-if scenarios. Similar feature can be used in the DBN model to identify the 
expected change in the overall bridge group condition due to the effects of inspection 
findings and/or any maintenance activities. For example, the change in SBg with time, 
when assuming the abutments are found to be in the worse possible condition (i.e. 
Sa<20) at year 18, is shown in Figure 6.27.
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Figure 6.27. Updating the deterioration profiles based on inspection findings
Similarly, the effect of any potential maintenance activities can also be explored with the 
aid of the DBN model. For instance, Figure 6.28 indicates the change in mean Sbg if the 
abutment condition is restored to good (i.e. Sa>80).
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This feature is particularly helpful for bridge owners to identify the effects of any 
potential future defects on elements and to plan maintenance works accordingly in 
advance to minimise risk. However, it should be noted here that it would not be possible 
to change the rate of deterioration since the transition probabilities must be identical 
between time slices for a DBN (Chapter 4). If it is necessary to change the deterioration 
rate, then the deterioration profile should be derived from two separate DBN models.
m 60
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Figure 6.28. Effect of potential maintenance activities
6.6 A Proposal for an Element Level Deterioration M odel
The condition index based DBN model described is useful for inspection planning at a 
group/network level. However, a more refined material specific deterioration model, e.g. 
fatigue crack growth model for steel structures, will be required to plan inspections at 
element level. Such a material specific deterioration model is not available for masonry 
bridges. Hence, a BBN model for masonry element deterioration, which connects the 
major deterioration problems affecting masonry elements with the root causes, is 
proposed in this section.
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From the literature study presented in Chapter 3, scour due to flooding, deterioration of 
masonry and brick elements due to ffeeze-thaw cycles, chemical actions and vegetation 
growth and fatigue due to excessive and/or cyclic loading are identified to be main 
deterioration mechanisms affecting masonry arch bridges. Scour can cause sudden 
catastrophic failures, hence, it is excluded from the scope of this study. On the other 
hand, the other factors lead to progressive failures with enough warning that they can be 
identified during inspections and rectified. A static BBN model consisting of these 
factors is shown in Figure 6.29.
Effects of Living Organisms Climate
( xxCMemicals
Loading
Mortar/ Brick deterioration
Fatigue
Masonry Element Deterioration
Figure 6.29. A BBN representation of masonry element deterioration
It should be noted that this is a simplified model for illustrative purposes only. More 
refined models can be developed following the proposed concepts. For instance, mortar 
and brick deterioration is considered as a single variable. However, these can be 
considered separately, if necessary.
In this model, each variable is assumed to have two states representing the severity. 
More states could be added if necessary. For example, climate is classified into ‘mild’ 
and ‘severe’, however, it could be further refined into very mild, mild, moderate, severe 
and very severe. The details of the states used in the model are presented in Table 6.11.
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Table 6.11. States of the variables in the masonry element deterioration model
Variable Notation States
Climate C
Mild
Severe
Chemicals CH
Not present
Present
Loading L
Low
High
Fatigue F
Low
High
Effects of living organisms EL
Low
High
Mortar/brick deterioration MB
Low
High
Masonry element deterioration ME
Low
High
6.6.1 Model Inputs
6.6.1.1 Selection of CPT
One of the inputs needed in any BBN is the conditional probabilities between the 
variables. The CPT in this model cannot be defined using the method discussed in 
Section 6.3.3 since the states of the variables are not expressed as a numerical scale. 
Hence, a systematic way is followed to define the CPT, i.e. if a parent variable is in the 
severe state, then the probability of its child variable to be in the severe state would be 
high. This is explained through the following examples.
Fatigue (F) depends on loading (L), i.e. F is a child variable of L. If L is in the state of 
Tow’, then F is also assumed to be in the Tow’ state, i.e. P(F=low) is taken as 1. On the 
other hand, if L is ‘high’, then F is considered to be ‘high’. The CPT for fatigue is given 
in Table 6.12.
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Table 6.12. CPT for fatigue
L P(F=Low) P(F=High)
Low 1 0
High 0 1
Mortar/brick deterioration (MB) is dependent on three parent variables; climate (C), 
effects of living organisms (EL) and chemicals (CH). These factors are considered to 
have equal influence in determining the MB, i.e., if  all of them are in worse conditions, 
then the P(MB=High) is taken as 1 and P(MB=High) is taken as 0, when all these root 
causes are in good condition. In all other cases P(MB=High) is taken as a proportion of 
root causes being in worse condition. The CPT of masonry element deterioration, which 
depend on F and MB, is also derived in a similar way. These CPTs are presented in
Tables 6.13 and 6.14.
Table 6.13. CPT of brick/masonry deterioration
CH EL C P(MB=Low) P(MB=High)
Not Present Low Mild 1 0
Not Present Low Severe 2/3 1/3
Not Present High Mild 2/3 1/3
Not Present High Severe 1/3 2/3
Present Low Mild 2/3 1/3
Present Low Severe 1/3 2/3
Present High Mild 1/3 2/3
Present High Severe 0 1
Table 6.14. CPT of masonry element deterioration
MB F P(ME = Low) P(ME = High)
Low Low 1 0
Low High 0.5 0.5
High Low 0.5 0.5
High High 0 1
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6.6.1.2 Specification of Initial Conditions
In this model, there are four parent variables; loading (L), climate (C), effects of living 
organisms (EL) and chemicals (CH). The initial conditions of these parent variables are 
required to calculate the probability distribution of their child variables. For simplicity, 
these parent variables are assumed to have equal probability for being in better or worse 
condition, i.e.:
P(L = Low) = 0.5 and P(L = High) = 0.5
P(C = Mild) = 0.5 and P(C = Severe) = 0.5
P(EL = Low) = 0.5 and P(EL = High) = 0.5
P(CH = Not Present) = 0.5 and P(CH = Not Present) = 0.5.
6.6.2 Model Output
The output from the model is presented in Figure 6.30.
Effects of Living Orqa,
Climate50.00 Low
50.00 High 50.00 Mild
50.00 SevereChemicals
“ 50.00 Not Present 
2 50.00 Present
Loading
50.00 Low
50.00 High
: Mortar/ Brick deterion 
EZZZEB 50.00 Low 
SZZZ3I 50.00 Ugh Fatigue1 50.00 Low 
I  50.00 High
Masonry Element Pet. .
50.00 Low
50.00 High lion
Figure 6.30. M aterial model output
It can be seen from Figure 6.30 that the masonry element deterioration has equal 
probabilities for being in Tow’ and ‘high’ states, i.e. P(ME=Low) = 0.5 and 
P(ME=High) = 0.5. This can be attributed to the assumed initial conditions of the parent 
variables and the CPTs between the variables.
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6.6.3 Sensitivity of the Root Causes
A sensitivity study is performed using the ‘what-if feature to identify the effects of root 
causes on the masonry element condition. Each variable has been assigned with a 
probability of 1 for being in the worse condition in turn, and the change in the P(ME = 
High) has been calculated. As an example, the change in condition when making 
P(L=High)=l is shown in Figure 6.31.
Effects of Living Orqa. ClimateJ 50.00 Low 
3  50.00 High C = Z  50.00 Mild c r z z z :  SO.OO SevereChemicals
50.00 Not Present
50.00 Present
Loading
B m  Low 
0.00 High
Mortar/ Brick deterior..,
50.00 Low
50.00 High Fatigue
EKQQ! Low 
0.00 High
Masonry Element Pet.■
US.00 Low 
25.00 High
Mas
Figure 6.31. The change masonry element deterioration when mortar/brick
deterioration is ‘high’
From this Figure, P(ME = High) changes from 0.5 to 0.75, when P(L=High) changes 
from 0.5 to 1. The changes in the element deterioration probability with the other root 
causes have been identified, by performing similar ‘what-if analyses and the results are 
presented in Table 6.15.
Table 6.15. Change in element deterioration probability with root causes
Root cause changed to 
worse condition
P(ME = High): when 
the root cause is in 
worse condition
Change in P(ME = High) 
from BBN model results 
in Figure 6.30
Loading 0.75 0.25
Climate 0.67 0.17
Effects of living organisms 0.67 0.17
Chemicals 0.67 0.17
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The sensitivities of the root causes in determining masonry element deterioration are 
computed by normalizing the individually calculated change in the group condition 
(column 3 in Table 6.13) over the total change (i.e. sum of the changes in masonry 
element deterioration), and is presented using a pie chart in Figure 6.32.
Chemical
22%
Loading
34%
Climate
22%
Living
organisms
22%
Figure 6.32. Sensitivities of the basic variables on the masonry element
deterioration
From Figure 6.32, loading is found to be the most influential factor. This could be 
attributed to the assumptions used in specifying the condition probabilities. Tuning the 
model with real data and/or using expert knowledge in specifying the CPT may help to 
improve the accuracy of these predictions. For instance, some bridge engineers may 
want to give more weighting to ‘chemicals’, when considering an element in a heavily 
polluted area.
6.6.4 Inclusion of Time Variability
This masonry element deterioration model has been transformed into a DBN model 
according to the procedure described in Section 6.5. The time slice representation of the 
above model is shown in Figure 6.33.
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Figure 6.33. Time slice representation of material model
In this model, the parent variables at time a time instance t; (i.e. L(ti), C(t;), EL(ti) and 
CH(ti)) are connected to the corresponding variables at the next time instance U+i (i.e. 
L(tj+i), C(ti+i), EL(ti+i) and CH(tj+i)). Information about the states of these variables at 
time h is passed to the next time instance tj+i, by appropriately defining the transition 
probabilities.
For example, if the traffic flow and hence the loading on a bridge is expected to increase 
by 5% each year, whilst other factors remain unchanged, then the annual change in 
P(ME=High) can be obtained by defining appropriate transition probabilities.
For loading: P(L(ti+i) = Low | L(t;) = Low) = 0.95
P(L(ti+i) = High | L(tj) = Low) = 0.05 
P(L(ti+i) = Low |L(tj) = High) = 0 
P(L(ti+i) = High | L(tO = High) = 1.
For other root causes:
e.g. Climate P(C(tj+i) = Low | C(tj) = Low) = 1
P(C(ti+i) = High | C(tj) = Low) = 0
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P(C(ti+i) = Low |C(ti) = High) = 0 
P(C(ti+0 = High | C(tO = High) = 1.
The change in P(ME=High) calculated from the DBN model is presented in Figure 6.34.
0.57
0.56
0.55
§ , 0.54 
Î» 0.53
0.52
0.51
0.5
0.49
Time (Years)
Figure 6.34. The change in P(ME=High) over time with the change in loading
From this graph, the rate of change in P(ME=High) is found to be 0.011. This example 
demonstrates that the model will be useful to predict the change in element deterioration 
with the potential future changes in the root causes. This information can be used in 
planning maintenance works for a particular element. For instance, if an abutment is 
subjected to severe vegetation growth each year, then the potential change in P(ME = 
High) can be evaluated and, the prevention measures can be planned accordingly.
This model is presented here to illustrate the methodology only. Further refinements in 
the model can be carried when using it in practical situations. For example, a qualitative 
classification of loading (low or high) is used herein. However, it is possible to define 
the loading variable in a numerical scale representing the annual average traffic flow and 
classify it into four or five bands as necessary. These aspects of the model are not 
considered since these are beyond the scope the present study.
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6.7 Concluding Remarks
A novel deterioration modelling technique for a masonry arch bridge group using DBN 
is presented in this chapter. Initially, a static BBN model, which serves as a system 
model by linking minor element conditions with a bridge group condition through major 
element conditions, has been developed. Two input values are required in this model, 
one is the conditional probabilities between the elements and the other is the initial 
conditions of minor elements.
A. systematic approach to mathematically develop the conditional probabilities has been 
introduced. This method will help to overcome the difficulties associated with the 
specification of conditional probabilities. The relative weightings specified in the SCMI 
manual have been used in deriving these conditional probabilities.
A case study has been performed using some Network Rail sample bridge data. Element 
level SCMI scores of these sample bridges have been used to specify the initial 
conditions. The model has been validated by performing simple ‘what-if scenario 
checks and by comparing the BBN results with the SCMI scores computed from the 
sample structure data. Sensitivity studies have also been carried out to identify the 
effects of various assumptions used in the modelling.
This static model is then transformed into a DBN model by introducing temporal 
relationship between the element level conditions at two consequent time instances. The 
minor elements are considered to behave according to the Markov principle. Transition 
probabilities have been assumed due to the lack of real data and sensitivity analyses 
have been carried out to examine the influence of these assumptions.
A proposal to identify the material specific deterioration of masonry elements has also 
been made. The major deterioration problems affecting masonry arch bridges and their 
root causes, identified through the literature study presented in Chapter 3, are used in 
this model. This model will assist in planning inspections at an element level. However, 
it requires further refinements in specifying the conditional probabilities.
In summary, the benefits of the BBN and DBN models include:
• Use of expert knowledge in the absence of real data
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• Easy updating with new information
• Any type of relationship between the elements can be modelled
• Help to identify significant elements in a bridge stock
• Effects of future anticipated defects and maintenance works can be studied
The methodology has been used in establishing deterioration profiles for the two 
categories of the environment, i.e. mild and severe, which are used in the development 
of RBI planning methodology. This is detailed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 7: RBI Planning Model
7.1 Introduction
A methodology to specify the risk-based inspection intervals for a large bridge network 
is presented in this chapter. As discussed previously, it is vital to categorise a large 
bridge network into a manageable number of bridge groups to develop an RBI 
methodology. The risk ranking strategy developed in this study is helpful in this context 
as it classifies a bridge network into a number of bridge groups and sub groups (Chapter 
5). Moreover, the qualitative relative risk scores obtained from this method are used to 
specify the inspection intervals. Whilst the risk ranking strategy considers the time 
independent attributes that affect risk of a bridge network, time varying nature of risk is 
incorporated using the DBN condition index deterioration model (Chapter 6). These two 
methods are integrated within the development of the RBI methodology. A framework 
for the RBI planning of a bridge network is presented in Section 7.2. A detailed 
description of the important steps of the methodology is presented in Section 7.3.
The proposed methodology is demonstrated through a case study in Section 7.4, using a 
limited amount of sample data from the Network Rail bridge stock. Sensitivity studies 
are carried out in Section 2.5 to quantify the effects of modelling assumptions on the 
specified inspection intervals and the effects of potential changes in the inspection 
regimes. Main conclusions drawn from the proposed RBI planning methodology, its 
benefits and limitations and the possible refinements of the methodology are discussed 
in Section 7.6.
7.2 RBI Framework
The framework for the proposed RBI planning methodology is presented in Figure 7.1. 
This RBI framework consists of two modules, namely, ‘risk ranking module’ and 
‘inspection planning module’. It is possible to use these two modules independently, 
depending on the requirements. For example, if a bridge authority wants to know only
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the relative risk of its bridge stock, then the risk ranking module can be used. Similarly, 
if it is necessary to evaluate the inspection intervals for a small group of bridges, then 
the inspection planning module can be used. However, for RBI planning of large bridge 
networks it is necessary to use both modules to maintain a consistent risk level across 
the network.
Inspection Phiuting ModuleRisk Ranking Module
Target
Value
Bridge Network
Clasrification by ‘Type’
Classification by ‘Consequence’
Inspection Intervals for 
Subgroups
Main Bridge Groups
Classification by ‘Environment’
Relative Risk Scores
Classifi cation by ‘ Insp ectability’
Deterioration Profiles for 
Bridges in Each 
Environment Category
Maximum and Minimum 
Inspection Intervals fora 
Main Group
Figure 7.1. The RBI Framework
The risk ranking module ranks bridges in a network according to their relative risk 
levels, and forms a number of main and subgroups with comparable relative risk levels. 
As detailed in Chapter 5, various factors influencing the risk of a bridge network have 
been grouped into five bridge attributes, namely, ‘Type, ‘Environment’, ‘Inspectability’, 
‘Consequence’ and ‘Deterioration’. Main bridge groups are defined by considering the 
‘Type’ attribute. The ‘Environment’, ‘Inspectability’ and ‘Consequence’ attributes are
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used to rank the bridges within the main group. A qualitative scoring system is 
introduced to express the relative risk of bridges using a numerical scale, hence forming 
subgroups with comparable risk scores.
The fifth attribute, ‘Deterioration’, deals with the time varying nature of the risk, while 
the other attributes can be considered time independent. Hence, it is treated separately in 
the inspection planning module. As discussed in Chapter 2, in a simplified quantitative 
RBI planning, an inspection is recommended when the performance curve of a 
structure/element reaches a target value. A similar approach is adopted in the present 
study to specify the inspection intervals. The ‘environment’ attribute incorporates factors 
(loading, climate and location) that are external to a bridge, but have influence in 
determining its deterioration rate (Chapter 5). Hence, within a main bridge group 
separate deterioration profiles for each environment categories are considered. 
Maximum and minimum permissible inspection intervals for a main group can be 
obtained when these deterioration curves reach a predefined target value. The maximum 
and minimum inspection intervals are assigned to the bridge subgroups with the lowest 
and highest relative risk scores respectively. The inspection intervals for the other 
subgroups are obtained by linearly interpolating according to their relative risk scores.
In summary, the important steps in the inspection planning module are:
• Selection of appropriate deterioration profiles for each environment category.
• Determination of a suitable target value.
• Evaluation of maximum and minimum inspection intervals.
• Identification of inspection intervals for the sub groups.
These steps are elaborated in the following sections.
7.3 Inspection Planning
7.3.1 Selection of Deterioration Profiles
Deterioration profiles of structural condition are considered to be adequate for inspection 
planning at a group or network level, while a more accurate performance deterioration 
profile is needed for a structure/element level inspection planning (Chapter 2). Hence, 
condition index deterioration profiles are used in this study.
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Ideally, these deterioration profiles should be derived using representative sample bridge 
data. The sample shall have adequate number of bridges with sufficient historical data. It 
is also desirable to have bridges within the sample covering all possible risk scores. 
However, in reality it may be difficult to construct such an ideal sample, and expert 
knowledge may be introduced, for example, through a DBN type model presented in 
Chapter 6. These two approaches are discussed below.
7.3.1.1 Approach 1: From Historical Data
If past inspection reports with a consistent condition rating system are available for a 
bridge stock, then the required deterioration profiles can be developed by considering 
the probabilistic distributions of ‘mild’ and ‘severe’ environment bridge conditions at 
various points-in-time. Typically, a mean value (e.g. Das, 2000) is used, however, any 
other value (e.g. certain percentile) can also be considered. Figure 7.2 shows an ideal 
case of obtaining data from the new/as-built stage. In this Figure, PDF = probability 
density function.
110
PDFs for Conditions o f  Bridges in 
‘M ild’ Environment100
Deterioration Profile 
o f  Bridges in ‘M ild’ 
Environment
90 -bO
g  7 0  „ __PDFs for Conditions o f  Bridges in 
2 ‘Severe’ Environment
1 60 - -...................... Deterioration Profile 
o f Bridges in ‘Severe’ 
Environment
35
Time (Years)
Figure 7.2. Deterioration profiles from historical data
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7.3.1.2 Approach 2: Using DBN Deterioration Model
In many cases, developing deterioration models using historical data would be difficult 
and expert judgement may need to be employed in these circumstances. This can be 
carried out using the DBN model presented in Chapter 6. The following inputs are 
required for the DBN model;
• Conditional probability table (CPT) for the links in the BBN model
• Initial element level conditions
• Transition probabilities of minor element conditions between two subsequent 
time steps.
The output from the DBN model will be the condition-time profile at a main group level 
as required (Chapter 6).
The CPT can be specified according to the method introduced in Chapter 6. If element 
level conditions for sample bridges from ‘mild’ and ‘severe’ environments are available, 
these will be used to specify the initial conditions. Otherwise, estimations from the 
bridge owners and managers about their bridge stock condition can be used.
Similarly, experienced bridge managers and engineers will be able to predict 
deterioration rates of their bridge stock in simple terms (e.g. ‘about 10% of minor 
elements will deteriorate to the next condition state from their condition current state 
during a period of 6 years’). The above statement corresponds to a transition probability 
(i.e. 1-Pii) of 0.10. Where, Ph is the probability of an element stays at its current state at 
the next time step. It is also advisable to obtain the estimations from a panel of experts 
instead of a single expert to overcome the effects of any potential bias.
The required deterioration profiles for ‘mild’ and ‘severe’ environment bridges can be 
obtained by feeding these inputs into the DBN model. A case study is presented in 
Section 7.4 to illustrate the practical application of this approach.
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7.3.2 Evaluation of Maximum and Minimum Inspection Intervals
The inspection selection criterion adopted in this study is presented through a conceptual 
model in Figure 7.3.
■Deterioration Profile o f Bridges in 
‘Mild’ Environment
Deterioration Profile o f Bridges in 
‘Severe’ Environment
Time
('Years'!
Figure 7.3. Conceptual inspection selection model
Structures deteriorate in a curvilinear trend. However, it can be assumed to be linear for 
the purpose of intervention/inspection planning within the time frame for inspection 
intervals (e.g. Liu and Frangopol, 2005). Hence, the model in Figure 7.3 follows the 
linear assumption. As it can be seen from this model, two inspection intervals (Tmax and 
Tmin) are specified when the deteriorating profiles of ‘mild’ and ‘severe’ environment 
bridges reach a pre-defined target condition index Cy.
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7.3.3 Inspection Intervals for Subgroups
Inspection interval ( T x )  of a subgroup X can be obtained by linear interpolating 
according to its risk score ( R x )  (Figure 7.4).
Inspection
Intervals
(Years)
R isk  
Score, R
Figure 7.4. Inspection intervals for subgroups
As discussed previously, Tmax and Tmin are assigned to the subgroups with minimum 
(Rmin) and maximum (R max) relative risk scores respectively. Inspection interval ‘ T x ’ of 
a subgroup X can be obtained by linear interpolating according its risk score ‘R x ’ 
(Equation 7.1).
Tx = T Mi, + - ^ - [ R x - R MJ  (7.1)
R
Where, T r  = Tmax -  Tmin
R r — Rmax ~Rmin
Rmax = Maximum relative risk score 
Rmin = Minimum relative risk score
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7.3.4 Selection of Target Condition Index, CT
The target condition can be specified by the respective bridge authorities since different 
authorities use different condition rating systems. However, an alternative approach that 
can be used with any condition rating system is presented in Figure 7.5.
Deterioration Profile of Bridges 
in ‘M ild' Environment
Deterioration Profile of Bridges in 
‘Severe’ Environment
Time (Years)
Figure 7.5. Selection of target condition index
In Figure 7.5, CM,6 and Cg,6 are the expected mean conditions of ‘mild’ and ‘severe’ 
environment bridges at the time of next inspection (six years in this case). It is proposed 
to use the weighted average of these values as the Ct (Equation 7.2).
r  _ r  _ Cm,6 x N m + Cs>6 x N s 
C t = C a v =  ( }
Where, Nm and Ns are the number of bridges in mild and severe environments 
respectively. This target value helps to maintain the overall bridge group condition at the 
same level that can be obtained with the current inspection practice, while altering the 
subgroup conditions according to their risk levels.
Sometimes the ‘severe’ environment bridges may already have a condition index less 
than the Ct defined through Equation 7.2 (see Figure 7.6).
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Time 
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Figure 7.6. Target condition index with different initial conditions
In this case, Tmin can be selected from engineering judgements and a revised Ct can be 
selected by equating the expected bridge group conditions at the time of next inspection 
that can be obtained with the current practice and RBI. An example is given in Equation 
7.3, when assuming Tmin as 2 years.
CT x N m + Cg % x N s Cm,6 x N m + CS 6 x N s (7.3)
Expected Bridge Group 
Condition with RBI
Expected Bridge Group 
Condition with current practice
Where, Cm,6 is the expected mean condition of ‘mild’ environment bridges at year 6, Cs,6 
and Cs,2 are the expected mean condition of ‘severe’ environment bridges at year 6 and 2 
respectively, CT is the target condition and Nm and Ns are the number of bridges in mild 
and severe environments respectively.
From this equation, the revised Ct is found to be:
CT =
Cm,6 x N m + Cg g x Ng CS)2 x Ng
N
(7.4)
M
if  UNIVERSITY OF
W- SURREY
146
Chapter 7 RBI Planning Model
7.3.4.1 Good Practice Guidance
An unpublished TRL document by Vassie and Ricketts (1997) cited in McMahon and 
Woodward (2006) recommends 18 years as the maximum inspection interval for 
masonry arch bridges, based on the past experience with these bridges. Hence, this is set 
as the maximum permissible inspection interval in addition to defining a condition index 
based target value.
In the following section, the concepts and procedure for the inspection selection 
methodology is explained through two case studies.
7.4 Case Studies
The case studies presented in this section are performed using the Network Rail bridge 
condition marking system (SCMI). However, the methodology is applicable to any 
condition rating system.
7.4.1 Case Study 1
Network Rail has introduced the SCMI system only a few years ago and only one set of 
past inspection reports was available with the SCMI scores. Hence, the development of 
deterioration profiles from historic approach was not possible. However, one of the 
Network Rail contractors had predicted the expected deterioration rates for a limited 
number of sample structures, based on their knowledge about Network Rail bridge 
stock. These predictions are used in this case study to illustrate the proposed inspection 
planning methodology.
The environment classification and deterioration rates of the sample structures are 
presented in Table 7.1.
It has been decided to use the maximum deterioration rate from each environment 
instead of the mean values since the sample size is very small. That is, the representative 
deterioration rates of ‘mild’ and ‘severe’ environment bridges are taken as 0.401 
SCMI/Year and 0.738 SCMI/Year respectively.
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Table 7.1. Predicted deterioration rates of sample structures (Mouchel, 2007)
Environment Bridge Reference Deterioration Rate (SCMI/Year)
Mild
ANG030 0.067
ANG013 0.401
GW006 0.385
STH030 0.345
LNE-MID026 0.200
MID010 0.158
Severe
LNW-MID025 0.296
GW101 0.423
SCO 103 0.738
The inspection selection model fed with these values is shown in Figure 7.7.
85
80
C t
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Deterioration Profile o f Bridges 
in ‘Mild’ Environment70
Deterioration Profile o f Bridges 
in ‘Severe’ Environment
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Figure 7.7. Selection of inspection intervals
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As it can be observed from Figure 7.7, bridges from both mild and severe environments 
are assumed to be in a good condition (i.e. Sbg^ O )  to replicate the case of a new bridge 
stock.
Cm,6 and Cs,6 are found to be 77.6 and 75.6 respectively from the model. From Table 
7.1, Nm and Ng are seven and three respectively. Hence, using Equation 7.2 Ct is found 
to be 76.9. By setting this target value, Tmax and Tmin are identified as 8.5 and 4.5 years 
respectively. The inspection intervals of subgroups have been selected from Equation
7.1 and shown in Table 7.2.
Considering the practical difficulties in scheduling the inspection intervals in months, 
these have been rounded off into whole years without exceeding the calculated values. 
The maximum interval in this case study is less than 18 years, hence, it complies with 
the good practice guide specified in Section 7.2.3.
Table 7.2. Inspection intervals for subgroups for case study 1
Subgroup Relative Risk Score, R
Inspection Interval (Years)
From Analysis Recommended
SGI 1.00 8.5 8
SG2 1.17 7.3 7
SG3 1.33 6.7 6
SG4 1.67 5.3 5
SG5 2.00 4.5 4
As discussed earlier, the above results are based on the deterioration rate predictions 
made by the bridge engineers due to difficulties in developing a historical deterioration 
profile. However, the DBN model presented in Chapter 6 could be more effective in 
these circumstances since the expert knowledge can be used probabilistically, hence 
reducing the level of uncertainty.
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7.4.2 Case Study 2
This case study is performed using the deterioration profiles developed by the DBN 
model.
7.4.2.1 Development of Deterioration Profiles
In Chapter 5, a small number of bridges have been ranked according to the risk ranking 
strategy. As part of the process these bridges have been categorised into ‘mild’ and 
‘severe’ environments (see Table 5.4 in Chapter 5). The element level SCMI scores 
from these bridges are used as the initial element condition distributions (Tables 7.3 and 
7.4). In these tables Sx = SCMI score of respective minor element X.
Table 7.3. Element condition index distribution for mild environment bridges
Variable P(Sx<20) P(20<SX<40) P(40<SX<60) P(60<SX<80) P(SX>80)
Wing wall 0.02 0.05 0.26 0.54 0.14
Abutment 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.83 0.03
Barrel arch 0.06 0.13 0.13 0.69 0.00
Face Rings 0.00 0.08 0.31 0.62 0.00
Parapets " 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.46 0.00
Spandrel wall 0.08 0.04 0.15 0.73 0.00
Table 7.4. Element condition index distribution for severe environment bridges
Variable P(SX<20) P(20<SX<40) P(40<SX<60) P(60<SX<80) P(SX >80)
Wing wall 0.25 0.37 ' 0.25 0.00 0.13
Abutment 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Barrel arch 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Face Rings 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.00
Parapets 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.00
Spandrel wall 0.63 0.00 0.25 0.12 0.00
Conditional probabilities between the variables are specified according to the method 
proposed in Chapter 6 (Section 6.3.3).
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Due to lack of any data to specify the transition probabilities, estimates from the 
Steering Committee (2 0 0 5 -2 0 0 8 )  have been utilised. From these estimates, the 
probabilities of an element deteriorating to the immediate next state from its current state 
[i.e. (1-P ii)] for ‘mild’ and ‘severe’ environment bridges are taken as 0 .1 5  and 0 .3 0  
respectively. As an example, the transition probabilities for wing wall condition in 
‘mild’ and ‘severe’ environments are given in Tables 7 .5  and 7 .6 . Transition 
probabilities for other minor elements are also assigned in the same way.
Table 7.5. Transition probabilities for wing walls in mild environment
P [Sw(ti+1)]
[Sw(ti)]
80-100 60-80 40-60 20-40 0-20
P(Sw(ti+i)) > 80) 0.85 0 0 0 0
P(60< Sw(ti+1) < 80)) 0.15 0.85 0 0 0
P(40< Sw(ti+1)< 60)) 0 0.15 0.85 0 0
P(20< Sw(ti+i)< 40)) 0 0 0.15 0.85 0
P (S w (W < 2 0 )) 0 0 0 0.15 1
Table 7.6. Transition probabilities for wing walls in severe environment
P [Sw(ti-n)]
[Sw(tO]
80-100 60-80 40-60 20-40 0-20
P(Sw(ti+i)) > 80) 0.7 0 0 0 0
P(60< Sw(ti+i) < 80)) 0.3 0.7 0 0 0
P(40< Sw(ti+i)< 60)) 0 0.3 0.7 0 0
P(20< Sw(ti+i)< 40)) 0 0 0.3 0.7 0
P(Sw(t^i)<20)) 0 0 0 0.3 1
Where, Sw(ti) = Wing wall SCMI score at time step tj
Sw(ti+i) = Wing wall SCMI score at the subsequent time step tj+i
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T.4.2.2 Selection of Inspection Intervals
The deterioration profiles of bridge group SCMI scores (Sbg) developed from the DBN 
model are used in the RBI model as shown in Figure 7.8.
30 -
40
Tmin Tmax Time (Years)
Mild Environment Bridges - ■ Severe Environment Bridges Target
Figure 7.8. Selection of inspection intervals using DBN deterioration model
In this case, Cm,6 and Cs,6 are found to be 60.6 and 44.6 respectively. Within this 
sample, NM and Ns are 14 and 4 respectively (Table 5.4 in Chapter 5). From Equation
7.1 Ct is found to be 57.1, which is higher than the current ‘severe’ environment bridge 
condition.
Hence, according to Section 7.3:3, Tmin is adjusted to two years, and revised Ct is 
calculated using Equation 7.2. From this revised target value Tmax is identified as 8.2 
years. The inspection intervals for the subgroups are in Table 7.7.
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Table 7.7. Inspection intervals of subgroups for case study 2
Subgroup Relative Risk Score, R
Inspection Interval (Years)
From Analysis Recommended
SGI 1.00 8.2 8
SG2 1.17 7.2 7
SG3 1.33 6.2 6
SG4 1.67 4.1 4
SG5 2.00 2.0 2
7.5 Sensitivity Analyses
The selection of inspection intervals depend on the following two factors; the ratio 
between the ‘mild’ and ‘severe’ element level transition probabilities, and the ratio 
between the number of bridges in ‘mild’ and ‘severe’ environments. The effects of these 
factors in the selection of inspection intervals are examined through sensitivity tests.
7.5.1 Effect of Element Level Transition Probabilities
In the previous case study, the element level transition probabilities [i.e. (1-Pii)] for 
‘severe’ and ‘mild’ environment bridges were assumed as 0.30 and 0.15 respectively. 
Sensitivity tests have been performed by changing the ‘mild’ environment bridges’ 
transition probability while maintaining the severe environment transition probability at
0.30.
The change in the inspection interval of the ‘mild’ environment bridges, i.e. Tmax, with 
the ratio of ‘severe’ environment element transition probability (hereinafter referred to 
as (l-Pü)severe) to ‘mild’ environment element transition probability (( l-P ii)m iid ) is given 
in Figure 7.9. The inspection interval of the ‘severe’ environment bridges, i.e. Tmin, has 
been maintained at 2 years as discussed in Section 7.3.
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Change in inspection Interval of Mild Environment Bridges
b  1 2
2  10
20 1 3 64 5
Figure 7.9. The change in the inspection interval of ‘mild’ environment bridges 
(Tmax) with the ratio of (1-Pii)severe to (1-Pii)mild
It can be seen from Figure 7.9, when the ratio of ( l - P i i ) Severe/(l-Pii)miid is equal to that of 
the ‘mild’ environment elements, Tmax is found to be 7 years. As the ratio between these 
two transition probabilities increases to 5, Tmax can be extended from 7 to 12 years, 
while maintaining a Tmin of 2 years. However, bridges in ‘mild’ environment would 
deteriorate at a slower rate than bridges in ‘severe’ environment, i.e. (l-P ii)severe would 
always be greater than (l-Pn)m iid . Therefore, if ‘severe’ environment bridges are 
inspected every 2  years (Tmin= 2  years), then the inspection interval of ‘mild’ 
environment bridges (Tmax) can be extended to more than 7 years.
7.5.2 Effect of Number of Bridges in Mild and Severe Environments
Another sensitivity analysis has been carried out to find out the effects of number of 
bridges in each environment in the selection of inspection intervals. The transition 
probabilities (1-Pü) are kept at 0.15 and 0.30 for mild and severe environment bridges 
respectively. The inspection interval for severe environment bridges, Tmjn, is maintained 
at 2 years.
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The change in inspection interval for mild bridge, Tmax, with the different ratios of 
number of bridges in mild and severe environments is plotted in Figure 7.10.
Change in the Inspection Interval of M ild ' Environment Bridges
35
C 20
E 15
10
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 43 3.5
Figure 7.10. The change in the inspection interval of ‘mild’ environment bridges
(Tmax) with the ratio of NM to Ns
As is evident from Figure 7.10, when there are more bridges in the ‘mild’ environment, 
Tmax becomes closer to the current practice of 6 years. On the other hand, if there are 
more bridges in the ‘severe’ environment, then Tmax can be extended up to 31 years, thus 
allocating more inspection resources to the ‘severe’ environment bridges. However, in 
order to comply with the good practice guidance (Section 7.3.4) the maximum 
inspection interval has to be fixed at 18 years.
7.5.3 Summary of the Sensitivity Study Results
It can be concluded from the above sensitivity studies that the selection of inspection 
intervals is dependent on the element level transition probabilities and the number of
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bridges in ‘mild’ and ‘severe’ environments. For example, when maintaining T mjn at 2  
years, Tmax can be extended up to the industry good practice limit of 18 years under the 
following two circumstances:
• if there are more bridges in the ‘severe’ environment than the ‘mild’ 
environment
• bridges in the ‘severe’ environment deteriorate at a much faster rate than 
the ‘mild’ environment bridges.
It should be noted here that Tmin can also be varied in the range of 1 to 5 years instead of 
the currently assumed 2 years. This decision can be made by the bridge managers based 
on their knowledge about the bridge stock. However, two year interval is considered to 
be a reasonable time span for the detailed inspection of high risk assets.
These results are dependent on the specified target value. Hence, if a Bridge Authority 
wants to decide a different target value, then the inspection interval ranges may also 
change. However, this case study demonstrates the level of flexibility that can be 
introduced in an inspection regime to maintain a consistent level of risk.
7.6 Concluding Remarks
An RBI framework for a bridge network is introduced in this chapter. This framework 
consists of two sections, namely, risk ranking module and inspection planning module. 
The risk ranking strategy presented in Chapter 5 forms the basis for the risk ranking 
module. This module is used to categorize a network into main and sub groups of 
bridges with similar risk levels. A new method to prioritize inspection intervals for 
these bridge groups, based on their relative risk levels, is introduced in the inspection 
planning module.
Condition index deterioration with time is used as the criterion to specify the inspection 
intervals. Two deterioration profiles (to represent bridges in the ‘mild’ and ‘severe’ 
environments) are considered within a main group of bridges. Inspections are 
recommended when the deterioration profiles reach a predefined target level and these 
inspection intervals are assigned to the subgroups with lowest and highest relative risk
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scores. The inspection intervals of the other subgroups are calculated by linear 
interpolating according to their relative risk scores.
Proposed methodology is demonstrated through its application on Network Rail bridge 
stock. Prediction of deterioration rates made by bridge engineers for a limited number of 
sample structures is used in the first example. The second case study utilises the DBN 
model developed in this study to produce the required deterioration curves.
The effects of element level transition probabilities and the number of ‘mild’ and 
‘severe’ environment bridges on the inspection intervals are studied through sensitivity 
analyses. It is identified the inspection intervals can be varied from 2 to 18 years within 
a main group depending on factors such as, initial bridge conditions, deterioration rates 
and number of bridges in ‘mild’ and ‘severe’ environment bridges. These intervals can 
then be assigned to the subgroups according to the relative risk scores, which have 
included other key factors affecting risk, hence ensuring a consistent risk level is 
maintained across the network.
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Chapter 8: Conclusions and 
Recommendations for Further Work
8.1 Conclusions
The main aim of this study was to develop a risk-based inspection (RBI) planning 
methodology for a large bridge network, which will help to optimize the use of 
inspection resources in a cost effective and safety critical way, while maintaining a 
consistent overall risk at the network level.
As part of accomplishing this main aim, the following outcomes have been achieved;
• A literature review with the objective of critically analysing various RBI techniques 
available from the literature, their suitability and unsuitability for the current study 
and the areas which need further development.
• A risk ranking strategy that classifies a large network of bridges into a limited 
number of groups according to their risk levels in a systematic and practical manner, 
which may be used to prioritise bridges for inspection/maintenance.
• A deterioration model using Dynamic Bayesian Network (DBN), which is capable of 
using actual data and/or expert knowledge to predict the deterioration of bridge 
group conditions with time.
• A methodology to establish the inspection intervals for bridge groups identified from 
the risk ranking strategy, using the DBN deterioration model.
• Case studies to test and demonstrate the above methodologies and models.
The key conclusions drawn from each of these works are highlighted in the following 
sections.
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In chapter 2 a literature review with the objective of identifying the suitable RBI 
technique that will fit the aim of the current study is presented. The main conclusions are 
given below.
• RBI applications hitherto are mainly limited to element and single structure 
applications; in few cases groups of structures with similar characteristics have been 
considered.
• RBI methods can be broadly classified as quantitative or qualitative.
• Typically, structural reliability analysis and cost optimization (e.g. failure, repair and 
inspection costs) are considered in the quantitative approach. This approach is 
preferred for high value assets for which inspection planning is carried out at an 
element/structure specific level. Expensive inspection techniques are usually 
employed.
• A qualitative approach is preferred when considering groups of structures. 
Engineering judgement is an important element in expressing risk, typically through 
a risk matrix.
The need to classify a bridge network into a manageable number of groups is identified 
as a first step in achieving the main aim of this work. Hence, a risk ranking strategy has 
been developed and its significance can be summarised as;
• It serves as an initial screening process to prioritise bridges for inspection and 
maintenance.
• It groups bridges with similar risk levels by classifying them into main and sub 
groups, and then assigns risk scores to the subgroups according to risk. These risk 
scores are useful in identifying the inspection intervals.
• The risk ranking strategy has been demonstrated through its application on the 
Network Rail bridge stock. An industry focused, simple and practical procedure to 
identify the subgroup of a bridge has also been developed.
• A random sample of bridges from the Network Rail bridge stock has been ranked 
according to this procedure. One of the attributes used in the risk ranking strategy,
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namely ‘environment’, is comparable with condition index. A good agreement 
between the two has been observed within this random sample, providing assurance 
for the validity of the method.
• Although the case studies focused on the Network Rail bridge stock, the risk ranking 
strategy and the subgroup identification criteria are generic and can be adopted by 
other bridge owners.
The above risk ranking strategy incorporated time invariant attributes affecting risk. The
next phase focused on deterioration modelling to include the time variability of risk. A
novel bridge group level deterioration model using DBN has been developed. The main
conclusions from this part of the work are;
• The DBN model serves two purposes; first, it connects the basic element condition 
to bridge group condition and, secondly, it estimates the change in bridge group 
condition with time.
• This model can be used to produce deterioration profiles that can be used in 
inspection/maintenance planning.
• This model can be used with any amount of data. If no data is available, engineering
judgements can be used. Since this model treats the engineering judgements
probabilistically as opposed to traditional deterministic engineering judgements, the 
results are more reliable.
• A case study has been performed using Network Rail sample structure data, which 
showed that the model is able to closely represent the statistical variation of the 
actual data.
• New information or ‘what-if scenarios can be introduced in this model. For
example, anticipated element failures, effects of maintenance works, etc. can be
investigated through this model.
• A material specific masonry element deterioration model that incorporates the root 
causes of deterioration is also proposed in this study. This model could be beneficial 
for more refined applications.
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Finally, a methodology to specify inspection intervals for different bridge groups has
been introduced. The outcomes from this methodology are;
• A new method to identify the target condition index, which helps to maintain 
consistency across a bridge group, is introduced.
• Within a main group, maximum and minimum possible flexible inspection intervals 
are identified using condition index deterioration profiles and the target condition 
index. From these inspection intervals, the optimum inspection intervals for the 
subgroups are specified with the help of the risk scores.
• The use of DBN model in the RBI planning has been demonstrated using Network 
Rail sample structure data and engineering judgements.
• Whilst maintaining a consistent risk level across the network, inspection intervals 
can vary between 2  and 18 years, depending on various factors affecting risk.
In summary, it can be concluded that the primary aim of the current study has been
fulfilled with the combination of three steps;
1. Rank the bridges in a network according to their relative risk levels and make them 
into groups and assign a risk score.
2. Obtain the representative deterioration profiles for these bridge groups using the 
DBN deterioration model.
3. Obtain the inspection intervals for the bridge groups using the deterioration profiles 
and risk scores.
8.2 Recommendations for Future Research
• In the risk ranking strategy, each attribute is classified into two categories (good and 
poor) according to the severity. However, if required, these classifications can be 
further refined (e.g. good, medium, moderate and poor). A sensitivity analysis can be 
carried out to identify the effect of refinement in the final outcome.
• The inspection intervals proposed in this study have not considered the possibility of 
updating based on inspection findings but suggest only the first (or a priori) 
inspection intervals to maintain broadly consistent risk levels throughout the
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network. Subsequent inspections could be either at the same interval or after 
updating based on inspection findings. The second approach may result in additional 
savings in terms of inspection resources, since the a priori models are based on 
conservative assumptions.
• The current study considered optimizing the inspection intervals with the usual 
inspection method of close visual inspection. However, by introducing more 
advanced inspection techniques such as NDT, the reliability of inspection findings 
could be increased and, hence, the interval between the inspections also can be 
stretched. A trade off analysis between the costs of introducing the new inspection 
intervals and the benefits that can be obtained from the new methods would be 
another possible research area.
• In this project a condition index deterioration model has been developed using 
Dynamic Bayesian Belief Networks (DBN). This model considered brick masonry 
arches since this is a major bridge group in the Network Rail stock. The concepts of 
this model can be extended to other bridge types as well.
• A second useful DBN model, which identified the root causes of element level 
deterioration and linked them to estimate the element deterioration profile, has also 
been developed. Since this level of accuracy will not be necessary when considering 
a large bridge network, this model has not been used in the inspection planning. This 
model can be used, if  it is necessary to identify the root causes that lead to the 
condition deterioration, instead of the condition itself.
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Appendix A: Network Rail Bridge Management Practice
A l. Inspection Procedure
Network Rail carries out two types of inspections namely cursory visual examinations 
and detailed visual examinations. Visual examinations are carried out annually to 
perceive and record any significant visible changes in the condition of the structures 
since the previous examination. These are normally carried out from the ground level 
adjacent to the structure. Detailed examination is a close visual inspection (normally 
within touching distance) of all accessible parts of the structure including underwater 
parts to establish the condition, severity and extent of the defects and the rate of 
deterioration (Network Rail, 2004a).
A2. Bridge Maintenance Policies
Network Rail has five different policies to maintain its assets, namely A, B, C, D and E. 
Policy A aims to maintain the structures to a sustainable state over the long term without 
replacement by providing good protection to the elements. In policy B interventions are 
planned and carried out in accordance with minimum whole-life net present cost. This 
policy tries to avoid condition led disturbances to the service. Policy C allows carrying 
out works at a much later stage than under policy B with higher probabilities of 
restriction. Policy D is the minimum maintenance approach that is commensurate with 
running a rail vehicle on a railway. This is normally related delivering materials or 
vehicles for a yard that has been disused for some time. Policy E is a non-operational 
management option which aims to maintain public health and safety and legal liabilities 
at minimum initial cost.
The maintenance policy for a bridge is normally selected considering the route type, 
possible consequences such as traffic delays during the maintenance, significance o f the 
assets (e.g. Golden Assets), etc. Railway routes are classified by the Network Rail into 
the following categories; primary, LSE (London South Eastern), main secondary, 
secondary, rural and freight. As a general guide, bridges serving primary, LSE and 
secondary routes are maintained under policy B, while rural and freight route bridges are
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maintained under policy C. Other policies are selected in exceptional cases only 
(Network Rail, 2007).
A3. Condition Marking System
Network Rail uses a numerical condition marking system called SCMI (Structures 
Condition Marking System) to measure and demonstrate the condition of its structures. 
In the SCMI system a bridge is initially divided into major and minor elements. During 
inspections, inspectors assess the condition of these minor elements and mark them on 
the inspection sheet according to an ‘alpha numeric’ code provided in the SCMI 
guidelines. In this code, the ‘alpha’ term represents the severity of a defect and the 
‘numerical’ term represents its extent on the structure. As an example, the guidance for 
identifying the codes for masonry elements is given in Table A l.
Table A l. Severity and extent codes for masonry elements (SCMI, 2004b)
Severity Definition
A No visible defects to masonry
B Spalling/softness of brick up to 10 mm or Indication of wetness/presence of 
water
C Deterioration of pointing
D Spalling/softness of brick greater than 10 mm and up to 100 mm thickness
E Hollowness
F Bulging/Distortion, displacement
Extent Definition
1 No visible defects
2 Localised defect due to local circumstances
3 Defect occupies <5% of surface of the element
4 Defect occupies 5% to 10% of surface of the element
5 Defect occupies 10% to 50% of surface of the element
6 Defect occupies >50% of surface of the element
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Where:
SE%
These alpha-numeric codes are then converted into bridge SCMI score, on a scale from 0 
to 100 (SCMI, 2001):
S C M I = 1 0 0 - ( ^ y « I L  (E fxS E J/N m JxN ft/N m aj) (A .l)
Ef = Element Factor
= Material Specific Severity/Extent factor, i.e. the result o f an 
inspection using the alphanumeric code and converted to a 
numerical value using Table A.2.
= Number of ‘minor’ elements in a major element of the bridge 
= Number of ‘major’ elements in the bridge 
= Normalisation factor for a ‘major element’ group
= 1 0 0 /(X i„  (E fX lO )/N mi„)
The element factors and material specific severity/extent factors for masonry elements 
are given in Tables A.2 and A.3.
Table A.2. Element factor for masonry elements (SCMI, 2001)
N mjn
N maj
Nf
Nf
M inor Element Element Factor
Abutment 10
Wing wall 5
Barrel Arch 10
Face Rings 3.5
Parapets 2.5
Spandrel wall 3.5
Table A 3. Severity/extent factors for masonry elements (SCMI, 2001)
Extent
Severity 1 2 3 4 5 6
A 0 - - - - -
B - 1 1 1.25 1.5 2
C - 1.5 1.5 2 2.5 3
D - 3 3 3.5 5 6
E - 3 4 5 6.5 8
F 3 4.5 6 8 10
UNIVERSITY OF
w . SURREY
190
Appendices
Appendix B: Fault Tree Analysis
In a fault tree, the top fault event of a system is linked to the immediate events that cause 
the failure through ‘AND’ (parallel system) or ‘OR’ (series system) logic gates. The 
probability of the top event is evaluated from the probabilities of lower events. The 
probability calculations for the ‘AND’ and ‘OR’ gates are explained below.
Series System: ‘OR’ Gate
In a series system, the system fails if  one of the elements fails, i.e. union of element 
failure events. An example series system and its fault tree ‘OR’ representation are given 
in Figure B.l
System
Fails
Series System
OR Gate
Fails Fails
Figure B .l. An example series system
Let failure probabilities of basic events A and B are Pf(A) and Pf(B) respectively. From 
basic probability theorem, the probability of system failure, Pf(S), is given by (Evans 
and Evans, 2001):
Pf(S) = Pf(AUB) (B.l)
Assuming A and B are statistically independent,
Pf(S) = Pf(A)Pf(B)-Pf(A)Pf(B) (B.2)
i f  UNIVERSITY OF . 191
h SURREY
Appendices
Parallel System: ‘AND’ Gate
In a parallel system, the system fails only if all the elements fail, i.e. intersection of 
element, failure events. The parallel system of A and B and it’s ‘AND’ gate fault tree 
representation are given in Figure B.2.
Parallel System
B
System
Fails
AND Gate
Fails Fails
Figure B.2. An example parallel system
For an ‘AND’ Gate failure probability o f the system is given by:
P f ( S )  =  P f ( A , B )  (B.3)
Assuming A and B  are statistically independent,
P f ( S )  =  P f ( A ) P f ( B )  (B.4)
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Appendix C: Basic Probability Concepts
In this section, the basic probability concepts extracted from Ang and Tang (1975) are 
provided to explain the underlying theory for Bayesian Belief Networks.
In set theory, a sample space (S) is a set of all the possible outcomes in a probabilistic 
problem. An event (E) is a subset of the sample space. Generally, the sample space and 
events are expressed graphically using Venn diagram. In Figure C .l, an example for two 
evens A and B in a sample space S is provided.
Figure C .l. Venn diagram of two events (Ang and Tang, 1975)
Some important definitions of more commonly used terms are given below.
Term Definition Notation
Union of events Occurrence of events A or B or both AUB
Intersection of 
events
The joint occurrence of A and B A,B
Impossible event An event with no sample point 0
Certain event The event containing all the sample points S
Complementary 
event (of event A)
An event containing all the sample points 
except A
Â
Mutually exclusive 
events
Events A and B have no common sample 
points.
A,B = O
Collectively 
exhaustive events
Union of events A and B contains all the 
sample points in the sample space
AUB = S
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C.l. Axioms of Probability
• Axiom 1: For every event A in a sample space S, there is a nonnegative probability. 
That is, For all A ç  S, there is a probability, P(A) > 0
• Axiom 2: Probability of a certain event S is 1, i.e., P(S) =1.
• Axiom 3: If two events A and B are mutually exclusive, then P(AUB) = P(A)+P(B) 
From axioms 1 and 2, the basic equation for the probability of an event can be obtained.
0 < P(A) < 1 (C .l)
For two events which are not mutually exclusive,
P(AUB) = P(A)+P(B) -  P(A,B) (C.2)
C.2. Conditional Probability
If the occurrence of an event A, depends on another event B, then the probability 
associated is known as conditional probability and denoted by P(A|B).
P(A/B)=^ r a F ’ P(B)^0- (C.3)
Therefore, P(A,B) = P(A|B)P(B) (C.4)
Similarly, P(A,B) = P(B|A)P(A) (C.5)
This is known as multiplication rule or fundamental rule.
If  the events are statistically independent, that is, the occurrence of one event does not 
affect the occurrence of the other, then equations 4 and 5 becomes,
P(A,B) = P(A)P(B) (C.6)
P(A,B) = P(B)P(A) (C.7)
From B.4 and B.5,
P(A | B) = PfBp ^ .P(A), P(B) ^  0. (C.8)
This is known as Bayes’ theorem.
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C.3. Probability Concepts of Discrete Variables
The above theorems and rules are specified for events from a sample space. However, in 
real world situations it may be necessary to deal with a collection of several events 
called a variable. In a variable, each possible outcome of events can be considered as a 
state of the variable. Normally, variables are denoted by capital letters and the states of 
the variables by small letters. In Bayesian Belief Networks, the states of a variable are 
considered to be mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. Consider a variable A
consisting of states ai, a^ , ,an.
The probability distribution of A, P(A), is given by,
P(A) = (P(A=a1),P(A=a2),....... P(A=an)); ^ P ( A  = a,) = l (C.9)
i=l
If B is another variable with states; bi, b i, bm, then the conditional probability of
variables, P(A|B) will have a n*m probability values in the form of P(A=ai|B=bj).
Form axiom 2, ^ P ( A  = a. | B = bj) = 1 for each bj (C.10)
i=l
The probability of having joint outcomes of two or more variables is given by joint 
probability denoted by P(A,B). This is the probability o f having A=ai and B=bj. Since, 
both A and B are mutually excusive and exhaustive, they will form a sample space 
hence using axiom 2,
n m
P(A,B) = £ E  p(A =  a i ’ B  =  b j )  =  1 (C .ll)
i = l  j = l
From the joint probability table, the individual probabilities of variables can be 
calculated. For instance, in the above joint probability distribution, the possible
combinations of outcomes when A is in state a; are (ai,bi), (a^bz), (ai,bm). Since
these are mutually exclusive, using axiom 3,
P(ai) = £ P ( a i,b j ) (C.12)
j=l
This is called marginalization, that is variable B is marginalized out of P(A,B) and is 
often denoted by,
p(A) = Z s P(A’B) ( C l3)
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Fundamental rule for variables,
P(A,B) = P(A|B)P(B) (C.14)
From fundamental rule, Bayes’ Rule for variables,
P (B [A )= P(A |B )P(B-1 =  P(A’B) (€.15)
P(A) E bP(A’B)
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Appendix D: Traffic Sensitive Streets
In Chapter 5 road bridge consequences are assessed based on the road traffic flow. These 
can be based on the traffic sensitivity of the routes they are carrying as well. According 
to the Street Works (Registers, Notices, Directions and Designations) (England) 
Regulations (2007), an authority may designate a street as traffic-sensitive if one or 
more of the criteria are met.
>  The traffic flow is estimated to be greater than 500 vehicles per hour per lane of 
carriageway, disregarding bus or cycle lanes.
>  A single carriageway two-way road, the carriageway of which is less than 6.5 metres 
wide, having a traffic flow in both directions of not less than 600 vehicles per hour.
>  If it falls within an area covered by an order in respect of congestion charges made 
under either section 295 of the Greater London Authority Act 1999 or section 169 of 
the Transport Act 2000.
>  If more than 25% of the traffic flow in both directions consists of heavy commercial 
vehicles.
>  If the traffic flow in both directions includes more than eight buses per hour.
>  A road designated by the local highway authority, as part of its winter maintenance 
programme, as one requiring the treatment of any part of it with salt or other 
chemicals, when low temperatures are expected, to prevent the formation o f ice.
>  If it is within 100 metres of a critical signalised junction or a critical gyratory or 
roundabout system.
>  If it has a pedestrian traffic flow of at least 1300 people per hour, per metre width of 
footway.
>  If it is on a tourist route or within an area where international, national or significant 
major local events take place.
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Appendix E: BBN Model Data
Table El: CPT of Deck Condition
Face
Ring
Condition
Parapet
Condition
Barrel
Arch
Condition
Spandrel
wall
condition
Deck Condition
P(Sd<45) P(0<Sd<80) P(Sd>80)
S p < 4 5 S P < 4 5 S B < 4 5 S s w < 4 5 1 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
Sf<45 S p < 4 5 S B < 4 5 0<Ss\y<80 0 . 9 9 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 0
Sf<45 S P < 4 5 Sb<45 S s w > 8 0 0 . 9 1 0 . 0 9 0 . 0 0
Sf<45 S p < 4 5 0<Sb<80 S s w 5 4 5 0 . 6 2 0 . 3 8 0 . 0 0
Sf<45 S p < 4 5 0<Sb<80 O ^ S s w ^ O 0 . 2 3 0 . 7 7 0 . 0 0
Sf<45 S p < 4 5 0<Sb<80 S s w > 8 0 0 . 0 4 0 . 9 6 0 . 0 0
S F < 4 5 S p < 4 5 Sb>80 S s w < 4 5 0 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
S F < 4 5 S P < 4 5 Sb>80 0 < S s w < 8 0 0 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
Sf<45 S p < 4 5 S B > 8 0 S s w > 8 0 0 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
Sf<45 0 < S p < 8 0 S B < 4 5 S s w < 4 5 1 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
Sf<45 0 < S P < 8 0 S B < 4 5 0 < ' S s w ^ 8 0 0 . 9 1 0 . 0 9 0 . 0 0
Sf<45 0 < S P < 8 0 Sb<45 S s w > 8 0 0 . 7 2 0 . 2 8 0 . 0 0
S p < 4 5 0 < S p < 8 0 0<Sb<80 Ssw<45 0 . 3 3 0 . 6 7 0 . 0 0
S p < 4 5 0 < S P < 8 0 0<Sb<80 0 < S s w < 8 0 0 . 0 4 0 . 9 6 0 . 0 0
Sf<45 0 < S P < 8 0 0<Sb<80 S s w > 8 0 0 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
S F < 4 5 0 < S p < 8 0 S B > 8 0 Ssw<45 0 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
Sf<45 0 < S P < 8 0 Sb>80 0 < S s w < 8 0 0 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
Sf<45 0 < S P < 8 0 S B > 8 0 S s w > 8 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 9 1 0 . 0 9
Sf<45 S p > 8 0 Sb<45 S s w < 4 5 0 . 9 8 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 0
S p < 4 5 S p > 8 0 Sb<45 0 < S s w < 8 0 0 . 7 8 0 . 2 2 0 . 0 0
S F < 4 5 S P > 8 0 S B < 4 5 S s w > 8 0 0 . 5 7 0 . 4 3 0 . 0 0
S p < 4 5 S P > 8 0 0<Sb<80 Ssw<45 0 . 1 6 0 . 8 4 0 . 0 0
S p < 4 5 S P > 8 0 0<Sb<80 0 < S s w < 8 0 0 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
Sf<45 S p > 8 0 0<Sb<80 S s w > 8 0 0 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
S p < 4 5 S p > 8 0 S B > 8 0 Ssw<45 0 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
Sf<45 S P > 8 0 S B > 8 0 0 < S s w < 8 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 9 5 0 . 0 5
Sf<45 S p > 8 0 Sb>80 S s w > 8 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 6 9 0 . 3 1
0<Sf<80 S p < 4 5 S B < 4 5 Ssw^ 45 0 . 9 9 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 0
0<Sf<80 S P < 4 5 S B < 4 5 0 < S s w < 8 0 0 . 8 4 0 . 1 6 0 . 0 0
0<Sf<80 S p < 4 5 S s < 4 5 S s w > 8 0 0 . 6 4 0 . 3 6 0 . 0 0
0<Sf<80 S P < 4 5 0<Sb<80 Ssw^ 45 0 . 2 3 0 . 7 7 0 . 0 0
0<Sf<80 S p < 4 5 0<Sb<80 0 < S s w < 8 0 0 . 0 1 0 . 9 9 0 . 0 0
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Face
Ring
Condition
Parapet
Condition
Barrel
Arch
Condition
Spandrel
wall
condition
Deck Condition
P(Sd<45) P(0<Sd<80) P(Sd>80)
0<Sf<80 S p < 4 5 0<Sb<80 S s w > 8 0 0 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
0<Sf<80 S p < 4 5 S B > 8 0 Ssw<45 0 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
0<Sf<80 S p < 4 5 S s > 8 0 0 < S s w < 8 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 9 8 0 . 0 2
0<Sf<80 S p < 4 5 Sb>80 S s w > 8 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 8 1 0 . 1 9
0<Sf<80 0 < S P < 8 0 S B < 4 5 Ssw<45 0 . 9 1 0 . 0 9 0 . 0 0
0<Sf<80 0 < S P < 8 0 S B < 4 5 0 < S s w < 8 0 0 . 6 3 0 . 3 7 0 . 0 0
0<Sf<80 0 < S P < 8 0 S B < 4 5 S s w > 8 0 0 . 4 1 0 . 5 9 0 . 0 0
0<Sf<80 0 < S P < 8 0 0<Sb<80 Ssw<45 0 . 0 4 0 . 9 6 0 . 0 0
0<Sf<80 0 < S P < 8 0 0<Sb<80 0 < S s w < 8 0 0 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
0<Sf<80 0 < S P < 8 0 0<Sb<80 S s w > 8 0 0 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
0<Sf<80 0 < S P < 8 0 Sb>80 S s w < 4 5 0 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
0<Sf<80 0 < S P < 8 0 S B > 8 0 O ^ S s w ^ O 0 . 0 0 0 . 7 9 0 . 2 1
0<Sf<80 0 < S P < 8 0 S B > 8 0 S s w > 8 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 3 6 0 . 6 4
0<Sf<80 S p > 8 0 S B < 4 5 Ssw<45 0 . 7 8 0 . 2 2 0 . 0 0
0<Sf<80 S p > 8 0 S B < 4 5 0 < S s w < 8 0 0 . 4 7 0 . 5 3 0 . 0 0
0<Sf<80 S P > 8 0 S B < 4 5 S s w > 8 0 0 . 2 5 0 . 7 5 0 . 0 0
0<Sf<80 S P > 8 0 0<Sb<80 Ssw<45 0 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
0<Sf<80 S P > 8 0 0<Sb<80 0 < S s w < 8 0 0 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
0<Sf<80 S p > 8 0 0<Sb<80 S s w > 8 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 9 5 0 . 0 5
0<Sf<80 S p > 8 0 Sb>80 S s w < 4 5 0 . 0 0 0 . 9 5 0 . 0 5
0<Sf<80 S P > 8 0 S B > 8 0 0 < S s w < 8 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 4 9 0 . 5 1
0<Sf<80 S p > 8 0 S B > 8 0 S s w > 8 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 9 0 . 9 1
S F > 8 0 S p < 4 5 S B < 4 5 Ssw<45 0 . 9 2 0 . 0 8 0 . 0 0
S p > 8 0 S p < 4 5 Sb<45 0 < S s w < 8 0 0 . 6 4 0 . 3 6 0 . 0 0
Sf>80 S P < 4 5 S B < 4 5 S s w > 8 0 0 . 4 2 0 . 5 8 0 . 0 0
Sf>80 S p < 4 5 0<Sb<80 Ssw£45 0 . 0 4 0 . 9 6 0 . 0 0
Sf>80 S P < 4 5 0<Sb<80 0 < S s w < 8 0 0 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
Sf>80 S p < 4 5 0<Sb<80 S s w > 8 0 0 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
Sf>80 S p < 4 5 Sb>80 S s w 5 4 5 0 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
S p > 8 0 S P < 4 5 Sb>80 0 < S s w < 8 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 8 1 0 . 1 9
Sf>80 S p < 4 5 S B > 8 0 S s w > 8 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 3 8 0 . 6 2
Sf>80 0 < S P < 8 0 Sb<45 Ssw<45 0 . 7 2 0 . 2 8 0 . 0 0
S p > 8 0 0 < S P < 8 0 Sb<45 0 < S s w < 8 0 0 . 4 1 0 . 5 9 0 . 0 0
Sf>80 0 < S P < 8 0 Sb<45 S s w > 8 0 0 . 2 0 0 . 8 0 0 . 0 0
S p > 8 0 0 < S P < 8 0 0<Sb<80 Ssw^ 45 0 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
S p > 8 0 0 < S P < 8 0 0<Sb<80 0 < S s w < 8 0 0 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
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Face
Ring
Condition
Parapet
Condition
Barrel
Arch
Condition
Spandrel
wall
condition
Deck Condition
P(SD<45) P(0<Sd<80) P(Sd>80)
S f > 8 0 0 < S p < 8 0 0 < S b < 8 0 S s w > 8 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 9 1 0 . 0 9
S p > 8 0 0 < S p < 8 0 S b > 8 0 S s w < 4 5 0 . 0 0 0 . 9 1 0 . 0 9
S f > 8 0 0 < S P < 8 0 S b > 8 0 0 < S s w < 8 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 3 6 0 . 6 4
S p > 8 0 0 < S p < 8 0 S B > 8 0 S s w > 8 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 3 0 . 9 7
S f > 8 0 S p > 8 0 S B < 4 5 S s w < 4 5 0 . 5 7 0 . 4 3 0 . 0 0
S p > 8 0 S p > 8 0 S B < 4 5 0 < S s w < 8 0 0 . 2 5 0 . 7 5 0 . 0 0
SF>80 S p > 8 0 SB<45 S s w > 8 0 0 . 0 5 0 . 9 5 0 . 0 0
S f > 8 0 S p > 8 0 0 < S b < 8 0 S s w < 4 5 0 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
S f > 8 0 S p > 8 0 0 < S b < 8 0 0 < S s w < 8 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 9 5 0 . 0 5
S f > 8 0 S p > 8 0 0 < S b < 8 0 S s w > 8 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 7 3 0 . 2 7
S p > 8 0 S p > 8 0 S b > 8 0 S s w < 4 5 0 . 0 0 0 . 6 9 0 . 3 1
S f > 8 0 S p > 8 0 SB>80 0 < S s w < 8 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 9 0 . 9 1
S f > 8 0 S p > 8 0 S b > 8 0 S s w > 8 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 . 0 0
Table E2. CPT of Bridge Group Condition
Support
Condition
Deck
Condition
Bridge Group Condition
P(Sbg<45) P(0<SBg<80) P(SBg>80)
Ss<45 Sbg<45 1 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
S s < 4 5 0<Sbg<80 0 . 6 1 0 . 3 9 0 . 0 0
Ss<45 Sbg>80 0 . 0 5 0 . 9 5 0 . 0 0
0<Ss<80 Sbg<45 0 . 6 1 0 . 3 9 0 . 0 0
0 < S s < 8 0 0<Sbg<80 0 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
0 < S s < 8 0 Sbg>80 0 . 0 0 0 . 7 2 0 . 2 8
S s > 8 0 Sbg545 0 . 0 5 0 . 9 5 0 . 0 0
Ss>80 0<Sbg<80 0 . 0 0 0 . 7 2 0.28
Ss>80 Sbg^ SO 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 . 0 0
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E2. Initial Minor Element Conditions from Sample Structures
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E3. Manual Calculation to Verify the BBN Model Results
In order to illustrate the computation behind the BBN, manual calculation of the 
probability distribution of support condition (Chapter 6) is provided below. Support 
SCMI (Ss) depends on wing wall SCMI (Sw) and Abutment SCMI (SA). Assuming Sw 
and Sa are statistically independent as discussed earlier, P(Ss < 45) is calculated as an 
illustrative example.
P(Ss <45) = [P(Ss<45/(Sa <45),(Sw <45)]x P(Sa < 4 5 )x P(Sw <45)
+ [P(Ss < 45/(45< S A < 80),(Sw < 45)]xP(45 < S A <80)xP (S w <45)
+ [P(Ss<45 /(Sa >80),(Sw <45)]x P(Sa > 8 0 )x P(Sw <45)
+ [P(Ss < 45/(Sa <45),(45 < S W <80)]xP(SA < 4 5 )x P (4 5 < S w <80)
+ [P(Ss < 45/(45 < SA < 80), (45 < Sw < 80)]x P(45 < SA < 80) x P(45 < Sw < 80)
+ [P(Ss<45 /(Sa > 80 ),(45< S w <80)]x P(Sa > 8 0 )x P(45< S w <80)
+ [P(Ss < 45/(Sa < 45), (Sw > 80)]x P(SA < 45) x P(SW > 80)
+ [P(Ss< 45/(Sa < 45),(Sw > 80)]xP(45 < SA < 80)xP(SW >80)
+ [P( Ss < 45/(Sa > 80), (Sw > 80)]x P(SA > 80) x P(SW > 80)
By substituting the conditional probabilities (Table 6.4) and initial element conditions 
(Table 6.5) specified in Chapter 6, P(Ss<45) is found to 0.200, which is same as the 
BBN result.
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